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Abstract 
The battle for corporate control may ultimately lead to the improvement of 
corporate governance, or the plunder of corporate wealth. The goal of hostile takeover 
regulation is to promote merit-adding takeovers while decreasing as much as possible 
the agency costs between the corporate insiders and shareholders. To achieve this goal, 
the U.S. adopted a Fiduciary Duty Centered Mode to combine the court trial on 
directors' behavior with federal formality examination on tender offers. The U.K. 
adopted a Self-Regulatory Mode where the non-governmental Takeover Panel had 
replaced the ex post adjudications with fair and swift ex ante conciliations. The E.U. 
adopted a Free Choice Mode that allowed the Member States to transpose the takeover 
law according to their needs based on an ostensibly “unified” European Directive. 
The formation of the three above regulatory frameworks had gone through special 
historical contexts, political manipulation and institutional evolution; in turn, these 
factors together shaped legal schemes with varying path dependence features with 
regional characteristics. The top-down two-tier U.S. regulatory framework has 
distinctive Board Centrism features: the fiduciary duty review system established 
through a series of legal precedents was nothing more than an intermediate standard 
between the Business Judgement Rule and the Substantive Fairness Principle. Instead of 
judicial review, it in fact produced the effect of judicial deference to the directors’ 
anti-takeover actions. In comparison, the bottom-up single-pattern U.K. regulatory 
framework was obviously shareholder supreme: institutional investors, being the major 
shareholders of the companies, remained rational apathy in corporate governance, but 
maintained convenient oversight of their managers by lobbying the industrial elites to 
make private laws that favored them. The Takeover Panel is constantly racing with 
public legislators, unifying the interests of the panel committee with the yields-first 
investors honoring traditions. The bottom-up drafted European Directive had all the 
characteristics of Shareholder Centrism, but the top-down transposition process of it had 
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VI 
given Member States the chance to adopt director primacy laws and promote 
trade-protectionism. Interestingly, the E.U.'s dilemma mirrors China's status quo in 
regulating hostile takeovers - a seemingly shareholder-oriented Company Laws failed to 
guarantee shareholders’ legitimate decisive power in takeover-related issues, which 
meant that corporate insiders could easily elbow out dissenting stockholders and utilize 
management tools for self-promotion.  
Originally, China had crafted its hostile takeover law from the U.S., the U.K. and 
the E.U. After 15 years of local practice, China had formed a unique regulatory 
framework (and path dependence) in its semi-market economy. On one hand, the target 
board has very limited ex post takeover defensive measures under the current law, they 
then introduced various ex ante anti-takeover provisions into the articles of associations 
utilizing their de facto controlling powers. The duty of care and duty of diligence in 
Chinese law are stipulated through a series of positive and negative lists; this parody of 
the U.S. fiduciary duty review system failed to provide a comprehensive and fair 
standard to review the board's ultra vires. On the other hand, facing unruly 
managements, the acquirers also have gone wild and frequently broke the bottom line of 
the Securities Law. Breaches of the tender offer procedural requirements, violations of 
information disclosure rule and other questionable behaviors are common practices in 
the stock market. Previous hostile takeover cases illustrated that, these loopholes came 
from over-complicated legislations that were vague and obscure. Almost every pending 
dispute has been solved by the China Securities Regulatory Commission’s 
administrative intervention; the intentions of the “above” have outweighed the 
substantial law to decide the outcomes of hostile takeovers.  
With this in mind, it can be seen how actual amendments to the law would be 
of little to no use in improving the hostile takeover regulations in China. That is 
why the main priority should be to discard the “CSRC centralism” dependency 
path. To find an applicable alternative path under the current regime, this research first 
draws suggestions from the established approaches of the U.S., the U.K., and the E.U.; 
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future reform in China must take the contextual and complicated local factors into 
consideration, such as the economic needs, capital market development, supply 
side reform and other imperative political appeals. Despite the fact that the E.U. 
practice was a falling victim to pork-barrel politics and interests exchange between the 
Member States, the Directive itself is an exemplary paradigm that successfully and 
accurately codified some of the advantages of the U.S. and U.K. approach. At the 
macro level, China should adopt a U.K. alike regulatory approach referring 
to the E.U.’s codification technique to gradually reform the current pro-U.S. 
regime. 
This research then reviews China’s peculiar capital market history, 
extra-ordinary political particularities and systemic inertia in law, and provided 
detailed suggestions at the micro level for future improvement taking all these 
social and institutional backgrounds into account. 
First, the supervisory power needs to be redistributed. The Chinese 
Securities Law acknowledges two self-regulatory entities in the Chinese 
securities market – the Stock Exchanges and the Securities Association of China. 
However, both of them lack the substantial punitive power to regulate as the 
CSRC maintains strict vertical control of them. The modernization of China’s 
securities market cannot be fulfilled without the development of inner-industry 
self-supervisory authorities that truly represent the interests of the participants. 
Therefore, despite the fact that the CSRC is the highest regulator in China, 
power should be delegated little by little to self-regulatory entities in order to 
achieve higher supervisory efficiency. 
Second, after approximately 20 years of growth, institutional investors in 
China are not as well-organized as their Western counterparts. Experiences from 
the U.K. demonstrates that, strengthening the scales and rights of the 
institutional investors could ultimately push China’s relatively primitive 
takeover regulatory regime into a modern one. Moreover, in order for the 
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limited self-regulation to be effective and long lasting, the motives of the 
regulators must be compatible with those of the institutional investor 
shareholders – the overall profitability of the listed companies should always be 
the prior concern.  
Third, the ultra vires of the management should be restrained especially in 
conflict-of-interests situations. The Administrative Rules on Acquisition of 
Listed Company should make it clear that without shareholder approval, the 
board of directors should not take any defensive measures. This is not to suggest 
a blanket ban on all takeover defenses, but rather, to allow the shareholders the 
ability of having the final say of adopting ex post defenses. 
Fourth, considering the severity of the insider control and no functional 
proprietor of the state-owned shares in Chinese listed companies, the agency 
costs among minority shareholders and controlling shareholders are especially 
high in China. As a result, the direct application of the Board Neutrality Rule 
proves to be inadequate. This research suggests a “modified” Board Neutrality 
Rule that stipulates when takeovers are imminent, directors should not take any 
actions that may frustrate the offer bid unless the majority of minority 
shareholders say otherwise. This would make it imperative for the shareholders’ 
assembly to establish a criteria that delineates the “minority shareholders” in the 
company bylaw.  
Fifth, the fundamental rights of shareholders stipulated in the Company 
Law should be respected in takeover activities. Shareholders’ right to vote on 
major issues, to elect and nominate directors of the board and to call on interim 
meetings should not be violated by any means. In light of this, some of the 
anti-takeover provisions in the articles of associations should be nullified; it is 
also important to ensure that the proper procedures of shareholder assembly’s 
resolution are correctly fulfilled.  
Sixth, current Chinese Mandatory Bid Rule has a trigger so low that hostile 
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takeovers can hardly happen; beyond that, partial offers instead of general offers 
are too frequently allowed in takeovers that the interests and lawful rights of the 
minority shareholders are ignored. A higher trigger, combined with a stricter 
general tender offer requirement is optimal and imminent for Chinese securities 
market. Likewise, considering the state-owned shares percentage varies from 
company to company, and almost every listed company in China has its unique 
equity distribution, a flexible trigger is very important.  
Seventh, the current threshold of the sell-out right in public acquisitions is 
too low. Drawing knowledge from the experiences of the Member States of the 
E.U., 90% is an optimal line for shareholders’ sell-out right. In addition, it is 
rational that when minority shareholders exercise the sell-out right, all majority 
shareholders (according to their shareholding ratio) are together responsible for 
the remnant shares, but the acquirer reserves a preemptive right to acquire all 
the remnant shares. Accordingly, the introduction of a Squeeze-out Right is also 
necessary in China. 
Eighth, the law should allow moderate discriminative treatments to 
acquirers of different funding sources and leverage ratio. The management 
should be allowed to have the discretionary power of adopting defensive 
measures when faced with intruders funded by high-leverage ratio capital or 
insurance funds. Additionally, the supervisory body should meticulously define 
the parameters of leverage ratio, in other words, what could be regarded as 
“high” leverage ratio. 
Ninth, increasing the speed and transparency of takeover activities could 
help to ease the uncertainties in the market. Some of the efficacy clauses in the 
U.K.’s City Code largely increase the efficiency of tender offers and takeovers, 
which are of great referential value to China as well. 
Key words: Hostile Takeover; Regulatory Framework; Path Dependence; 
Systemic Inertia; Agency Problems 
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I. Introduction 
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I. Introduction 
A. Backgrounds 
The contest for corporate control is a perpetual thread in every corporate 
governance regime. Associated with wealth transfer, ambitious investors and 
their capitals behind are challenging the existing order of modern Company 
Laws, bringing new opportunities as well as risks and conflicts to the securities 
market. Intrinsically, the regulation of hostile takeover is just like any other 
laws – it shall strike a subtle balance between efficiency and equity – and shall 
maintain the beautiful equilibrium in-between every participants. 
A series of changes recently in China awaked adventurists for corporate 
control. In 2015, the Supreme People's Court called off the 10-year ban on 
private loans between non-financial institutes2, and China Banking Regulatory 
Commission (CBRC) removed its prohibition for merchant banks to fund 
takeovers.3 Since then, P2P lending and internet insurance instruments began to 
thrive for the first time in Chinese history.4 Meanwhile, the Shanghai Securities 
Composite Index of Chinese stock market plummeted from its peak of 5178.19 
in June 12th, 2015 to under 3000 in 2016, during which most listed companies in 
China lost more than 30% of their market value.5 The stock market is still in 
distress in 2017 and 2018, with no sign of imminent recovery.6 During this 
                                                 
2 See Garnaut, Ross, et al. Private enterprise in China. ANU Press, 2014. 
3 See Jiang, Chunxia, and Shujie Yao. "The Evolution of the Banking Sector in China." Chinese 
Banking Reform. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham, 2017: 15-17. 
4 See Huang, Robin Hui. "Private enforcement of securities law in China: a ten-year retrospective and 
empirical assessment." American Journal of Comparative Law 61.4 (2013): 757-758. 
5 See CSRC, Annual Report of the CSRC (2014); CSRC, Annual Report of the CSRC (2015); CSRC, 
Annual Report of the CSRC (2016). 
6 See Carpenter, Jennifer N., Fangzhou Lu, and Robert F. Whitelaw. "The real value of China’s stock 
market." Work. Pap., Stern Sch. Bus., NY Univ. (2017). 
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process, the cumulative stock price of some ST-companies7 are approaching 
their bust-up value.8 The concentrated ownership structure in Chinese listed 
companies was once the biggest obstacles for barbarians to knock at the gate, 
however, the Share Split Reform beginning in 2005 made the non-tradable 
shares of the State tradable9 and gradually reduced the level of ownership 
concentration in Chinese listed companies, 10 which paved the way for hostile 
takeovers to emerge in a large scale. 
Indeed, the end of 2015 saw the outbreak of hostile takeovers (or, to a 
lesser extent, disputes for corporate control) in Chinese capital markets.11 The 
Baowan Disputes had drawn the whole nations’ attention12. Since then, Kingkey 
Group's bid for Shenzhen Kondarl, Shanghai Bao Yin Chuang Ying Investment 
Management Corporation's bid for Xinhua Department Store Corporation, Hu 
Brothers' bid for Tibet Tourism, Kainan and its concerted parties' bid for ST 
Xinmei, and Baoneng and its concerted parties' bid for Nanbo A Share and Gree 
                                                 
7 “ST-companies” in China are listed companies that are labelled with “Special Treatment” by the Stock 
Exchange because of bad performances over the past years.  
8 See CSRC, Annual Report of the CSRC (2017). 
9 See Sun, Jian, et al. "Principal–principal agency problems and stock price crash risk: Evidence from 
the split‐share structure reform in China." Corporate Governance:  An I nternational  Revi ew 25.3 (2017):  
186-199. 
10 For various reasons, a large portion of the State shares in Chinese Listed Companies were still 
restricted from sale even after the Share-split Reform. These shares are entering the market very slowly 
(and on a yearly basis) until they are fully released. See Liu, Chunyan, Konari Uchida, and Yufeng Yang. 
"Controlling shareholder, split-share structure reform and cash dividend payments in China." 
International Review of Economics & Finance 29 (2014): 339-342, and 345. 
11 See Shi, Zhonghua. "A Practical Legal Analysis of Defense Mechanisms in the Wake of Hostile 
Takeovers in China." PhD diss., Harvard Law School, 2016. 
12 From July to December, 2015, Baoneng and its affiliations acting in concert consecutively acquired 
Vanke-A Share from the stock market. By December 17th, 2015, Baoneng group collectively held 
approximately 24% of total shares of Vanke, exceeded the China Resources Corporation and became the 
largest shareholder. Baoneng funded its acquisition through issuing corporation bond and the 
highly-controversial Universal Life Insurance. Baoneng’s sudden attack has shocked the whole 
securities market. See The driving force behind Baoneng’s assault on Vanke, available at 
http://www.scmp.com/business/article/1990310/driving-force-behind-baonengs-assault-vanke, (last 
visited January 24th, 2017). 
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Electric Appliances Inc. subsequently entered the public consciousness13, yet 
this is just a small tip of the hostile takeover iceberg. The once rare corporate 
control battles are becoming everyday routine in China, pressuring the 
supervisory authorities to upgrade the contemporary regulatory framework.  
Acquirers in China are repeatedly challenging the bottom line of the law; 
breaches of the tender offer procedural requirements, violations of information 
disclosure rule and other misbehaviors are common practices. 14  However, 
current law and administrative rules are more problematic than thorough, not 
only did it fail to provide explicit answers in certain conflicts, some of the 
articles and clauses are contradictive with each other, which need official 
judicial interpretation urgently. All the legal vacuums are left for the China 
Security Regulatory Commission (herein after “CSRC”) to fill, yet this supreme 
regulator’s decisions are somewhat inconsistent and capricious in different cases. 
As a result, both the acquirer and the target company are faced with huge 
uncertainties in takeover activities.15 On one hand, the target management are 
constrained by various vague prohibitive clauses; they usually hesitate before 
adopting ex post anti-takeover defenses. As a result, they tend to abuse their 
management power and introduce anti-takeover provisions into their articles of 
associations. On the other hand, the bidders usually have to hide their intentions 
of hostile takeover, and they even have to break the law to circumvent the 
coercive ex ante defenses in the target companies’ articles of associations.16 As 
substantial law and stipulations cannot provide clear solutions to pacify the 
                                                 
13 There are, of course, more hostile takeovers than those listed above; but these are the ones that drew 
the most attention. See Qiong Fu. "Legal Standing of Hostile Takeover." China Legal Science 3 (2017): 
227. 
14 Id, at 226. 
15 See Chen, Juan. "Legal Transplantation Theory: A Theoretical Framework for Examining Chinese 
Takeover Law." Regulating the Takeover of Chinese Listed Companies. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg, 
2014. 19-41. 
16 Id, at 20. 
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disputes and conflicts between the acquirers and the target boards, both sides of 
takeover activities have to probe the supervisory authorities’ standing before 
taking another move. 
Such contexts leave many questions to the academia. How did the 
up-mentioned “CSRC centralism” come into being? Is actual amendment to the 
law enough to improve the Chinese hostile takeover regulatory framework? 
What are the most distinctive path dependence features in securities regulation? 
What are the missing factors and legal supports that caused the anxiety of both 
the acquirers and the target boards? Should the law be shareholder supreme, 
which respects the power of capitals and lets the acquirers freely expel the 
management board? Or, should the law be more board-oriented, which 
strengthens policy intervention and believes the management’s business 
judgment? 17 Most importantly, how can Chinese future legislation get rid of 
the previous path dependence and systemic inertia features, and build a 
level-playing field for all the participants in the hostile takeovers? Empirical 
study found that, the emergence of hostile takeovers have promoted the reform 
of the takeover regimes world widely.18 Some Chinese scholars have noted that, 
currently, only the hostile takeover regulatory framework of the U.S. and the 
U.K. are incredibly stable, while the takeover law in other countries and areas 
are in constant changes. 19 Path-dependence theory implies that the present 
regulations in the U.S., the U.K., and E.U. are somewhat entrenched and that it 
would be difficult for them to modify the present regulatory environment. China 
had transplanted the takeover laws from the above-mentioned Western countries, 
and have been repeatedly modifying its law to better adapt China’s locality over 
                                                 
17 Qiong Fu. "Legal Standing of Hostile Takeover." China Legal Science 3 (2017): 227. 
18 See Armour, John, Jack B. Jacobs, and Curtis J. Milhaupt. "The evolution of hostile takeover regimes 
in developed and emerging markets: An analytical framework." Harv. Int'l LJ 52 (2011): 219. 
19 See Hongtao Xu. "Research on the Institution of Hostile Takeover". Report of Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange,2017.  
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the past decades.20 This research first reviews the Western takeover regulatory 
frameworks as well as the transplantation process of them in China, and then 
points out China’s failure of installing an ineffective takeover regulation due to 
insufficient consideration of the path dependence nature of the Western 
regulatory approaches. 
Comparative studies on hostile takeover laws between the U.S., the U.K. 
and other countries are not rare. However, most previous studies have paid too 
much attention to the difference of the contents of the law, yet failed to analyze 
the difference of the modes and the law’s formation process. 21 Moreover, most 
scholars regard the U.S. and the U.K.’s regulatory approach as the opposite ends 
in the scale, yet they failed to realized that there is actually an intermediate 
mode in between,22 (the failure of) the E.U.’s regulatory framework is also 
quite unique in terms of regional transposition.  
To the author, in the takeover domain, the U.S. adopted a Fiduciary Duty 
Centered Mode, the U.K. adopted a Self-Regulatory Mode, the E.U. adopted a 
Free Choice Mode, and China adopted a CSRC Centralism Mode. 23 What 
really needs to explore is that, is any one of these modes mentioned above 
superior to others? Is there any mode more suitable for legal transplantation? 
How did the differences of the modes come into being, and what are the 
implications for future lawmaking? This research regards the formation of the 
different modes as a selectable process, and hereby discusses the optimal 
institutional arrangement for China in the future.   
                                                 
20 See Cabrelli, David, and Mathias Siems. "Convergence, legal origins, and transplants in comparative 
corporate law: A case-based and quantitative analysis." The American Journal of Comparative Law 63.1 
(2015): 109-154. 
21 For example, Liu, Miao. "A Comparative Study of Takeover Defences in U.K., US and Chinese Law". 
Diss. Durham University, 2016. See also Varottil, Umakanth, and Wai Yee Wan. "Hostile Takeover 
Regimes in Asia: A Comparative Approach." (2018). 
22 The detailed demonstration of this viewpoint, please refer to infra part III and infra part V. 
23 About how and why the modes are named like this, please refer to infra part III. 
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Another important focus of this study is the unique path dependence of 
each regulatory modes. Our venation of the evolution and transposition of the 
hostile takeover regimes delineates the process of laws and modes repeatedly 
entrenching themselves. Western scholars have long noticed the tendentiousness 
and inclinations of laws as time goes by.24 Hansmann and Henry had pointed 
out that, corporate control transactions had highlighted the acquirer as a new 
subject that complicated the agency problems in corporations. As a result, every 
country had developed their own paradigm independent of the common law 
rules to standardize such transactions. 25 Previous studies have noticed the 
predilection for the management board in the U.S., 26  and it has been 
acknowledged that, in the takeover domain, “[t]he decision must necessarily 
reside with those most interested and competent.” 27  Interest groups and 
political power had played vital rules in the formation of the rules, and their 
gambles and contests largely determined the substance of the law.28 Time has 
provided a new dimension to review the iteration of the hostile takeover laws 
under the path-dependence-theory angle. This research attempts to fathom the 
legislators’ tradeoffs and concerns when trying to formulate a balanced law, to 
reveal the measurable pattern of legal development in its certain historical 
backgrounds, and to suggest not only the revisions to the law but detailed 
changes to the “legal climate” of China as well.  
                                                 
24 See Priest, George L. "The common law process and the selection of efficient rules." The Journal of 
Legal Studies 6.1 (1977): 65-82. See also Holmes Jr, Oliver Wendell. The path of the law. The Floating 
Press, 2009. See Also Kelsen, Hans. General theory of law and state. Routledge, 2017. 
25 See Kraakman, Reinier, and John Armour. The anatomy of corporate law: A comparative and 
functional approach. Oxford University Press, 2017. 
26 See Armour, John, Jack B. Jacobs, and Curtis J. Milhaupt. "The evolution of hostile takeover regimes 
in developed and emerging markets: An analytical framework." Harv. Int'l LJ 52 (2011): 219. 
27 See Ventoruzzo, Marco. "Europe's Thirteenth Directive and US takeover regulation: regulatory means 
and political and economic ends." Tex. Int'l LJ41 (2006): 171. See also Lee, Joseph. "Striking a Fair 
Balance in U.K. Takeover Law: Market Interests, Power of Regulation, and Enforcement." European 
Business Law Review 28.6 (2017): 829-831. 
28 The detailed demonstration of this viewpoint, please refer to infra part III and infra part V. 
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B. Literature Review 
1. Classical Literatures 
The “Shareholder centrism” over “Board centrism” debate in corporate law 
is always an interesting topic in takeover researches.  
In the U.S., hostile takeovers became very frequent after the invention of 
the tender offers. Henry Manne first observed hostile takeovers’ positive effect 
on corporate governance. 29  With the prevalence of the Williams Act, 
information disclosure and tender offer procedures were no longer academic 
focus. Since then, power allocation between the shareholders and the directors 
of the board had brought a new round of academic debate. 30 
Based on the Henry Manne’s research, some U.S. scholars in the 1980s 
emphasized the natural conflict of interests of the management board in 
takeovers – the selfish motives to keep their position outstriped their fiduciary 
duty to maximize the interest of the company.31 As a result, the directors of the 
board would usually defense hostile takeovers at all costs. In light of this, 
scholars like Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischer argued that the shareholders, 
not the directors, should have the decision rights of anti-takeover defenses. 32 
                                                 
29 See Manne, Henry G. "Mergers and the market for corporate control." Journal of Political economy 
73.2 (1965): 110-120. 
30 Such debates were documented as early as the first and second year of the 1970s. For example, 
Conrad, Alfred F., et al. "Functions of Directors Under the Existing System." Bus. Law 27 (1971): 23. 
See also Conard, Alfred F. "A Behavioral Analysis of Directors' Liability for Negligence." Duke 
LJ (1972): 895. See also Hazen, Thomas L. "Transfers of Corporate Control and Duties of Controlling 
Shareholders. Common Law, Tender Offers, Investment Companies. And a Proposal for 
Reform." University of Pennsylvania Law Review 125.5 (1977): 1023-1067. 
31 See Herzel, Leo, John R. Schmidt, and Scott J. Davis. "Why Corporate Directors Have a Right to 
Resist Tender Offers." Chi. B. Rec. 61 (1979): 152. See Also Winter Jr, Ralph K. "State law, shareholder 
protection, and theory of the corporation." The Journal of Legal Studies 6.2 (1977): 251-292. 
32 See Frank Easterbrook, Daniel Fischer, Takeover bids, Defensive Tactics, and Shareholders’ welfare, 
36 Bus. Law. 1733 (1981). See Also Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target’s Management 
in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161 (1981) . 
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On the other hand, some scholars maintained that the directors of the board 
always have the access to more sufficient information; hence, they are in better 
position to review the merits of takeovers.33 Some empirical studies had found 
that, the defenses by the directors of the board ultimately bring more benefits to 
the company as a whole, be it the better performance of the company in the long 
run or the premiums of the shares when the company was sold.34 Representative 
works of such view point came from the famous Wall Street lawyer Martin 
Lipton, whose invention – the “poison pills” later became the most pervasive 
anti-takeover mechanisms in the U.S. 
In the landmark case Unocal Corp V. Mesa Petroleum Co. in 1985, Justice 
Moore cited very carefully from Frank Easterbrook, Daniel Fischer and Martin 
Lipton’s works in his judgement.35 Later, a slightly milder view came into 
being, which maintained that the board should be allowed to defense takeovers 
to such an extent that the shareholders could get higher prices for their 
shareholding. 36 
Studies on who shall bear the decision power in takeovers were the 
extension of “Shareholder Centrism” over “Board Centrism” debate, which until 
                                                 
33 See Firth, Michael. "Takeovers, shareholder returns, and theory of the firm." The Quarterly Journal 
of Economics 94.2 (1980): 235-260. 
34 See Martin Lipton, Takeover bids in the target’s boardroom: an update after one year, 35 Bus. Law. 
101 (1979). See also Martin Lipton & Andrew Brownstein, Takeover Responses and Directors’ 
Responsibilities: An Update, ABA National Institute on the Dynamics of Corporate Control (Dec. 8, 
1983). See Also Ronald Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case Against Defensive 
Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REV. 819, 819 (1981). 
35 In the Unocal case, Justice Moore had to cite carefully from the prominent academic works from 
“Shareholder Centrism” supporter Martin Lipton, who pointed out that hostile takeovers are merit 
adding. Meanwhile, he also made reference to the works of “Director Centrism” advocator Frank 
Easterbrook and Daniel Fischer, who argued that cash tender offers “increase everyone’s welfare” and 
challenged Martin Lipton’s economic rationale for permitting directors to defense hostile 
takeovers.Eventually, the court abandoned the Passive Board Theory and did not require shareholder 
approval before directors could take defensive measures. For the details of the court's careful 
consideration, please refer to infra part V.A. 
36 See John C. Coffee, Regulating the Market for Corporate Control: A Critical Assessment of the 
Tender Offer’s Role in Corporate Governance, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1145, 1149 (1984). 
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now there is still no definite answer. 37 As we will discuss in detail in the 
following chapters, the hostile takeover regulatory framework of the U.S. and 
the U.K. had chosen completely different sides of this debate, and the E.U.’s 
mode was somehow in between. 
2. Empirical Studies 
Another classic academic debate about hostile takeover that still hangs in doubt is: 
whether hostile takeover is really “merit adding”? 
  Martin Lipton first observed that: “[o]ver 50 percent of target companies, 
who resisted hostile takeovers, later traded at higher market prices than the 
rejected offer price, or were acquired after the tender offer was defeated by 
another company at a price higher than the offer price.” 38 Related studies 
also confirmed the positive effects of hostile takeovers on corporate 
governance. Under the threat of being taking over, management of the 
company would work more diligently to keep the share price correctly 
reflecting its value. 39  Moreover, some scholars believed that, hostile 
takeovers could add value by re-allocating resources to the people who can 
better utilize them. 40 
Meanwhile, dissenters to these views pointed out that, hostile takeovers were not 
always value creating. In order to prove their opinions, researchers displayed several 
hostile takeover cases in several U.S. States that did not bring any wealth growth 
afterwards. 41 Even those who agreed that hostile takeovers benefit the shareholders 
                                                 
37 See Grossman, Sanford J., and Oliver D. Hart. "Takeover bids, the free-rider problem, and theory of 
the corporation." The Bell Journal of Economics (1980): 42-64. 
38 Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946. Footnote 11. (Del. 1985). Martin Lipton’s research that as cited in 
this judgement was Martin Lipton, Takeover bids in the target’s boardroom: an update after one year, 35 
Bus. Law. 101 (1979). 
39 See Clark, Robert C. "Contracts, elites, and traditions in the making of corporate law." Columbia Law 
Review 89.7 (1989): 1703-1747. 
40 See Easterbrook, Frank H., and Daniel R. Fischel. The economic structure of corporate law. Harvard 
University Press, 1996: 162. 
41 See Zhiyuan Cui. "Implications of the Legal Reforms of 29 U.S. States". Economic Research. 
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also argued that, such benefits were achieved at the sacrifices of the employees and 
the debtors. 42 To some scholars, hostile takeovers may even destroy the glorious 
traditions and culture of old brand listed companies. 43 They worried that, the old 
managent might be replaced by even worse successors – people who are not familiar 
with the company inertia, or have little knowledge of the industry – which may cause 
even greater loss to the society. 44 
Recent empirical studies have added new evidences for the positive effects 
of hostile takeovers, 45 yet this is not conclusive. Economists, rather than legal 
professional argued that the overall gain of hostile takeovers are obvious. 46 The 
author of this research acknowledges the two sidedness of hostile takeovers but 
slightly prefers the general conclusion that hostile takeovers are overall merit 
adding, at least in the long run.  
3. Contemporary Researches  
The 2000s marked the ripe of hostile takeover researches. Holmstrom and 
Kaplan summarized the hostile takeover attempts in the 1980s and 1990s, and 
reflected the comprehensive aftereffects of the takeovers. 47 Following studies 
concluded the “settled pattern” in corporate control transfer. 48 Professor John 
                                                                                                                                               
4(1996):17-34.  
42 See Moerland, Pieter W. "Alternative disciplinary mechanisms in different corporate systems." 
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 26.1 (1995): 17-34. 
43 See Armour, John, and David A. Skeel Jr. "Who writes the rules for hostile takeovers, and why-the 
peculiar divergence of US and U.K. takeover regulation." Geo. LJ 95 (2006): 1739. 
44 Qiong Fu. "Legal Standing of Hostile Takeover." China Legal Science 3 (2017):228. 
45 See Cain, Matthew D., Stephen B. McKeon, and Steven Davidoff Solomon. "Do takeover laws matter? 
Evidence from five decades of hostile takeovers."Journal of Financial Economics 124.3 (2017): 
464-485. 
46 See Bessler, Wolfgang, and Colin Schneck. "Excess Takeover Premiums and Bidder Contests in 
Merger & Acquisitions: New Methods for Determining Abnormal Offer Prices." Analysis of Large and 
Complex Data. Springer International Publishing, 2016. 323-333. 
47 See Holmstrom, Bengt, and Steven N. Kaplan. Corporate Governance and Merger Activity in the US: 
Making Sense of the 1980s and 1990s. No. w8220. National bureau of economic research, 2001:121, 
126-27 
48 See Kini, Omesh, William Kracaw, and Shehzad Mian. "The nature of discipline by corporate 
I. Introduction 
11 
Armour and Professor David Skeel focused on the supply-side of the takeover 
laws, and clarified the difference of supervisory modes of the U.S. and the 
U.K. 49 Recent studies also focused on the legal evolution of takeover laws in 
the E.U. and developing countries, 50 some empirical study attempted to link the 
substance of takeover laws with the concentration level of equity structure. 51 
Inspired by abroad takeover experiences and research findings, the 
academia in China had several local findings as well. Earliest discussion on 
takeover rules and laws could trace back to 2001, when Hu and Zhao 
demonstrated that the shareholders should have the highest decision power in 
takeovers. 52 Several comparative studies emerged since 2003, and tender offer 
procedure and bid rules were the highlights. 53 Since 2005, Chinese researchers 
began discussing the boundary of anti-takeover defenses, and the duty of care 
and duty of prudence of the controlling shareholder. 54 In 2006, Professor Tang 
and Zhu analyzed deeply the European directive, and brought up the legislative 
concept of “establishing a level-playing field in China”. 55 At the same year, 
                                                                                                                                               
takeovers." The Journal of Finance 59.4 (2004): 1511-1552. 
49 See Armour, John, and David A. Skeel Jr. "Who writes the rules for hostile takeovers, and why-the 
peculiar divergence of US and U.K. takeover regulation." Geo. LJ 95 (2006): 1727. See also Armour, 
John, Jack B. Jacobs, and Curtis J. Milhaupt. "The evolution of hostile takeover regimes in developed 
and emerging markets: An analytical framework." Harv. Int'l LJ 52 (2011): 219. 
50  See Emma Armson, Evolution of Australian Takeover legislation, Monash University Law 
Review,Vol.39(2012). See also Klaus J,Hopt, Takeover Defenses in Europe: A 
Comparative ,Theoretical and Policy Analysis, Columbia Journal of European Law, 
Vol.20(2014),P249-281.  
51 See Luca Enriques, Ronald J, Gilson,Alessio M. Pacces,The Case for an Unprejudiceed Takeover 
Law(with an Application to the European Union),Harvard Business Law Review Vol.4,(2014)；  
52 See Honggao Hu, Limei Zhao. "On Decision Power of Takeove Defenses". China Legal Science 
02(2001):123-132.  
53 See Baoshu Wang. Corporate Takeovers: Law and Practice. Publication House of Social Science 
Literature, 2003.  
54 See Wenyu Wang. "Policy and Law of Undesired Takeovers". Yuedan Law. Volume 125. January 
2015: 155-175.  
55 See Xin Tang, Yunyang Zhu. "The Anti-takeover Defenses under the New European Directive". 
Tsinghua Law Review, 2006(00): 128-142. 
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Chinese famous economist Jinglian Wu pointed out that, China is undergone 
great reforms from the centralized economy to market economy; this whole 
transformation process has the features of path dependence. 56In 2009, Professor 
Fu and Chen advocated that the Board Neutrality Rule should be a significant 
part in Chinese takeover laws, and the majority shareholders should be entitled 
the right to review the merit of the takeover. The search for a suitable legislative 
path on takeovers in China began in 2013, 57 and Chinese scholars have realized 
the self-correction power of the market.58 The Baowan Dispute from the end of 
2015 triggered a new round of discussion on corporate governance in hostile 
takeovers. Professor Pen proposed that the listed companies should at least have 
some available defenses when facing takeovers, and China should design its 
takeover law after taking full consideration of the equity structure differences in 
different listed companies. 59 In 2017, Professor Fu indicated that, the key to a 
new takeover law is to provide fair and stable rules for the participants, he also 
replenished that the social responsibility of the listed companies are very crucial, 
too. 60 
The author of this research had adequately referenced the previous studies. 
Standing on the giants shoulder, this research strives to display a contextual 
analysis of the issue.  
B. Methodology 
The substance of the law and rule design are just the surface of the problem. 
The root lies in the long history of the formation of the law of the Western 
countries. Contemporary researches embody the characteristics of Posnar’s 
                                                 
56 Wu, Jinglian. Understanding and interpreting Chinese economic reform. Texere, 2005. 
57 See Qiong Fu, Lin Chen. "Evolution of the Rules of Takeovers and Anti-takeovers". Contemporary 
Law,2009(05). 
58 See Wendao Lu, Jun Fang. "Latest Updates and Regulatory Path of Corporate Control Battles of 
Chinese Listed Companies". Securities Law Forum. December 2014. Volume 13.  
59 See Bing Pen. "Meditations on Hostile Takeover Legislation". Finance, 2016(01): 119-121.  
60 See Qiong Fu. "Legal Standing of Hostile Takeover." China Legal Science 3 (2017): 226-243. 
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pragmatism61 too much, they emphasize the search for a path to deal with 
practical issues and thus focus too much on the future. This research is 
pragmatic, too, but it cherishes the past as to find the key for future.  
In light of this, the methodology of this research includes historical 
retrospect, experience reflection, comparative research, case analysis and legal 
interest evaluation. The author begins with the three original regulatory 
frameworks of the U.S., the U.K. and the E.U., using rich theoretical 
frameworks to explain the positive materials in order to reveal the overall 
perspective of the vein and skeleton of Western takeover laws. Subsequent 
chapters view the formation of the laws as an economical, political and social 
process, 62 and backtrack to the buds of the different regulatory approaches (as 
early as 1920s for the U.S., 1940s for the U.K., and 1970s for the E.U.) to 
justify the wide differences between them. In sum, in this interdisciplinary 
research, theoretical generalization works hand in hand with empirical analysis, 
and historical assessments are closely linked to reality extension.  
On the inspirations of the Western hostile takeover regulatory framework, 
the author also resorts to the traditional Dogmatism of law. In order to 
systematically interpret the laws and modes, this research scrutinizes the orders 
of worth within the Western laws and combines echoes of the historical events 
with long time market responds; the author sticks closely to the cognitivism 
standing and believes that all realistic issues have their roots and solutions.  
The path dependence theory is very useful for this research. Found by 
economists, the term path dependence was used to express technology adoption 
processes and industry evolution; the evolutionary economics thereafter 
                                                 
61 See Posner, Richard A. Overcoming law. Harvard University Press, 1995. Richard Posner argues in 
this book that legal theory and knowledge should be must become more pragmatic and empirical, and 
less conceptual and polemical. 
62 Building an immediate social consensus on the foundation of the inevitable relationship between law 
and politics is an important new solution to reality issues. See de Sousa Santos, Boaventura. "Toward a 
New Common Sense Law, Science and Politics in the Paradigmatic Transition." (1995). 
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developed a unique angle besides the neo-classical economics. This theory is 
widely used to explain how the current situation is restrained or affected by the 
previous circumstances, even though the past affairs may no longer be 
relevant. 63 Douglass North first creatively using the path dependence theory to 
interpret the evolution pattern of economical institutions.64 
The regulation of hostile takeover is a broad topic per se; it concerns the 
Company Law, the Securities Law, the Economic Law and the Financial Law. 
This research mainly focus on the Company Law and Securities Law aspect, and 
primarily concentrates on the equilibrium between the participants of hostile 
takeovers, especially the acquirers, the target boards and other related third 
parties. Despite a great length were given to explicitly expound the law of the 
U.S., the U.K., and the E.U., the key point of this research is to testify and check 
the applicability of different laws and modes in China.65 Of course, China is not 
the only countries in Asia that needs to improve its hostile takeover regulation. 
In fact, most Asian countries more or less failed to recognize the spiritual nature 
and connotation of the original hostile takeover laws when transplanting them 
from the Western countries. 66 Therefore, reviewing the conceptual system and 
clarifying the interactive mechanism within the takeover laws of the developed 
countries could also be useful to other Asian countries as well.  
 
                                                 
63 "Most generally, path dependence means that where we go next depends not only on where we are 
now, but also upon where we have been." See Liebowitz, S. and Margolis, Stephen.Encyclopedia of Law 
and Economics.ISBN 978-1-85898-984-6.2000:981. 
64 See North, Douglass C., and Barry R. Weingast. "Constitutions and commitment: the evolution of 
institutions governing public choice in seventeenth-century England." The journal of economic history 
49.4 (1989): 803-832. See Also North, Douglass C. "Economic performance through time." The 
American economic review 84.3 (1994): 359-368. 
65 In the ten chapters of this research, Chapter II to XI introduces and analyses the formation, structure, 
evolution and impact of the hostile takeover regulatory framework of the U.S., the U.K. and the E.U. On 
this basis, Chapter VII to X examined the deficiencies of current Chinese law, and come up with 
practical solutions combining the Western practice with local demands. 
66 For instance, Japan and Korea.  
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C. Purpose of Research 
1. Explicate the Three Western Original Regulatory Modes 
The battle for corporate control may ultimately lead to the improvement of 
corporate governance, or the plunder of corporate wealth - the key of hostile 
takeover regulation for the legislators is to set fair and stable rules for the 
participants. 67  During this process, the hostile takeover laws could reveal 
certain level of “predilections”: the tradeoff between empowering the board or 
the shareholders’ assembly seems unavoidable. To set order for the securities 
market, the U.S., the U.K. and the E.U. adopted three completely different 
modes and regulatory patterns.68 
Table I: Modes and Regulatory Pattern of the U.S., the U.K., and the E.U. 
 
2. Refute Traditional Explanatory Theories 
How did the divergence of the regulatory frameworks happen? The 
traditional ownership structure theory was widely adopted to explain the 
diversity of the hostile takeover regulatory framework of the U.S., the U.K. and 
                                                 
67 Qiong Fu. "Legal Standing of Hostile Takeover." China Legal Science 3 (2017): 227. 
68 For the details and citations of the three original completely different modes and regulatory patterns, 
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the E.U. 69 The logic behind this theory is as follows.  
The listed companies in the U.S. had more dispersed ownership structure 
than their counterparts did in the U.K. or the E.U. Meanwhile, the controlling 
minority structure widely existed in the listed companies of Germany, Finland 
and the Netherlands – some rich and powerful families controlled their 
companies firmly with only a small portion of shares. As a result, it was easier 
to takeover listed companies in the U.S. than companies in the U.K. or E.U. 
Therefore, the boards in the U.S. listed companies were allowed to take 
anti-takeover defensive measures, while the boards in the U.K. or E.U. were 
prohibited from warding off unfavorable takeovers. 70  
However, recent empirical studies showed that, the ownership structure in 
U.S. listed companies was not diffused as expected and dual-ownership 
structure and share pyramiding was very common in the U.S. 71 As we will 
explain in detail in this research, the situation of the listed companies was much 
more complicated. In sum, the traditional ownership structure theory was flawed, 
and was insufficient to explain the hostile takeover regulatory differences 
between the U.S., the U.K. and the E.U. 72 
3. Retrospect the Unique Legal History of the U.S, the U.K. and the E.U. 
The author believes that, the reasons behind the divergence of the modes are 
comprehensive. Path dependence theory implies that, historical factors and 
localities had set the basic tones for the hostile takeover regulatory frameworks 
                                                 
69 See Demsetz, Harold, and Kenneth Lehn. "The structure of corporate ownership: Causes and 
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long long ago, even though some of the past circumstances are now no longer 
relevant.  
The history of the U.S. hostile takeover regulations could trace back to the 
early 1920s. The failure of the Blue Sky Laws and the financial crisis of 1929 
resulted in President Roosevelt's aggressive reform and reconstruction of the 
banking and securities' industry. 73  The populist-dominated U.S. congress 
consecutively passed the Securities Act of 1933, Securities Exchange Act of 
1934, Glass-Steagall Act and the Banking Act of 1935, 74 federalizing the 
regulation of the securities market75 and establishing a tradition of separate 
management of commercial and investment banks. 76  Proxy contests first 
appeared in 1954, and battles for corporate control became pervasive with the 
invention of the tender offer. 77 Cunning corporate raiders designed coercive 
offers like the “Saturday Night Special”, pressing the stockholders rush to 
tender. 78  On account of this, the Williams Act in 1968 imposed stricter 
information disclosure and procedural requirements on the acquirers.79 Along 
with the federal legal reform at the end of 1960s, the commercial law of 
Delaware was undergone huge changes - it largely expanded the liability 
exemptions for directors, established a loose accreditation criterion for 
self-interested transactions, 80 narrowed the use of appraisal rights of dissent 
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shareholders and upheld the Business Judgement of the board of directors. 81 In 
the sequence of landmark trials of hostile takeover conflicts in the 1980s, the 
court recognized that the directors were “of a necessity” confronted with a 
conflict of interest that they may very possible lose their job if the takeover 
succeeds, because of this, the direct application of the Business Judgement Rule 
was inappropriate. In Unocal Corp V. Mesa Petroleum Co. of 1985, a scientific 
interim standard – the Unocal test – came into being. However, as the directors 
of the board were repeated players in case trials and they could utilize the 
company resources to cope with the litigations, it was extremely hard for the 
acquirers to obtain injunctions from the court on the anti-takeover defenses of 
the target company. Eventually, the ostensible mature fiduciary review system 
established in a series of cases was nothing more than an interim standard in 
between the rigorous Substantive Fairness Principle and loose Business 
Judgement Rule. In sum, the Fiduciary Duty Centered Mode of the U.S. was 
more of a judicial deference to the directors' anti-takeover actions than stringent 
judicial review.82 
The history of the U.K. hostile takeover regulations could trace back to the 
end of the Second World War, when the high inflation rate elevated the price of 
fixed assets, 83 making companies with land and real estates extraordinarily 
appealing to acute investors. Moreover, the government-imposed dividend 
restriction in the 1950s led to the hoard of cash of many companies, 84 which 
gave rise to the outburst of hostile takeovers, for example, Charles Clore's 
takeover of the Shoe Retailer J. Sears and Harold Samuel's takeover of the 
                                                 
81 See Nourse, Victoria. "Passion's progress: Modern law reform and the provocation defense." Yale LJ 
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Savoy Hotel Group.85 Interestingly, the institutional investors and commercial 
groups in the U.K. were more outraged by the management's ultra vires in 
taking defensive measures without the approval from the shareholders than the 
hostile takeover attempt per se. 86 Such discontent out-broke in the takeover 
contests between the U.K. Tube Investments, the U.S. Reynolds Metal Company, 
the Aluminum Company of America and the British Aluminum. 87 To set order 
for the increasing merger activities within the industry, the Bank of England 
formed a private legislation committee and drafted the first self-regulatory law 
on takeovers - the Notes on Amalgamation of British Businesses, under the close 
cooperation with the Issuing Houses Association, the Accepting Houses 
Committee, the British Insurance Association and London Stock Exchange. 88 
This private law evolved into its more mature version - the City Code on 
Takeovers and Mergers (hereinafter “the City Code”) of 1968, and the Panel on 
Takeovers and Mergers (hereinafter “the Takeover Panel”) was established 
based on this code. 89  The Panel had nine committee members initially, 
representing the banks, large corporations, business associations and industrial 
unions. To those commercial elites, ex ante interference was more efficient than 
ex post adjudication. The inchoate performance of the Takeover Panel was not 
as good as expected, it was overwhelmed by the steady flow of cases. Fearing 
the government and public authority might thereby interfere, the Takeover Panel 
acted swiftly to improve itself in the 1970s. 90 In addition, the Board of Trade 
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supported the Takeover Panel’s back by agreeing to inflict administrative 
punishments on undisciplined bidders and the London Stock Exchange also 
expressed their will to work along with the Takeover Panel to delist companies 
out of order. 91 Since then, the Takeover Panel's sanction and penalty power had 
been inexorably on the increase. With the whole industry as its back, the 
Takeover Panel and its City Code finally became the ultimate authority in 
takeover disputes. Despite the left-leaning labor governments in the 1970s, the 
Takeover Panel proved its irreplaceability through its impeccable performances 
and proactive self-improvements. All in all, the history of the Takeover Panel 
and the City Code was the history of a self-regulatory system racing with the 
administrative legislation. 92 In order to survive, the Takeover Panel had to 
constantly improve itself to better cater the need of the market, at the same time, 
it must keep its good reputation as legislative interventionism may resurge at 
any time.93 
The E.U. hostile takeover regulation came into being much later than the 
U.S. or U.K. The notion of “a united European takeover law” started from the 
middle of the 1970s, when the European Council discussed intensely on how to 
integrate its internal market. In a landmark document - Completing the internal 
market: white paper from the commission to the European Council of 1985, the 
European Committee mentioned the necessity of improving the tender offer 
procedure. In 1989, the European Committee drafted the Proposal for a 
Thirteenth Council Directive on Company Law Concerning Takeover and Other 
General Bids. This proposal contained basic equal treatment rule for 
shareholders and delineated the rudiment of the general duty of the acquirers as 
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well as the target management. 94 Despite the fact that it was based primarily on 
the City Code, this proposal had been severely criticized by the U.K. The 
Department of Trade and Industry feared that codifying the non-statutory 
self-regulation code might impair Takeover Panel's speed and flexibility. The 
following proposals of 1996, 2000 and 2002 by the European Council had 
several innovations. 95 For example, in order to improve the efficiency of a 
united market in Europe and to establish a “level-playing fields” among all 
Member States, Professor Jaap Winter and his drafting team invented the 
Breakthrough Rule. 96  However, these proposals ignited even more 
controversies and debates among the Member States, and “a united European 
takeover law” seem almost impossible. After continuous negotiations and 
compromises, the Italian Representative worked out the idea of “Optional 
Arrangements Rule”, 97 which gave each member state the freedom to apply or 
not apply the controversial Board Neutrality Rule and Breakthrough Rule. In 
2004, The European Directive on Takeover Bids was finally passed and came 
into effect afterwards – it “harmonized” the takeover regulation of all the E.U. 
Member States by giving up the most important essence of the notion of “a 
united European takeover law” – unification.98 
4. Display the Path Dependence Nature and Mechanism of the Three Regimes  
The history retrospect has explained the inevitability of the formation of 
three different hostile takeover regulatory modes, yet it did not fully reveal the 
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path dependence nature of the takeover regulations. How did the regulatory 
systems entrench themselves? What accounted the most for the systemic inertia 
of the three regimes? Professor John Armour and David A. Skeel Jr. found the 
differences in the U.S. and the U.K. takeover law were mainly because the 
institutional investors of the two countries had played very different roles.99 
Enlightened by their theory, this research attributes the discrepancies and 
formation of the path dependence of the hostile takeover regulatory frameworks 
of the U.S., the U.K. and the E.U. to the different roles of different interest 
groups, and the contests between them. These interest groups include: the 
institutional investors, industry associations, labor unions, large conglomerates 
and so on. 
Before the establishment of the Securities and Exchange Commission, the 
financial industry of the U.S. had undergone more than 100 years of incomplete 
self-regulation. From the Buttonwood Agreement of 1972 to the Constitution of 
the New York Stock Exchange Board of 1863, inner industry self-regulation was 
the principal constraints of the securities market, and the New York Stock 
Exchange was the most important supervisor. 100 However, the “greedy Wall 
Street” was severely blamed for the cause of the financial crisis of 1929, and the 
public (represented by furious labor unions) and the government (represented by 
the populist Congress) no longer believed that self-regulation was an optimal 
way of supervision, 101 which led to the drastic legal reforms that shifted the 
power to the SEC. The emergence of the hostile takeovers from the 1950s 
further raised the rifts and frictions among the general public and the Wall 
Street capitalists who were referred to as “corporate raiders” and “white collar 
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pirates”. 102 In 1968, Senator Williams Harrison spoke candidly that he wanted 
to ensure the management of the company to have enough “gunpowder” to fight 
back the “barbarians at the gate”. 103 The State Courts (mainly the Delaware 
Courts) had get used to defer to the requests of the directors of the board, as 
they could decide where to incorporate their companies. 104 It is not hard to see 
that, the legal climate in the U.S. was never pro-acquirers. Restrained by these 
factors and circumstances, future corporate lawmaking of the U.S. could hardly 
swift to shareholder supreme. Today’s U.S. regulatory framework is already 
well-entrenched: it is a pro-management system with no room for 
self-regulation.105 
The regulatory preference is quite opposite in the U.K. – institutional 
shareholders had influenced the legal climate of their capital market since the 
very beginning. The punitively high rates of marginal taxation applied to 
investment income for individuals after the World War II completely destroyed 
the investment enthusiasm of independent citizens. 106 The Mutual Investment 
Scheme then promoted the wild growth of institutional investors. 107 These 
stockholders of the U.K. listed companies were famous for being passive and 
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indifferent to the corporate governance:108 whenever the performance of the 
company was not satisfactory, they “vote with their feet” by dumping all their 
shareholding. Meanwhile, the institutional investors were inclined to exert their 
influences on legislations directly to ensure that the laws were at their favor,109 
but they would achieved so without the cooperation of the industrial 
associations that represent their interests. When hostile takeovers first emerged 
in the U.K., the management's ultra vires provoked the institutional investors 
and their associations; they were united together by the Bank of England to 
promulgate the first self-discipline rule of takeovers in the 1950s. During this 
process, the Institute of Directors and Association of British Chambers of 
Commerce were completely excluded from participating.110 As the institutional 
investors and their associations continued to lobby the politicians and the 
government thereafter, the doctrine of “active shareholders, passive directors” 
of the self-regulatory rules were deeply engrained. 111  At last, a 
shareholder-supremacy self-regulatory takeover law became unshakeable.112 
In the E.U., the protests and indignation of the institutional investors, large 
consortiums and labor unions ultimately led to the compromises of the European 
Directive. The formation of a “united” European Directive was not only the 
contest between the Member States, but battles between the interest groups, 
institutional investors and large conglomerates as well. 113  Although their 
influences were not easy to penetrate the Member States’ shell frame, but the 
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discontents and objections inevitably would influence the transposition process 
of the final European Directive, causing even larger divergences under a 
“uniformed” European Directive.114 Prominent cases were the Volkswagen’s 
protests of the Board Neutrality Rule and the Wallenberg Family’s severe Condemn of 
the Breakthrough Rule, which more or less contributed to the introduction of the 
Optional Arrangements Rule and the Reciprocity Exception Rule as a compromise from 
the legislation side. In sum, the European Council had immersed into a web of cyclic 
dependencies – whenever it wants to move one step ahead, it ended up in two steps back 
– the endless contests among the Member States and the uncoordinated interests 
between the conglomerates had largely constrained its legal progress within.  
5. Compare the Three Original Regulations and Seek Implications 
The path dependence nature of the hostile takeover regulatory frameworks 
is a double-edged sword: on one hand, it may restrict future legal reforms; on 
the other hand, it could awake the “internal vigor” and turned the institutional 
inertia into endogenous force of growth. Having strong confidence in their court 
system, the U.S. takeover regulation relied heavily on ex post judicial review. 
Indeed, the U.S. courts, especially the Delaware court, is quite capable. Such 
special infrastructure may not be present in other jurisdictions. The U.K., on the 
contrary, gave the Takeover Panel an unprecedented opportunity of 
self-regulation, and precluded courts participants in takeover issues. Both the 
systems are regarded as the most efficient and refined regulatory frameworks for 
hostile takeovers. 
One very important reflection from the U.S. regulatory framework is that, 
the judicial-review system would very likely lead to potential structural 
prejudice that favors the interest of the board; as the judges could only review 
the cases that are put in front of them, the repeated players in trials - the 
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directors are more likely to win. 115 Previous trial practices in the U.K. also 
displayed the tendency of the judges becoming tolerant of the directors' 
trenching behaviors. 116 Another insight from the U.S. approach is that, the 
shareholder activism of institutional investors could improve the overall 
corporate governance in U.S. listed companies, but it is almost impossible for 
them to bring huge changes to the currently hostile takeover regulatory 
framework. 117  
Comparing with the U.S. and the E.U. model, the self-regulatory 
framework of the U.K is more efficient in terms of cost and time, offering more 
certainty to the capital market. 118 Both the acquirer and the target board do not 
have to afford far-flung litigation costs and expensive legal service fees as the 
Takeover Panel tackles with takeover disputes with no delay. Moreover, the 
Takeover Panel could proactively amends the City Code to tackle the needs of 
the market, but the judges in Delaware and legislators in the E.U. are relatively 
passive and lagging in upgrading the law. 119 However, the formation of a 
self-regulatory framework required the institutional investors, bankers and 
industrial associations to work in concert – and an important prerequisite for 
them to achieve this is the geographical proximity they had in London. 
Moreover, in order for the self-regulatory model to be effective and long lasting, 
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the motives of the regulator must be compatible with those of the stockholders – 
to increase the overall profitability of the company. 120 Indeed, institutional 
investors in the U.K. have various motives, but the overall profitability of the 
company was always their mutual concern, as they had to be responsible for the 
investors who invest their money in the institutions. In light of this, the failure 
of the self-regulation in the U.S. was also due to the inconformity of the 
participants' motives. For example, the brokers and traders had very different 
self-interest motives; they might froze any deals that would delist the target 
company, 121 even if the deal were beneficial to both the offeror and the 
offeree. 122 
The European Directive only had little impact in shaping a “united 
European takeover law”. The Board Neutrality obligation could be waived in 
reciprocity situations, and extremely few companies had adopted the 
Breakthrough Rule. The Optional Arrangements Rule let some directors of the 
board, who had accustomed to stay neutral, now asked for larger discretionary 
power in takeover defenses. 123  The Mandatory Bid Rule provided the 
shareholders with a fair opportunity to exit the company with share premium, 
however, many of the Member States set the trigger too high to be effective.124 
Future lawmaking in China must draw lessons from the E.U.'s practice,125 and 
should try to avoid the internal contradictions of the legal clauses.  
Moreover, the European Directive, though designed based on the U.K. City 
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Code, yielded the legal effect similar to the U.S. in the transposition process 
from the E.U. level to its Member States. In a cognitive aspect, the unpleasant 
transition process of the European Directive mirrors the failure of many Asian 
countries transplanting their takeover law from abroad, notably, China. So much 
so, the European Directive itself offered a paradigm of codifying together the 
merits of the U.K. City Code as well as the pioneer practice of the Delaware 
court, which could be regarded as an excellent template for other Asian 
countries. In other words, the transposition of the European Directive might be a 
completely failure, but the European Directive was merely a falling victim to 
pork-barrel politics. Its articles and clauses were so carefully and articulately 
trimmed that if all of its core rules were completely mandatory for the Member 
States, it could fulfill its original goal to construct an integrated market with a 
level-playing field within the E.U., and at the same time promote prosperity of 
the market for corporate control. Most importantly, the European Directive have 
given thorough consideration and protections to the shareholders, especially the 
minority shareholders, setting an exemplary example for countries whose 
agency costs between the corporate insiders and minority shareholders are 
high.126 
6. Review China’s Regulatory Framework from Legal Aspects 
Some scholars believed that, the Chinese takeover laws were mainly 
transplanted from the U.K. 127  The Audit Committee of Mergers and 
Acquisitions under the CSRC was regarded as the counterpart of the Takeover 
Panel in the U.K., and the Administrative Rules on Acquisition was the Chinese 
version of the City Code. However, the ACMA is obviously not a 
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self-regulatory entity; it had virtually no authority at all in takeover disputes. On 
the other hand, the Chinese hostile takeover regulatory framework bears 
resemblance to the U.S. model as well. The CSRC has the ultimate authority 
oversighting the securities market; it functions in a similar way just like the SEC. 
However, Chinese courts also deal with the takeover issues that the CSRC’s 
administrative supervision alone could not reach. In sum, the Chinese regulatory 
framework took an administrative supervisory approach that depends heavily on 
public law intervention with very limited self-regulation. 
In terms of legal clauses and provisions, China has transplanted the 
takeover law from the U.K., U.S and the E.U.  
First, in parallel with the City Code and the Companies Act of the U.K, the 
Chinese Company Law is ostensibly “shareholder centered” – the general 
assembly seems to be the highest authority in corporate issues, and the board of 
directors are responsible for carrying out the general assembly’s resolutions. 128 
In theory, as all defensive measures, no matter ex ante or ex post, more or less 
concern corporate issues which need the majority approval from the 
shareholders – hence it is the general assembly, not the board of directors has 
the conclusive power of the defensive measures.  
Second, just like the takeover laws of the U.K. and E.U., the Chinese 
Company Law directly banned certain takeover defenses such as poison pills, 
dual ownership structure129 and so on. Equal treatment of shareholders has 
become a basic principle in Chinese Law. 130 In addition, the Securities Law had 
rigorous merit-review requirements131 for the target board to issue shares and 
bonds, making share repurchase schemes 132 , share issuance schemes and 
                                                 
128 2014 Company Law, Article 98.  
129 Id, at Article 126.  
130 Id, at Article 103. 
131 2014 Securities Law, Article 13. 
132 2014 Company Law, Article 142.  
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convertible securities issuance plans 133  impossible to defend hostile 
takeovers. 134  
Third, in tender offer regulation and investors’ protection, the Chinese 
Securities Law has learnt a lot from the Securities Exchange Act of the U.S.; 
insider trading, market manipulation, false statement and fraud behavior were 
strictly prohibited. Chinese Securities Law and the Administrative Rules on 
Acquisition also have similar information disclosure and tender offer procedural 
requirements with the William’s Act. 135  Disgorgement Statute and share 
transfer restrictions for corporate insiders could also be found in the Securities 
Law. 136  
Fourth, Chinese law put considerable attention on the board’s fiduciary 
duty in takeovers. The Administrative Rules on Acquisition requires the 
directors to “assume the duty of loyalty and duty of care” in takeovers. 137 The 
Chinese Company Law explained what “duty of loyalty” is through a series of 
prohibitive stipulations. 138  The Guidelines on Articles of Association has 
suggested the meaning of the “duty of care”. 139 
Fifth, the Chinese Securities Law borrowed the Mandatory Bid Rule from 
the City Code and the European Directive, mandating acquirers reaching 30% 
shareholding of the target company to send out tender offers, either partial or 
full, to all shareholders of the target company. 140 Likewise to most of the 
Member States within the E.U., the Securities Law also left abundant room for 
the exemption of tender offer. 141   
                                                 
133 2014 Securities Law, Article 16. 
134 2014 Securities Law, Article 22 and Article 24.  
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Sixth, the Administrative Rules on Acquisition borrowed the Board 
Neutrality Rule from the U.K. and the E.U., but modified into a less rigorous 
one.142 This is the same case with the Selling-out Right143 from the European 
Directive.  
7. Illustrate China’s “CSRC centralism” Path Dependence from Past Cases  
China’s seemingly comprehensive, conclusive law is more problematic 
than thorough, not only did it fail to provide explicit answers in certain conflicts; 
it also exacerbated the internal contradictions of the provisions. As the target 
board had very limited ex post takeover defensive measures under the current law, they 
then take advantages of their de facto controlling powers to introduce self-trenching ex 
ante anti-takeover provisions into the articles of associations. Official data indicates 
that, in 2016 alone, more than 600 A share companies revised their corporate 
charters to adopt ATPs. Until June 2017, more than 620 Chinese A share 
companies adopted ATPs. 144  In this research, the author teased out nine 
different types of anti-takeover provisions from 850 randomly chosen A-share 
Company Articles. 145 
On the other hand, facing target board ignoring the duty of care and duty of 
diligence in Chinese law, the acquirers also went wild and frequently broke the bottom 
line of the Securities Law. Breaches of the tender offer procedural requirements, 
violations of information disclosure rule and other questionable behaviors are common 
practices. 146When acquirers and the target boards were nearly a draw, the China 
Securities Regulatory Commission usually engaged and “hosted” the tiebreaker. 
Previous hostile takeover cases illustrated that, almost every pending dispute was solved 
                                                 
142 Administrative Rules on Acquisition, Article 33. 
143 2014 Securities Law, Article 51. 
144 Jicong Wen. "Over 620 Listed Companies Adopted Anti-takeover Provisions". Economic Daily. 
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by the CSRC’s administrative intervention - the intentions of the “above” replaced the 
contradictive clauses and become the only decisive factors in hostile takeovers. 147 
Baoan's hostile takeover of Yanzhong Industry in 1993 is the first hostile 
takeover in China. When Baoan was publicly criticized because of its illegal 
share purchasing without notifying the target company, the CSRC connived 
Baoan's takeover and simply inflicted a fine of 900,000 RMB. 148 In the 
following cases of Dagang Oilfield taking over Shanghai ACE, when the two 
parties were in stalemate because the law could not decide the legality of the 
anti-takeover provisions in the ACE's bylaw, the CSRC coordinated the merger 
between the two (yet it still did not explain whether the ATPs were legal or 
not).149 The hostile takeover between Shanghai Xinlv and Jindi lasted for more 
than 4 years; it was settled only after the CSRC's administrative intervention. 150 
In the nationally famous Baowan Dispute, the Baoneng Group had almost 
guaranteed its success but met its Waterloo after CSRC's president publicly 
opposed leveraged buyout. 151  
Maybe, a privileged and unchallenged supervisory body in China could, to 
some extent, function equivalently just like the Takeover Panel in the U.K., but 
the CSRC’s legal standing is very obscure and constantly changing, which 
caused the uncertainty in the capital market. The status quo of Chinese 
regulation does not answer clearly that whether the law should give primacy to 
shareholders protection, or respect the directors’ business judgements? 
                                                 
147 For the details of the previous hostile takeover cases in China, please refer to infra part VIII.B. 
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Moreover, this top-down “CSRC centralism” had created bigger path 
dependence issues for the participants of takeovers in China – they no longer 
care about what and how the law stipulates, but spend every resources to show 
the impression of weakness in takeovers to the CSRC.  
8. Reveal the Social and Political Aspects for Future Legal Reform  
Apparently, merely amending the articles and clauses of the law is of very 
limited use in improving the Chinese hostile takeover regulatory framework; the most 
important thing is to get rid of the “CSRC centralism” path dependence. Drawing 
experiences from the U.S., the U.K., and the E.U., future legal reform in China must 
take its contextual and complicated local factors into consideration. There are 
several facets critical to future lawmaking.   
First, the institutional investors are weak in China. The Chinese 
institutional investors had undergone several phases. The embryonic stage began 
from 1990 and ended in 1998, when securities companies were almost the only 
player in the securities market. The growth period began from 1999 and ended 
in 2008, during which the government allowed state-owned and state-controlled 
listed companies to enter the stock market. 152 Since December 2002, the State 
Council began carrying out the scheme of Qualified Foreign Institutional 
Investors, and foreign capitals poured into China since 2004. From October 
2004, insurance funds were allowed to enter the stock market. After 2008, 
mainstream institutional investors in the capital market are securities companies, 
different types of funds, large enterprises, financial companies, commercial 
banks and Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors. However, comparing to the 
institutional investors in the Western countries, Chinese institutional investors 
are not mature enough to bring substantial changes to the takeover laws.153 
Psychologies of herd instinct and great fool exert strong influence on the 
                                                 
152  See Li, Wei, Ghon Rhee, and Steven Shuye Wang. "Differences in herding: individual vs. 
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institutional investors' decisions, which give rise to myopic behaviors that 
corrode the market. First, individual investors still account for the majority in 
the stock market, and they are too dispersed to become investment communities. 
Second, current established institutional investors are not strong enough to form 
political associations that have the power to lobby the legislators. Third, the 
market infrastructure and legal supports for institutional investors are grossly 
inadequate. 
Second, self-regulation in China is still in the nascent period. Chinese 
Securities Law acknowledged two self-regulatory entities of the Chinese 
securities market – the Stock Exchanges and the Securities Association of 
China. 154However, in practice, neither the Stock Exchange nor the Securities 
Association in China has substantial self-regulatory power and the supervisory 
effects were virtually none. 155  Historically, these two self-regulatory 
institutions were not established by the traders, investors or participants in the 
securities market; instead, they were established and developed by the 
government in the first place. Current law allows the CSRC to designate up to 
half of their council members, including their general managers. Under the 
vertical control of the CSRC, neither of them could truly represent the 
well-being and interests of its members, but the will from above. Moreover, the 
reputational punishment mechanism is not established yet in Chinese capital 
market, there is still a long way to go for the self-regulation to be really 
effective.156 
In addition, it has been 15 years since the first hostile takeover attempt in 
China. From indiscriminately imitating the law from the Western countries to 
                                                 
154 2014 Securities Law, Article 8, 102, 174.  
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drafting the Administrative Rules on Acquisition with regard to the local 
conditions, this 15-year marked the spiral progress of the Chinese securities 
market. Despite several amendments and revisions, the Chinese hostile takeover 
regulatory framework is still insufficient in terms of legislative technique and 
dispute resolution. These defects might be temporarily masked in 
government-leading legal reforms, as the CSRC and the State Council have 
extreme controlling power over the capital market. However, with the 
intensification of the hostile takeovers and the prosperity of the market of 
corporate control, these defects would eventually manifest and even cause 
disastrous consequences. As we have mentioned above, merely literal 
adjustment of the law could no longer improve the hostile takeover regulation 
anymore – China is in desperate need of changing its legal climate and 
constructing necessary legal infrastructure for future law making. 
9. Chose the Optimal Path for Future Legal Reform 
Path dependence theory also implies that, consistency is the foremost merit 
in hostile takeover regulation. A good hostile takeover regulation should be 
consistent and bring certainty to the capital market. Over the time, the 
participants could adjust their behaviors according to the established preference 
of the law.157 
The complete Self-Regulatory Mode of the U.K. had its uniqueness 
beginning (an infancy environment that China could never have) and special 
developing trajectory. On the other hand, the U.S. trial-based Mode is also very 
hard to imitate. Above all, clarifying fiduciary duty is never easy. Instead of 
writing down simple principles of fiduciary duty one by one, the Delaware court 
employed a two-part reasonableness-based tests, to determine whether it is 
legitimate for the board to take defensive measures. Moreover, the Delaware 
judges had accumulated decades of experiences to seize the nature and boundary 
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of directors' fiduciary duty;158 China simply lacks the infrastructure of applying 
a trial-dominant mode. The European Directive offered a paradigm of codifying 
together the merits of the U.K. City Code as well as the pioneer practice of the 
Delaware court, but several of its cores rules should be further amended to suit 
the needs for China.  
To choose the optimal path for future lawmaking, there are several local 
and contemporaneous factors that matter, too, for example, the must to improve 
large companies’ corporate governance, 159 the aftershock of the share split 
reform, the practical need to normalize the insurance funds and debt equity and 
the call of a nation-wide supply-side reform.  
The remarkably rapid economic growth based on the “demographic 
dividend” had come to an end after 2015. In order to achieve sustainable growth, 
the whole industries are in desperate need of takeovers and reorganizations to 
better utilize the social resources. Therefore, a legal framework which facilitates 
takeovers is more optimal for China. China should adopt a U.K. alike regulatory 
approach referring to the E.U.’s codification technique.160 
10. Propose Detailed Suggestions for Future Lawmaking in China 
The reform of law is always a painful process. Chinese takeover regime 
could only step by step evolve into an investor-friendly hostile takeover 
regulatory framework. In the conclusion part,161 the author has given several 
detailed suggestions for future legal reforms, including enhancing the limited 
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self-regulation of the Stock Exchange and Securities Association, strengthening 
the scales and rights of the institutional investors, entitling shareholders to the 
decision power in adopting takeover defenses, empowering minority 
shareholders to participate more in corporate major issues, revising several rules 
and articles borrowed from the western countries and so on. 
  
D. Proceedings of Research 
Rather than conforming or refuting current academic views on hostile 
takeover lawmaking in China, this article seeks to understand the factors and 
reasons behind the legislation process: how local factors and history background 
matter in the formation of regulatory frameworks? Our analysis has explored the 
origins and development course of the divergence between the U.S., the U.K. 
and the E.U., and seeks the implications for policymakers in China. We suggest 
the path dependence nature and systemic inertia features behind the 
existing paradigms are of greater importance to future supply side of the 
hostile takeover law. In addition, by revealing the imperative role of legislative 
motivations, this research contributes to an emerging body of comparative 
corporate law scholarship that suggests the diversification of corporate 
governance – rather than convergence of it162 – was the trend even within the 
small scope of Asia.  
The balance of this research proceeds as follows. 
In the ten chapters of this research, Chapter II to XI introduces and 
analyses the formation, structure, evolution and impact of the hostile takeover 
regulatory framework of the U.S., the U.K. and the E.U. On this basis, Chapter 
VII to X examined the deficiencies of current Chinese law, and come up with 
                                                 
162 Scholars have noticed the convergence of corporate governance because of globalization and other 
reasons. See La Porta, Rafael, et al. Investor protection and corporate governance. Journal of financial 
economics 58.1 (2000): 3-27. See also Gilson, Ronald J. Globalizing corporate governance: 
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practical solutions combining the Western practice with local status quo.  
Chapter I introduces the research value and backgrounds of the topic. The 
literature review stretches from the “Shareholder Centrism” over “Board 
Centrism” debate, and reveals the ladder of associated research from the 1960s 
to now. 
Chapter II begins with the basic theories of hostile takeovers. Hostile 
takeover is sometimes good and sometimes bad – this two-sided nature 
determines that, the goal of takeover regulation should be to facilitate 
value-adding takeovers while mitigating the agency costs between the corporate 
insiders and the shareholders. Consistency is the foremost merit in hostile 
takeover regulation. 
Chapter III introduced in details the widely divergent hostile takeover 
regulatory framework of the U.S., the U.K. and the E.U. The U.S. framework is 
divided into two pillars – the federal pillar and the State pillar, and there are 
three main resources of takeover law – federal Status, judicial decisions from 
the Delaware Court of Chancery, and the State Statutes. In the U.K., the City 
Code on Takeovers and Mergers governs all the takeover activities. It is drafted, 
revised and carried out by the Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, which consists 
of part-time and full-time professionals from different industries, 
representatives of commercial institutions and specialists on secondment from 
Banks and Industry Associations. The E.U. regulation is divided into two pillars, 
too: the European Community as the policy-maker and the Member States’ 
authorities as the policy-operator. The European Community first took each 
Member States’ concerns into consideration, and then brought up the official 
blueprint – the European Directive, for the Member States to implement 
according to its general policies. 
Chapter IV intended to seek answers and insights of the divergences of the 
modes from the historical formation of the laws. The development history of the 
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U.S. mode is the history of the federal government drawing the rein of the 
reckless Wall Street. In this history, the supervision of the Securities market 
were federalized by the populist government, and the directors fiduciary duty 
was broadened with the development of the general Corporate Law. The 
development history of the U.K. mode is the history of self-regulation racing 
with the governmental intervention. Despite the left-leaning Labor Governments 
being the threat, the Takeover Panel proved its irreplaceability through its impeccable 
performances and proactive self-improvements. The development history of the E.U. 
mode is the history of a scientifically drafted law step by step falling into the 
victim of pork-barrel politics and exchange of interests. In order for the 
Directive to be acknowledged by every member state, the European Council had 
to introduce the Optional Arrangements Rule, which largely undermined the 
original legislation purpose of the Directive. In conclusion, the formation 
process of the takeover regulatory framework in the U.S., the U.K. and the E.U.  
revealed certain degree of path dependences and endogenous institutional 
inertias of their own. 
After familiarizing with the formation process and the history of the 
different hostile takeover regulatory frameworks, in Chapter V, the author 
referred to the theory of Professor John Armour and David A. Skeel Jr., and 
demonstrated that the different roles of different interest groups, and the 
contests between them mainly accounted for the nuance and path dependence 
nature of the different regulatory frameworks. The formation of a director 
supreme law in the U.S. was because the Wall Street was always regarded as the 
initiator of evil of market turbulences and financial crisis. As a result, they were 
constantly constrained by the federal government. The labor union, on the other 
hand, unanimously supported the federal oversight and governmental reform of 
the financial system as always. In the formation of a shareholder supreme law of 
the U.K., the institutional investors were the most important interest group that 
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favored and promoted the self-regulation system. The industrial associations had 
given the Takeover Panel and the City Code unanimous and almost 
unconditional support and corporation, establishing the autonomous supervision 
as the main regulatory approach in the U.K. In the formation of a swing takeover 
law of the E.U, the Member States were arm wrestling with each other, and 
contests were frequent between the interest groups, institutional investors and 
large conglomerates of different Member States as well. Although their 
influences were not easy to penetrate the Member States’ shell frame, but the 
discontents and objections would inevitably influence the transposition process 
of the final European Directive, causing even larger divergences under a 
“uniformed” European Directive. 
Chapter XI compares in depth several aspects of the three hostile takeover 
regulatory frameworks and expounds on four vital questions. First, what are the 
pros and cons of every mode? Is self-supervisory paradigm certainly better than 
other modes? Second, what is the legal inclination of each mode? What are the 
consequences of such inclination? Third, how would the current regulatory 
frameworks progress forward? Would shareholder activism, expansion of 
institutional investors and Brexit influence the developing trajectory of the 
existing norms? Fourth, what are the deficiencies and problems of the European 
Directive codifying the U.K. and U.K. practice? How do the core rules of the 
European Directive affect each other?  
From Chapter VII and on, the author begins the discussion of Chinese 
takeover regulatory framework and law. The CSRC and court both participate in 
takeover dispute resolutions, and several laws and guidelines together deal with 
different aspects of hostile takeovers, including (but not limited to) the 
Company Law, the Securities Law, the Administrative Rules on Acquisition and 
the Guidelines on Articles of Association.  
Chapter VIII clarifies the dilemmas in Chinese hostile takeover regulation. 
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The author concludes nine different types of ex ante takeover defenses in 
Chinese listed companies’ corporate charters, and points out the CSRC’s over 
intervention in hostile takeovers from several typical cases in China, including 
the Baowan Dispute. “CSRC centralism” path dependence has created severe 
problems in the capital market.  
Chapter IX particularly reflects China’s regulatory practice from the social 
and political aspects through the comparative study of Western countries. In 
comparison, Chinese capital market is quite young, and the institutional 
investors are not well established yet. The finite self-regulation of the Stock 
Exchange and the Securities Association is still in the embryonic stage, too. 
Apparently, future regulatory pattern can only step by step break away from the 
“CSRC centralism” dependence, to achieve so it needs better legal 
infrastructures, too.  
Chapter X settles down the applicable alternative path for hostile takeover 
regulation in the future proposes several advices to achieve this goal. Future 
Chinese lawmaking should model on the U.K. mode, but refer to the E.U’s 
codifying technique to gradually reform the current U.S. alike regime.  
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II. Basic Theories of Hostile Takeover  
The battle for corporate control may ultimately lead to the improvement of 
corporate governance, or the plunder of corporate wealth – this two-sided nature of 
takeover is the foundation to discuss future lawmaking. 
A. Positive Effect of Hostile Takeover 
Hostile takeovers and the law that promotes them are beneficial to the 
shareholders as well as the company in three aspects. First, the shift of corporate 
control re-allocates the company resources into the hands of people who can better 
utilize them; in this way, inefficient managements are replaced by superior ones. 
Second, when takeover succeeds, the power of the acquirer and the target company 
“combine” together to create the synergy effect163. Third, hostile takeovers largely 
decrease the information inefficiency of the market by rectifying the share prices of 
the undervalued enterprises. 164 
In the first place, takeovers usually happen when the management of the target 
company cannot fully utilize the resource of the company, or, to a lesser extent, when 
the acquirers think they can utilize the company’s resources better for profits in long 
or short terms. In other words, acquirers could be more economically effective than 
the incumbent management of the target company, which is good for the shareholders, 
as they could get more share dividends or higher equity premium afterwards. The 
potential threat from the acquirers may help to discipline misbehaving managements 
as well. Because of such potential threat exists, corporate governance also improves.  
In the second place, the synergy effect because of the merger is a huge bonus for 
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the company stockholders. Economies of scale165 or economies of scope166 could 
boost the company value larger than the previous two combined. Moreover, after the 
takeover, the management cost of the two companies could be effectively reduced as 
well. The saved expenditures directly become profits for the shareholders in the same 
fiscal year. 
In the third place, hostile takeovers could promote the information efficiency of 
the market. If the stock value of a company is under its market value, astute acquirers 
and investors would take full advantage of this opportunity, until the void of the price 
difference is fulfilled. The launch of a hostile takeover would put the underappreciated 
company into the public focus, and soon the market would realize the true value of the 
company; no wonder some scholars even regard hostile takeover as the best cure for 
“market myopia”.167 
B. Negative Effect of Hostile Takeover 
In theory, in a fully competitive market, as far as it could increase company value, 
hostile takeover would happen. While hostile takeover has several up-mentioned 
merits for shareholders and the target company, it brings risks and uncertainties as 
well – the outbreak of agency problems being the most distinctive one.168 
The agency cost between shareholders and the management would manifest in 
hostile takeover situations, as the future of the target company is in a “pending” status. 
For instance, investor A is an acute investor, and he finds that company B’s market 
value is under its real value. Investor A attributes this fact to B’s incompetent 
                                                 
165 In microeconomics, economies of scale are the cost advantages that enterprises obtain due to their 
scale of operation (typically measured by amount of output produced), with cost per unit of output 
decreasing with increasing scale. In short, economies of scale refer to reduced costs per unit that arise 
from increased total output of a product. 
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105.430 (1995): 678-689. 
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management and intends to replace B in order to fully realize B’s potential value. 
Investor A then launches a hostile takeover. In order to secure control, A has to bulk 
buy B’s shares through public tender offer with a price higher than the market price, 
which is a good thing for B’s shareholders, especially the minority shareholders. They 
would like to sell their shares to A as this is an optimal opportunity for them to exit. 
For long term stable stockholders of B, they could benefit, too, as the incumbent 
management is very likely be be replaced by a superior one. Although all seems 
preferable for B’s shareholders and the company, B’s management board definitely 
thinks otherwise. For them, once the takeover succeeds, they would very possibly lose 
their position, thus their optimal strategy is to defense the takeover attempt by all 
means – interests of the company or the shareholders are now not their primary 
concern in hostile takeovers – and agency problems become worse. 
In addition, the agency cost may also exist between the majority shareholders 
and the minority shareholders. Let us continue with the example of A and B. The 
majority shareholder (or controlling shareholder) of company B may approach A to 
promote the sale of his own shares. If the majority shareholder’s shareholding is huge 
enough, B could save the trouble and inconvenience of acquiring company B’s share 
thorough public tender offer. Under this circumstance, the majority shareholder of 
company B deprives other minority shareholders of the right to sell their shares at a 
premium.  
In practice, shareholders may become victims of hostile takeovers for other 
reasons. In order to save money, the acquirer has the motives to construct a two-tier 
tender offer to pressure the shareholders to make a quick decision. This kind of tender 
offer is usually carried out in a “first come, first serve” basis, and acquirers use 
inferior securities (usually trash bond) instead of cash as the payment to latecomers. In 
recent years, such coercive tender offers are almost banned world widely, as most 
Company Laws intake “equal treatment of shareholders” as their principle rule.169 
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Moreover, the shareholders’ good days may never come even the old management 
were to be replaced by a new one. Once the acquirer A secured control of the target 
company B and replaced B’s management, A could realize instant gain by dismantling 
B for sale, which happened very frequently in the U.S. takeover boom of the 1980s. In 
a more common scenario, the former management’s successor might be even more 
incompetent, or greedier than the previous one – leading the company to doom.  
From this aspect, acquirers are not always the angels for shareholders. Some of 
them are originally experienced corporate raiders who seek disproportionate gains by 
selling the company’s asset piece by piece; some are notorious greenmailers, who intend 
to blackmail the management to buy back their company shares at a sky-high price later. 
In conclusion, hostile takeover brings certain merits to the shareholders and the target 
company, but it also intensifies the agency cost between the corporate insiders and the 
minority shareholders, and could thereby bring new risks to the shareholders as well. 
 
C. Classification of Takeover Defenses 
Based on the time when takeover defenses were used, they could be broadly 
divided into two types - ex ante defenses and ex post defenses.170 
Ex ante defenses are defensive measures that have already in place before 
the takeover bids, normally it appears as anti-takeover articles in corporate 
charter. Ex post defenses are defensive measures taken by management of the 
target company after the emergence of the takeover bid, and it has many 
different types. In sum, while ex ante defenses are proactive and precautionary; 
ex post defenses are usually passive and targeted. 171 
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D. Regulation of Hostile Takeover Regulation: A New Standard  
Before moving to the discussion of future takeover lawmaking, a very common 
question for researchers might be: is there a universally accepted standard to review 
hostile takeover regulations? The answer is no. In fact, if such standard does exist, the 
hostile takeover regulation of every country would be very similar – the convergence 
of hostile takeover regulation would be just like the convergence of the company 
laws. 
In the past decades, corporate scholars have observed the convergence of 
company law in Anglo-American countries. The general idea is that, legal 
competitions and federalism would drive every Anglo-American country to adopt a 
single, uniform and most effective company law. 172  Indeed, integration and 
cross-reference of company laws did happen between the most preeminent 
Anglo-American countries in the past. 173As most Asian countries, more or less, 
transplant their company law and securities law from the developed countries, some 
scholar even brought up the notion of “a global convergence of corporate 
governance”.174 
However, the hostile takeover regulation did not converge even a little bit, despite 
it being an extremely significant part of company laws. The U.S., the U.K., and the E.U. 
had adopted entirely different regulatory framework, and such difference is becoming 
even more distinctive in recent years.  
In the U.S., the management has larger discretion in adopting anti-takeover 
measures so far as such measures do not violate their fiduciary duty. State court and 
local legislators inclined to respect and protect the board’s business judgement, and such 
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inclination does not change even in conflicts of interests’ situations. The U.K. stands on 
the exactly opposite site to the U.S. as the shareholders have substantial and ultimate 
authority over corporate major issues. Unless specifically authorized by the general 
assembly, the board cannot take any measures that may frustrate the tender offer. The 
Member States of the E.U. has different appeals in hostile takeovers. For instance, 
German legislators regard board’s discretion as the foundation of modern enterprises; 175 
French legislators valued employee protection more than anything else.176 
Despite their obvious differences, one particular similarity they share is that, every 
hostile takeover regulation has their own “predilection”; the tradeoff between 
empowering the board or the shareholders’ assembly is unavoidable. In the previous 
section we discussed the two-sided nature of hostile takeover, one could very easily 
draw conclusion that “[t]he goal of takeover regulation should be to facilitate the types 
of takeovers that increase shareholder value while preventing management and 
controlling shareholders from acting against the interests of shareholders as a 
whole. ”177 However, such notion ignores the limitations of the law itself; an ideal 
hostile takeover regulation simply does not exist. If the maximization of shareholders’ 
interests is the regulators’ first concern, then the board’s power must be constrained; if 
the regulators care more about the board’s business judgement and industry stabilization, 
the shareholders’ certain rights cannot be fully satisfied. In a similar vein, 
over-emphasis on employee protection may more or less infringe the creditors’ interests, 
and vice versa.  
A swing hostile takeover regulation could give rise to terrible consequences. 
Taking Japan as an example. Japan's Company Law is apparently “shareholder 
centered”, but in hostile takeover disputes, the court adopted the American alike practice 
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that tend to easily accept the board's anti-takeover measures as proper actions under 
business judgement.178 After the failure of Steel Partners acquiring Bulldog Sauce in 
2007, the hostile takeover market of Japan is almost “frozen”. 179Without the supply of 
hostile acquirers, share premiums for shareholders and improvement of corporate 
governance all simply become impossible. China and most Asian countries, more or less 
shares the same institutional problems with Japan. In the next few chapters, we will use 
the E.U. approach as a direct example to illustrate how swing takeover laws would 
decrease its legal efficiency.  
All in all, a determined, doubtless preference is the core of every hostile takeover 
regulation paradigm in order to function efficiently – the law has to take sides between 
the shareholders and the board. In other words, a good hostile takeover regulation 
should be consistent and bring certainty to the capital market. Over the time, the 
participants could adjust their behaviors according to the established preference of the 
law. In sum, consistency is the foremost merit in hostile takeover regulation.
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III. Three Original Regulatory Frameworks of Hostile 
Takeover 
In order to set order for hostile takeovers and protect the lawful rights of 
the participants, the U.S., the U.K. and the E.U. had adopted three completely 
different regulatory frameworks in the hostile takeover domain. 
A. U.S.: “Fiduciary Duty Centered Mode” 
The legal framework of American takeover regulation has attracted 
enormous attention academically. The U.S. framework is divided into two 
pillars – the federal pillar and the state pillar, and there are three main resources 
of takeover law – Federal Status, judicial decisions from the Delaware Court of 
Chancery, and State Statutes. 
1. Federal Status – The Williams Act and Regulation S-K 
The Federal Status mainly addresses the procedural and form requirements 
of tender offers. Takeover activities were incorporated into federal regulation 
since 1968, when congress of the U.S. passed the Williams Act. The Williams 
Act was an amendment of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 which 
regulated tender offers and other takeover related actions. Most important of all, 
the fundamental goal of this Act was to ensure enough information disclosure to 
shareholders, so that they could make informed decisions that are best of their 
interest.180 At that time, abuses with cash tender offers were common in the 
U.S., and the Williams Act aimed to strengthen the information disclosure 
obligation of the acquirers to better protect the lawful rights of stockholders.181 
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There are two core aspects of the Williams Act - the mandatory information 
disclosure requirements and legal procedure rules in tender offers.  
Section 13 (d), (e), (f), (g) mainly deals with acquirer’s duty of information 
disclosure. “[A]ny person, or group who acquires beneficial ownership of 5 
percent or more of a class of equity securities must file with the SEC within ten 
days.” 182 The acquirers need to disclosure the following information: acquirer’s 
identity and background, resource of the acquisition fund, purpose of this 
acquisition (including plans to liquidate the target company or adjust major 
business of the company), and to what extent the acquirer wants to obtain 
control.  
Section 14 (d), (e), (f) stipulates certain rules for acquisition behavior, for 
instance, shareholders have the right to withdrew their acceptance of the offer 
within 7 days from the first day of the offer. Tender offer must last for at least 
20 days, and when there are more shares for sale than anticipated, the offeror 
has to acquire those shares on an equal proportion basis. 183 
In sum, the Williams Act serves as the base line of tender offer activity that 
required acquirers conform to the minimum requirement of information 
disclosure and equal price payment. The Securities and Exchange Commission 
(hereinafter SEC) is the federal governor of securities activities in the U.S., and 
it monitors the U.S securities market utilizing the clauses from the Williams Act. 
In addition, the SEC also has other laws that governs false statement, fraud and 
misleading behavior, but the most important element in the U.S. hostile takeover 
regulation - the fiduciary duty of directors, is reviewed by the State courts. 
Based on the Securities Act of 1933, the SEC has developed the Regulation 
S-K as partial supplement to the Williams Act. Article 10 to 50 stipulated in 
detail the form, contents and requirement of financial statement, it also puts 
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constraints on false statement, defraud and misleading behaviors, too.184 
In sum, the Williams Act and Regulation S-K together regulates the tender 
offer and public acquisition activities, but they only deal with the acquirers’ 
behaviors in hostile takeovers. The courts, on the other hand, deal with the 
target board’s behaviors, which is the most important part in the U.S regulatory 
framework.  
 
2. Judicial Decisions from the Delaware Court of Chancery 
i. Origin of the Fiduciary Duty and the Business Judgement Rule 
Federal regulation makes up only a small fraction of American takeover 
regulation. After all, professional and prudent as the acquirers are, they usually 
do not make mistakes to piss off the SEC. The judicial decisions interpreting the 
directors’ fiduciary duty are the core of the U.S. hostile takeover regulation. 
Although every State of the U.S. has its own courts and precedents, most large 
companies and conglomerates were incorporated in Delaware, whose corporate 
law is regarded as the most advanced one and whose Chancery Court represents 
the highest efficiency in the world. 185 
The concept of directors’ fiduciary duty could trace back to a Britain legal 
precedent - the Charitable Corp. v. Sutton case. Established in 1707, the Charitable 
Corporation was a British charity institution providing loans at low interest to the 
deserving poor; it also had large-scale pawn broking business, too. In 1742, the 
shareholders of the Charitable Corporation accused its committees of neglect of duties 
and breach of proper loan procedure, causing a huge loss of ￡350,000.  
Evidences revealed that, five directors were involved in collusion with the 
warehouse keeper to give uncensored loans to fellow directors. The remaining forty-five 
directors were criticized, too, because of gross negligence as they failed to maintain 
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oversight. In the end, the five directors were required to be responsible for the 
corporation’s total loss, while the forty-five director bear joint liability to this debt. Lord 
Hardwicke regarded “[t]he employment of a director to be of a mixed nature… it 
partakes of the nature of a public office, as it arises from the charter of the 
crown.”186 Most important of all, he pointed out that the directors were obliged 
to execute their duty with “fidelity” and “reasonable diligence”. 187 In the 
following cases, Lord Hardwicke’s decision was cited repeatedly, and the outline of 
the directors’ fiduciary duty became clearer – the directors should obey “the duties of 
loyalty” and “the duties of care” when exercising their power.  
Corporate internal disputes usually arose between directors of the board and the 
shareholders assembly in the U.S. and the U.K.; shareholders frequently sought 
compensations for their loss due to the directors’ malpractices. The British Chancery 
maintained that, the key to maximize shareholders welfare was “non-affiliated directors 
acting in bona fide”. However, the Delaware Judges had realized that, if the directors 
were always to be blamed and to be responsible for any fiscal loss, no directors would 
take any risks for the greater good of the company; inexpedient business judgements 
were unavoidable in nature, even the directors had fulfilled their fiduciary duty 
perfectly.188  
The exemption of directors’ duty first emerged in the Percy v. Millaudon case of 
1829. The Louisiana Supreme Court held that  
“[I]t is no doubt true that if the business to be transacted 
presupposes the exercise of a particular kind of knowledge, a person 
who would accept the office of mandatory, totally ignorant of the 
subject, could not excuse himself on the ground that he discharged his 
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trust with fidelity and care... But when the person who was appointed 
attorney-in-fact, has the qualifications necessary for the discharge of 
the ordinary duties of the trust imposed, we are of opinion that on the 
occurrence of difficulties, in the exercise of it, which offer only a 
choice of measures, the adoption of a course from which loss ensues 
cannot make the agent responsible, if the error was one into which a 
prudent man might have fallen. The contrary doctrine seems to us to 
suppose the possession, and require the exercise of perfect wisdom in 
fallible beings. No man would undertake to render a service to 
another on such severe conditions. The reason given for the rule, 
namely, that if the mandatory had not accepted the office, a person 
capable of discharging the duty correctly would have been found, is 
quite unsatisfactory. The person who would have accepted, no matter 
who he might be, must have shared in common with him who did the 
imperfections of our nature, and consequently must be presumed just 
as liable to have mistaken the correct course. The test of responsibility, 
therefore, should be, not the certainty of wisdom in others, but the 
possession of ordinary knowledge; and by showing that the error of 
the agent is of so gross a kind that a man of common sense, and 
ordinary attention, would not have fallen into it. The rule which fixes 
responsibility, because men of unerring sagacity are supposed to exist, 
and would have been found by the principal, appears to us essentially 
erroneous.”189 
Similar expression of the directors’ limitations could be found in Godbold v. 
Branch Bank of 1847.190 Later, in the Bodell v. General Gas & Electric Corp. of 1926, 
the Delaware court once again explained the essence of the directors’ fiduciary duty, but 
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it also pointed out directly that, so far as the directors had fulfilled their fiduciary duty, 
they were no longer to be responsible for the company’s loss. This liability exemption 
precedent lied the foundation for the later Business Judgement Rule. 
In Cole v. National Cash Credit Association of 1931, the Delaware Court brought 
up a rough standard to test whether the directors had fulfilled their fiduciary duty – 
whether they had acted in “good faith” and “bona fide”. The Litwin v.Allen case of 1940 
officially established the Business Judgement Rule. Justice Shientag maintained that 
 “[D]irectors stand in a fiduciary relationship to their company. 
They are bound by rules of conscientious fairness, morality, and 
honesty, which are imposed by the law as guidelines for those who are 
under fiduciary obligations. A director owes a loyalty to his 
corporation that is undivided and an allegiance uninfluenced by no 
consideration other than the welfare of the corporation. He must 
conduct the corporation’s business with the same degree of care and 
fidelity, as an ordinary prudent man would exercise when managing 
his own affairs of similar size and importance. A director of a bank is 
held to stricter accountability. He must use that degree of care 
ordinarily exercised by prudent bankers, and, if he does so, he will be 
absolved from liability even though his opinion may turn out to be 
mistaken and his judgment faulty.”191  
Indeed, as a U.S. scholar had pointed out, “[t]he fundamental premises underlying 
the Business Judgment Rule are salutary. Those premises are simply that, as human 
beings, directors are not infallible and are not able to please all of the stockholders all 
of the time. ” 192  
In 1984, the Aronson v. Lewis case confirmed the application of a Business 
Judgement Rule before judicial scrutiny. Henry Lewis is a shareholder of Meyers 
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Parking System; he claimed that the board’s decision has improperly wasted corporate 
assets. The 75-years-old Leo Fink is the founder and CEO of Meyers Parking System, 
he holds 47% shares of the company. The board granted Mr. Fink a generous five-year 
employment contract with a subsequent term as a consultant. Except a very decent 
salary, Mr. Fink could get an extra annual bonus equal to 5% of the company’s pretax 
profits. Mr. Lewis claimed that the board turned blind to Mr. Fink’s continued ability to 
perform as the CEO, and Mr. Fink had obtained disproportionate gain by manipulating 
the board of directors. Justice Moore held that there are no particularized facts for the 
plaintiff to overcome the presumption of director independence and proper exercise of 
business judgment. “[T]he business judgment rule is an acknowledgment of the 
managerial prerogatives of Delaware directors under Section 141(a)… 193 It is a 
presumption that in making a business decision the directors of a corporation acted on 
an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the 
best interests of the company…194Absent an abuse of discretion, that judgment will be 
respected by the courts. The burden is on the party challenging the decision to establish 
facts rebutting the presumption.195” In short, only when the plaintiff could substantially 
prove that the directors had breached their fiduciary duty would the court launch a full 
scope investigation over the board’s behavior. 196 
The following case of Grobow v. Perot in 1988 established an intact standard to 
review the directors’ fiduciary duty. To get protections from the Business Judgement 
Rule, the directors must: 1. Act in good faith; 2. Act in the best interests of the 
corporation; 3. Act on an informed basis; 4. Not be wasteful; 5. Not involve 
self-interest.197 
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Under the upfront application of the Business Judgement Rule, the court tacitly 
believe that the board is acting under their fiduciary duty (protected by the Business 
Judgement Rule) unless the plaintiff could prove otherwise (Overthrow the Business 
Judgement Rule).  
ii. Moran v. Household International, Inc 
In 1985, the Delaware court upheld a poison pill (an aggressive shareholder 
rights plan) as a legitimate exercise of business judgment by Household 
International's board of directors in Moran v. Household International, Inc. This 
case was the first one in which a U.S. state court upheld a poison pill as a 
legitimate reaction to hostile takeovers and paved the way for poison pills as the 
most common legitimate defensive measure in the U.S.198 
Household International Inc., is the predecessor of the nowadays 
well-known HSBC Finance. In August 1984, the board of directors of 
Household International adopted a Preferred Share Purchase Rights Plan (Poison 
Pills) as a preventative measure against potential future hostile takeover 
attempts. Usually, corporations would take defensive measures after the 
emergence of hostile acquirers, but the Household International was not under 
any takeover threat at all. Mr. John Moran was a director of the Household 
International Board who voted against the Preferred Share Purchase Rights Plan 
(Poison Pills). In fact, being the Chairman of the Board of the 
Dyson-Kissner-Moran Corporation, Mr. Moran was contemplating a hostile takeover of 
the Household International.  
Mr. Moran sued to the Delaware Court to seek injunction of the poison pill, 
but the Court of Chancery held in favor of the defendant; it ruled that the 
placement of the poison pill was normal business judgement. Finally, the 
Dyson-Kissner-Moran Corporation had to abandon its leveraged buyout scheme. Since 
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then, poison pills became common practices in the U.S. corporations.  
iii. Unocal Corp V. Mesa Petroleum Co 
The far-reaching case of Unocal Corp V. Mesa Petroleum Co. case in 1985 
established the interim standard to review directors' action in response to  
hostile takeovers.  
In 1985, Mesa Petroleum, notorious for greenmail, held 13% shares of 
Unocal Corporation. It then launched a tender offer for 37% more shares of 
Mesa Petroleum. Mesa Petroleum constructed a two-tier tender offer - one $54 
per share paid in cash, one $54 per share paid by trash bond. The Unocal Board 
considered the price as grossly inadequate, and suspected the possibility of 
greenmail. To tackle this threat, the Unocal Board designed a selective exchange 
offer (poison pill), which would trigger when Mesa Petroleum acquired 
64,000,000 Unocal shares. This self-tender offer enables the Unocal Board to 
buy back 49% of its company shares at the price of $72 from shareholders other 
than Mesa Petroleum. 199 
Mesa Petroleum immediately sought injunction of this interchangeable 
tender offer, claiming that the discriminative nature of this poison pill was 
unjust and unfair. The Delaware court realized that, the target board inevitably 
face conflicts of interests in hostile takeovers, as they may very possible lose 
their job if the takeover succeeds; the interest of the company and the interest of 
the board were not consistent in such condition. As a result, the usual Business 
Judgement Rule could not offer adequate protection for the shareholders of the 
company. The Delaware Court hence invented a two-pronged 
reasonableness-based test to determine whether the directors’ defensive 
measures were reasonable. The two prongs were: First, did the directors 
reasonably perceive a threat? Second, was the directors' defensive measure 
reasonable in relation to the threat posed? In other words, the defendant – the 
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directors of the board, was required to prove that: first, they had reasonable 
ground to believe that a danger to corporate policy and effectiveness existed 
because of another person’s stock ownership, and; second, the defensive 
measures that they were taking were proportionate to the threat posed. 
The trial court first deemed this selective exchange offer legally 
permissible, and issued a preliminary injunction against the use of the 
self-tender offer defense, but the Supreme Court later overturned this judgement. 
The Supreme Court ruled that “[t]he Unocal's board of directors had reasonable 
grounds for believing that a danger to corporate policy or effectiveness existed 
and that the response was reasonable in relation to the threat posed”. 200 
Thereafter, the application of Unocal Test before Business Judgement Rule 
(shift of burden of proof) became a convention in hostile takeover disputes. 
Because of the inherent conflict of interests involved, defensive measures 
against takeovers pose a significant danger to shareholders. Therefore, an 
“enhanced duty” on the board was necessary in hostile takeovers. For the board 
to be allotted the protection of the Business Judgment Rule, they must first 
demonstrate their responds to a legitimate threat to corporate policy and 
effectiveness were “reasonable in relation to the threat posed.”201 
One particular thing was far-reaching. The Supreme Court did not require 
the board to get approval of the defenses from shareholders, and did not restrict 
directors' excuses of adopting defensive measures to shareholders' benefits 
alone, which in fact empowered the directors to have even larger discretion 
when facing hostile takeover. Concerns of directors could include: price and 
timing of the offer, illegality of the acquisition, impact on related party such as 
employee, creditors and even customers, and so on. 202 
In sum, the two-pronged reasonableness-based test established in the 
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Unocal case is a modified version of the Business Judgement Rule, and it is the 
defendant, not the plaintiff, shall bear the burden of proof.  
iv. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc 
In 1986, a landmark decision of the Delaware Supreme Court on hostile 
takeovers was promulgated after the trial of Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & 
Forbes Holdings, Inc. The Supreme Court restricted the freedom of the board in 
taking defensive measures when the sale of the company became inevitable. The 
reasonable relation analysis of Unocal once permitted the directors to use price, 
nature, and timing of the offer as well as the impact on shareholders, creditors, 
customers, employees, and the community as proper excuses to defend. Such 
excuses were curtailed in the Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 
Inc case. 
The acquirer - Pantry Pride of MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 
offered a price of $40-42 per share for Revlon's outstanding shares. The 
management thought the price was simply not sufficient and therefore launched 
a series of takeover defenses. A share repurchase scheme at the price of $65 did 
not scare away the company raider; rather, Pantry Pride became quite 
determined and raised the price of his offer from $47.5 per share all the way to 
$56.25 per share. When recognizing the Revlon Company was inevitable for 
sale, the Revlon board still sought help from a potential white knight – 
Forstmann, with whom the management provided a series privileged terms such 
as a waiver of the restrictive covenants as well as a huge amount of cancellation 
fee. Pantry Pride then resorted to the court for an injunction on Revlon’s 
defenses.203  
The court opined that, the initial takeover defenses by Revlon board was 
reasonable and proportionate, which fitted the best interest of their shareholders. 
However, the situation had dramatically changed, when the sale of the company 
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became inevitable. Under this circumstance, it was the duty of the board to 
search for the highest bidder, rather than retaining control of the company. 
Hence, it is improper for the board to offer more favorable terms to a 
non-shareholder third party in order create difficulties for the less-favored 
acquirer. Directors of the board breached their duty of care by creating 
unnecessary obstacle that might impede the auction. 204 
The Revlon case revealed that, when the sale of a company become 
inevitable or has already begun, the duty of the board switches from protecting 
the company into obtaining the highest price for the benefit of the shareholders. 
In short, the board’s role now is similar to an “auctioneer”, who is responsible 
for transferring the company to the highest bidder, with no intention to frustrate 
it. This duty was referred to as “Revlon Duty” then. 
v. Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Incorporated 
The Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Incorporated case of 1989 
expanded the room for the board to take defensive measures, and shed light on the 
application of Revlon Duty. 
In early 1980s, the Time Incorporated Inc., was considering expanding its 
business into the entertainment and cultural field through a strategic merger. At 
first, Paramount Communications and Warner Brothers were its favorable choice. After 
thorough consideration and discussions, Time Incorporated and Warner Brothers 
reached a merger deal through equity swap. However, before submitting this deal to the 
Time Incorporated general assembly, Paramount Communications suddenly launched a 
tender offer for all outstanding shares of Time Incorporated at the price of $175. Time 
Incorporated’s trading price was around $120 at that time, thus the offer was 
very appealing to the stockholders. The Board of Time Incorporated considered 
Paramount’s deal as a threat to its future development as well as a “damage to 
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its culture”, 205  thus the board launched a range of defenses, including  
staggered board, 50-day notice period for any motions, and a poison pill plan 
with a 15% trigger.  
Paramount Communications raised its offer price all the way to $200, and 
Time Incorporated’s shareholders began standing up against their board of 
directors. They brought a shareholder derivative lawsuit to the court. The 
shareholders claimed that, according to the initial merger deal between Time 
Incorporated and Warner Brothers, the sale of their company was inevitable - 
the Revlon Duty should be triggered, thus their board should not take any 
defensive measures but seek the highest bidder. The share premium offered by 
Paramount Communications perfectly suited the shareholders’ interests. Except 
that, Paramount Communications also accused Time Incorporated’s board of 
taking responses unreasonable in relation to the threat posed. 206 
The Delaware Court supported the Board of Time Incorporate, claiming 
that the board did not breach their fiduciary duty. Chancellor Allen maintained that 
the defensive measures were proportionate to the threat posed to the culture of the 
company. He held that 
“[I] note parenthetically that plaintiffs in this suit dismiss this 
claim of ‘culture’ as being nothing more than a desire to perpetuate or 
entrench existing management disguised in a pompous, highfalutin’ 
claim… I am not persuaded that there may not be instances in which 
the law might recognize as valid a perceived threat to a ‘corporate 
culture’ that is shown to be palpable… distinctive and advantageous… 
Many people commit a huge portion of their lives to a single 
large-scale business organization. They derive their identity in part 
from that organization and feel that they contribute to the identity of 
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the firm. The mission of the firm is not seen by those involved with it 
as wholly economic, nor the continued existence of its distinctive 
identity as a matter of indifference…[The board has...] ... continued to 
manage the corporation for long term profit pursuant to a preexisting 
business plan that itself is not primarily a control device or scheme, 
the corporation has a legally cognizable interest in achieving that 
plan…Reasonable persons can and do disagree as to whether it is the 
better course from the shareholders’ point of view collectively to cash 
out their stake in the company now at this (or a higher) premium cash 
price. However, there is no persuasive evidence that the board of Time 
has a corrupt or venal motivation…”207 
Last but not the least, the court further clarified the trigger of the Revlon 
Duty – the definition of “the sale of the company is inevitable” - when a 
corporation initiates an active bidding process seeking to sell itself or to effect a 
business reorganization involving a clear break-up of the company. 
vi. Paramount Communications, Inc. v QVC Network Inc 
Five years later, the Paramount Company was again involved in takeover 
disputes. The Paramount Communications, Inc. v QVC Network Inc case slightly 
narrowed the use of defensive measures, and further explained the standard of the 
Revlon Duty. 
In 1994, Viacom Inc., proposed a merger with Paramount Communication. 
The board of Paramount Communications sanctioned this merger with Viacom 
and expressed their friendly intention by signing a series of favored deals with 
Viacom. The deals included: a No-Shop clause, which forbade Paramount 
Communications make any contact with other potential buyers; a reverse 
Break-up Fee clause, which required Paramount Communications to pay 
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$100,000,000 as compensation if the merger failed; and a Put Option clause, 
which gave Viacom the right to buy 19.9% of Paramount’s shares at the price of 
$69.14 per share. 208 
When Paramount Communications released this merger deal to the public, 
another company – the QVC Network approached Paramount Communications, 
and offered a merger deal of $80 per share. Viacom immediately raised its price 
to $80 per share, and then to $85 per share. As a respond, QVC Network raised 
its bid price again to $90 per share. Considering its previous deals with Viacom, 
the Paramount board insisted that the merger with Viacom best suited 
shareholders’ interests. 209 
QVC Network and Paramount’s shareholders together sued to the Delaware 
court, they claimed that, as Paramount board had already sanctioned its merger 
with Viacom, the sale of the company was inevitable and the Revlon Duty 
triggered. Since QVC Network offered a better price with fewer constraints, it 
was very hard to say that merging into Viacom was Paramount’s best choice. 
Viacom and Paramount’s board argued that, merger into another company 
should not trigger the Revlon Duty, as there was no breakup of the company. 
The Delaware Supreme Court held that, the merger between Paramount and 
Viacom should be enjoined, and their previous agreement was invalid; the 
Revlon duty was triggered “[w]here, in response to a bidder’s offer, a target 
abandons its long-term strategy and seeks an alternative transaction also 
involving the breakup of the company.”210 Therefore, Paramount was under no 
contractual obligation to avoid discussions with QVC, and Paramount's board 
could not contract to remove their fiduciary duties to shareholders because of 
their previous invalid contracts. 
vii. Unitrin, Inc. v. American General Corp. 
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The Unitrin, Inc. v. American General Corp. of 1994 supplemented the Unocal 
Test, and further curtailed the use of defensive measures.  
The American General Corporation and Unitrin Inc., were famous U.S. insurance 
companies. In July 1994, the American General Corporation wished to acquire Unitrin 
Inc., at the price of $2600,000,000 but was rejected by Unitrin’s board. The American 
General later launched a public tender offer for all outstanding shares of Unitrin. The 
Unitrin board collectively held 23% of its shares and they redeemed the American 
General’s offer grossly inadequate. In addition, the board also worried that, the merger 
of two insurance giants might very possible trigger the Antitrust Scrutiny. Therefore, 
they publicly opposed American General’s acquisition and sanctioned a poison pill 
scheme.  
In addition, in order to prevent the American General from obtaining 
control for sure, the Unitrin board designed another share repurchase scheme 
under the advice from Morgan Stanley, who obtained approximately 5000,000 
shares of Unitrin on behalf of the board from August 12th to 24th. On December 
6th, the American General sought injunctions from the court.  
Realizing the coercive nature of the tender offer, the lower court ruled that 
the Unitrin board’s defenses had passed the Unocal test and thereby under the 
protection of the Business Judgement Rule. The Delaware Supreme Court later 
overturned this verdict; to the judge, while the poison pill was “reasonable in 
relation to the threat posed”, the share repurchase scheme was certainly not. The 
Court maintained that, the defenses of Unitrin was so “draconian” that no 
shareholders could obtain control of the company thorough normal proxy 
contest ever since. Because their defenses were “coercive” even to its 
shareholders, the board’s trenching purpose was rather obvious. Since then, a 
Unitrin test211 became prepositive before the application of the Unocal test – 
defensive measures should first be not draconian, and should not be coercive to 
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its shareholders, then the proportionate test of Unocal could be applicable. 212 
 
3. State Anti-takeover Statutes 
Precedents on fiduciary duty is the core of the U.S. hostile takeover 
regulation. Yet this is not all. The remaining pieces of the U.S. takeover law are 
the various State anti-takeover statutes. Since the end of 1980s, more than 40 
states of the U.S. had issued this kind of impartial statutes, aiming at protecting 
its local industries from the capital raiders. Every State had anti-takeover 
statutes of its own. 
There are six most typical anti-takeover statutes in the U.S.  
i. Tender Offer Merits Review Statutes 
The first type of State anti-takeover statute is aiming at regulating offer 
bids, by empowering the state regulator the right to review the merits of the 
tender offer as well as the sufficiency of information disclosure.213 This kind of 
statute was widely used to protect specific local industries, as the state regulator 
and its special committee had the right to veto or suspend any unfavorable offer. 
For instance, when the Belzberg Family, who was notorious for greenmail, 
threatened to takeover Arvin Industries in Columbus Indiana, 214  the state 
regulator imposed a long waiting period to “review the merits of the offer”, 
which protected Arvin Industries from the potential harm of the acquirer. Arvin 
hired 2000 local employees and gave support to local education.215 
However, powerful and compelling as these statutes were, most of them 
were nullified later by the Supreme Court. For example, in 1982, the waiting 
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period imposed by Illinois statue was considered to have breached the Interstate 
Commerce Clause in American Constitution in the Edgar v. Mite Corp case. The 
Supreme Court held that local state should not turn a deaf ear to non-local 
shareholders' interests when protecting local investors’ rights.216 Louisiana and 
Pennsylvania subsequently repealed their anti-takeover statues in 1987 and 
1993.  
ii. Control Share Acquisition Statute 
The second generation of anti-takeover law focus on the protection of 
stable shareholders, among which the most famous and most efficient one was 
the “Control Share Acquisition Statute”. Under this law, a bid for the target 
company has to be approved by the majority of disinterested shares; otherwise, 
the acquired shares would carry no voting rights.  
Taking Minnesota as an example. In 1987, when the board of Dayton 
Hudson Corporation was informed of Dart Group Corporation’s shareholding of its 
common shares, it immediately sought help from the Minnesota Governor Rudy 
Perpich. Dayton Hudson had employed approximately 34000 local citizens; it was one 
of the Minnesota’s pillar industry.217 Governor Rudy Perpich at once convened a 
special legislative session, hoping to introduce a “Control Share Acquisition 
Statute” into its state law. This motion passed swiftly at the Senate and the 
House of Representatives. Not long after, Dart Group Corporation launched a 
hostile takeover of Dayton Hudson Corporation as expected, but this takeover attempt 
was defeated cruelly because of the state anti-takeover statute.218 
In 1987, the Supreme Court upheld Indiana's “Control Share Acquisition 
Statute” in CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. According to the Indiana statute, 
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217 See Mallette, Paul, and Robert Spagnola. "State takeover legislation: the political defense." SAM 
Advanced Management Journal 59.3 (1994): 15. 
218  See Hemphill, Thomas A. "Corporate governance, strategic philanthropy, and public 
policy." Business Horizons 42.3 (1999): 57-62. 
III. Three Original Regulatory Frameworks of Hostile Takeover 
67 
outstanding shares where the part exceeds 20% carries no voting right, unless 
this independent shareholder obtained voting right for this part of his shares in 
the general meetings of shareholders.219 
iii. Fair Price Statute 
The third type of State anti-takeover statute is the well-known “Fair Price 
Statute”, which requires the acquisition to be approved by the supermajority of 
the shareholders unless they all get the equivalent best price of the acquirer. The 
Connecticut General Statutes and the Maryland Code all used to have this kind of 
statutes.220 
iv. Stakeholder Statute 
The fourth type of the State anti-takeover statute is the “Stakeholder 
Statute”, which permits management consider the interest of all stakeholders 
rather than stockholders alone. This kind of statute gave the target board various 
considerations (excuses) to justify their anti-takeover defenses, for example, the 
management could take their creditors, employees, even customers and 
communities “interest” into consideration when facing takeovers. The California 
Corporation Code and the Indiana Code Annotated all used to have this kind of 
statutes.221 
v. Freeze Statute 
The fifth type of State anti-takeover statute is the “Freeze Statute”, which 
prohibits a merger within 5 years of an acquisition that gives control to an 
offeror unless that transaction was approved by the target company’s directors 
before the acquisition itself. Chapter 9 Article 912 of the New York Business 
Corporation Law has this kind of statutes222. This kind of statute ensures the 
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integrity of the company even years after the merger; it also to some extent 
guarantees the consistency of its company policy, preventing the acquirers from 
dismantling the company for sale. 
vi. Disgorgement Statute 
The sixth type of State anti-takeover statute is the “Disgorgement Statute” 
of Pennsylvania, which required any person owning more than twenty percent of 
a corporation’s shares to disgorge any profit realized within an 
eighteen-month’s period.223 
The “Freeze Statute” of New York and the “Disgorgement Statute” of 
Pennsylvania had survived the Constitutional Challenge of the Federal 
Courts.224 
 
In sum, the law’s predilection for directors of the board is quite obvious in 
the U.S. hostile takeover regulatory framework. Despite the very few cases 
where the acquirers obtained injunctions successfully, general speaking, the 
court favored the primacy of the board of directors over the will of the 
shareholders. As far as the anti-takeover measures were not “draconian” and 
within the reasonable boundary of the imminent threat, directors of the board 
were allowed to fire at their free will. Considering the widely existing State 
anti-takeover statutes, the U.S. hostile takeover regulatory framework is quite 
“anti-takeover” indeed. In terms of power allocation, the directors of the board 
have the primary power over all major corporate issues - including the power to 
adopt defensive measures. In contrast, shareholders are passive and inactive. In 
practice, even the sale of corporate assets and modification of company's article 
normally does not require shareholders’ approval. Except those powers clearly 
specified in the State laws and in the certificate of incorporation that belong to 
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shareholders, all other powers are allocated to directors of the board, which 
gives them more primacy and primary decision-making authority in hostile 
under the U.S. regime. 
 
B. U.K.: “Self-Regulatory Mode” 
Comparing to the U.S. hostile takeover regulatory framework, the U.K. 
mode is quite different. The shareholders assembly have the primary power over 
all major corporate issues, and the board shall not take any defenses unless 
authorized by the shareholders assembly.  
1. The Takeover Panel and the City Code 
The City Code on Takeovers and Mergers governs all the takeover 
activities in the U.K. It is drafted, revised and carried out by the Panel on 
Takeovers and Mergers. The Takeover Panel consists of full-time professionals 
from different industries, representatives of commercial institutions and 
specialists on secondment from Banks and Industry Associations. Unconstrained 
by the legal precedents and procedural limitations, the Takeover Panel and its 
City Code could solve takeover disputes in extremely high efficiency.  
2. No Frustrating Action Principle 
The core of the City Code is the famous “No Frustrating Action Principle”: 
“[D]uring the course of an offer, or even before the date of the offer if the board 
of the offeree company has reason to believe that a bona fide offer might be 
imminent, the board must not, without the approval of the shareholders in 
general meeting, take any action which may result in any offer or bona fide 
possible offer being frustrated or in shareholders being denied the opportunity 
to decide on its merits.”225 Moreover, the board are strictly prohibited from 
taking the following measures that may have certain effect on the tender offer: 
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“1. issue any shares or transfer or sell, or agree to transfer or sell, any shares 
out of treasury or effect any redemption or purchase by the company of its own 
shares; 2. issue or grant options in respect of any unissued shares; 3. create or 
issue, or permit the creation or issue of, any securities carrying rights of 
conversion into or subscription for shares; 4. sell, dispose of or acquire, or 
agree to sell, dispose of or acquire, assets of a material amount; or 5. enter into 
contracts otherwise than in the ordinary course of business.”226 Except these 
direct bans on issuing new shares, the Companies Act of U.K. also requires the 
board to obtain approval from the shareholders before allotting(issuing) any 
shares.227 In share issuance situations, the shareholders are entitled to the Right 
of Pre-emption: “[A] company must not allot equity securities to a person on 
any terms unless it has made an offer to each person who holds ordinary shares 
in the company to allot to him on the same or more favorable terms a proportion 
of those securities that is as nearly as practicable equal to the proportion in 
nominal value held by him of the ordinary share capital of the company, and the 
period during which any such offer may be accepted has expired or the company 
has received notice of the acceptance or refusal of every offer so made”228. Any 
attempt to circumvent the right of pre-emption is under the regulation of the 
Association of British Insurers and its Directors' power to allot shares and 
disapply shareholders' pre-emption rights.229 
These rigorous rules directly forbid the management, or the board to take 
any defensive measures without the approval from the shareholders. Most 
importantly, “[t]he Panel must be consulted in advance if there is any doubt as 
to whether any proposed action may fall within this Rule (No Frustrating Action 
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Principle).” 
From the literal expression, the “No Frustrating Action Principle” only 
works “during the course of an offer, or even before the date of the offer”, is it 
possible for the target company to take some precautionary measures? For 
example, dual-ownership structure, staggered boards, severance agreements or 
anti-takeover provisions are all common proactive defenses in Anglo-American 
countries.  
In fact, ex ante defenses appear much less frequent in the U.K. than in the 
U.S. Let us address the common ex ante defenses one by one. The U.K. 
Companies Act did not directly ban the use of dual ownership structure, but 
such arrangements may disfavor the institutional investors in the first place, 
which directly give rise to depressing share price and difficulties of refinancing 
in the capital market. 230 
As for the staggered board, the U.K. Companies Act entitles the 
shareholders’ assembly to remove directors even before his term due: “[A] 
company may by ordinary resolution at a meeting remove a director before the 
expiration of his period of office, notwithstanding anything in any agreement 
between it and him.” 231 Therefore, the staggered board provisions have no use 
at all in the U.K. under this context.  
In addition, the directors of the board are under intense surveillance by the 
people for whom they are working. The directors of a company must prepare a 
directors’ report for each financial year of the company, this report must record 
in detail the director's principal activities of the year. Moreover, “[u]nless the 
company is subject to the small companies’ regime, the directors’ report must 
contain a business review...The purpose of the business review is to inform 
members of the company and help them assess how the directors have performed 
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their duty under section 172 (duty to promote the success of the company).”232 
The Large and Medium-sized Companies and Groups (Accountant Reports) 
(Amendment) Regulations 2013 replaced the old Directors' Remuneration 
Report Regulation, imposing an even stricter disclosure requirement on the 
directors’expenditure.233 The Combined Code on Corporate Governance of the 
Financial Service Authority (FSA) explicitly limit the directors’ term to one 
year, and the renewal of the term is one-year maximum as well. 234 Because of 
these stipulations, severance agreements like the golden parachutes are 
practically not applicable in the U.K.235 
3. Principle of Equal Treatment of Shareholders 
The nature and purpose of the City code is to “[e]nsure that shareholders 
in an offeree company are treated fairly and are not denied an opportunity to 
decide on the merits of a takeover and that shareholders in the offeree company 
of the same class are afforded equivalent treatment by an offeror.”236 There are 
three substantial rules supporting this general principle. Section E11 Rule 6 sets 
the bottom price of an offer: “[a]n offeror or any person acting in concert with 
it acquires any interest in shares at above the offer price (being then current 
value of the offer), it shall increase its offer to not less than the highest price 
paid for the interest in shares so acquired.”237 Section H1 Rule 14 ensures that 
the same class of shares are to be treated the same:“[W]here a company has 
more than one class of equity share capital, a comparable offer must be made 
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for each class whether such capital carries voting rights or not; the Panel 
should be consulted in advance...In the case of offers involving two or more 
classes of equity share capital, prices for all of which are published in the Daily 
Official List, the ratio of the offer values should normally be equal to the 
average of the ratios of the middle market quotations taken from the Daily 
Official List over the course of the six months preceding the commencement of 
the offer period. ” 238 Section H3 Rule 16 forbids the acquirers to reach any 
superior agreements with any third party: “[E]cept with the consent of the Panel, 
an offeror or persons acting in concert with it may not make any arrangements 
with shareholders and may not deal or enter into arrangements to deal in shares 
of the offeree company, or enter into arrangements which involve acceptance of 
an offer, either during an offer or when one is reasonably in contemplation, if 
there are favorable conditions attached which are not being extended to all 
shareholders. ”239 
The above-mentioned shareholders protection rules are quite similar to the 
Securities and Exchange Act of the U.S., but the U.K. went even further and 
introduced the Mandatory Bid Rule:“[a]ny person acquires, whether by a series 
of transactions over a period of time or not, an interest in shares which (taken 
together with shares in which persons acting in concert with him are interested) 
carry 30% or more of the voting rights of a company, ” a mandatory offer is 
required. 240 Indeed, the Mandatory Bid Rule offers all shareholders with a fair 
opportunity to exit without any omissions, but it largely increases the cost for 
the acquirers, hence it hinders takeovers from happening. 
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To sum up, the U.K. hostile takeover regulatory framework leans largely to 
the shareholders’ side, which is very much the opposite to the U.S. practice. The 
shareholders have the primary power over takeover issues, and directors of the 
board must remain passive.  
 
C. E.U.: “Free Choice Mode” 
The U.K.’s practice had largely influenced the E.U. hostile takeover 
regulatory framework. In fact, the first drafts of the Directive 2004/25/Ec of The 
European Parliament and of The Council (hereinafter the European Directive) 
was drafted based almost entirely on the City Code of the U.K. 
1. A Unified Takeover Law 
The E.U. regulation is divided into two pillars: the European Community as 
the policy-maker and the Member States authorities as the policy-operator. The 
European Community took each Member States’ concerns into consideration, 
and provided the official blueprint for discussion; the Member States then 
implement the general policies and amend their law according to such blueprint.  
The original purpose of the European Directive was to harmonize the 
takeover rules among its Member States, to create a level playing field for 
takeover activities and to protect shareholders, especially the minority 
shareholders. Starting from mid 1970s, the European Directive had undergone 
several amendments and hundreds negotiations, discussions and compromises. It 
was finally passed in May 2004. As we will later demonstrate, instead of a 
united, harmonizing law, the European Directive is nothing but a “reference 
guide” for takeover lawmaking that encourages the Member States to act on 
their own.  
The European Community was established based on the Treaty Establishing 
the European Community. According to its Article 251 to 254, a directive has obtain 
approvals from the European Parliament and the Council before it could be suggested 
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for adoption as an act to the Member States. 241 The approved version of the European 
Directive has set the transposition deadline expired on 20th May 2006, but a 
significant number of Member States have not transposed the Directive by this 
deadline, only Austria, Denmark, France, Hungary, Ireland, Luxembourg and 
England fulfilled the task. Until February 2007, 17 Member States have 
promulgated their takeover regulations, and the rest 8 subsequently fulfilled this 
work until the end of 2007. Romania and Bulgaria joined the European Union in 
January 2007, and they changed their takeover laws in the first time to satisfy 
the requirements of the European Directive.  
There are many general clauses in the European Directive which deal with tender 
offers, similar to the Securities and Exchange Act of the U.S. The European 
Directive has extremely thorough requirements of information disclosure for the 
acquirers,242 which could be used as paradigmatic example for Asian countries. 
It not only concerns about the specific information a company has to offer, but 
also care about the way in which it should be offered: “[M]ember States shall 
ensure that a bid is made public in such a way as to ensure market transparency 
and integrity for the securities of the offeree company, of the offeror or of any 
other company affected by the bid, in particular in order to prevent the 
publication or dissemination of false or misleading information”. 243 
So much so, those General Clauses are not the essential part of European 
Takeover Law. In the following part we will focus on six major rules and 
innovations of the European Directive. 
 
2. Six Core Rules of the European Directive 
The European Union, indeed, is an integrated economic entity, but it is 
composed of more than 20 Member States of different manners and appeals. 
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This Chapter mainly focus on the European Union pillar – the “unified” law. 
The European Directive consists of six core rules: the Board Neutrality Rule, the 
Breakthrough Rule, the Optional Arrangements Rule, the Reciprocity Exception Rule, 
the Mandatory Bid Rule and the Squeeze-out and Sell-out Rule. 
These above-mentioned rules were all based on a general assumption that, 
takeover activity, be it hostile or friendly, can bring huge benefits to the target 
company and the investors, and can thereby bring benefits to the European economy 
one way or another. The legislators viewed acquisitions, mergers and reorganizations 
as the driving force for value creation and the only effective method to achieve 
economy of scale and scope, so as to improve E.U.’s international competitiveness. 
The European legislators also believed that hostile takeovers were the ultimate cure 
for the serious agency problems in the European listed companies; the main logic 
behind the European Directive was “[c]reating a fully integrated capital market by 
promoting a prosperous market of corporate control”. 244 
The Board Neutrality Rule, the Breakthrough Rule and the Reciprocity 
Exception Rule were originally designed to create a “level-playing field” within the 
E.U. The Board Neutrality Rule and the Breakthrough Rule were originally designed 
to promote takeovers, especially hostile takeovers. The Board Neutrality Rule, the 
Mandatory Bid Rule and the Squeeze-out and Sell-out Rule were originally designed 
to provide thorough protections to stockholders, especially minority shareholders. 
However, in order to get the European Directive passed in the European Parliament 
and Congress, the Optional Arrangements Rule had to be introduced as a compromise. 
All in all, the European Directive was a “shareholder centered” creation; the 
legislators deemed the defensive measures as the largest obstacle for takeovers. 
However, the existence of the Optional Arrangements Rule made the Board Neutrality 
Rule and the Breakthrough Rule optional for Member States, which largely 
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undermined the original legal effects that the Directive wanted to achieve in the first 
place and resulted in a “director oriented” law in practice.  
i. The Board Neutrality Rule 
The Board Neutrality Rule mainly borrowed the “No Frustrating Action 
Principle” from the City Code. The board, generally, should remain restrained 
and neutral in takeovers: “[D]uring the period referred to in the second 
subparagraph, the board of the offeree company shall obtain the prior 
authorization of the general meeting of shareholders given for this purpose 
before taking any action, other than seeking alternative bids, which may result 
in the frustration of the bid and in particular before issuing any shares which 
may result in a lasting impediment to the offeror’s acquiring control of the 
offeree company.”245  
The Board Neutrality Rule gives shareholders the primary decision-making 
power in takeover defenses. The intriguing thing is that it mentioned two 
takeover defenses specifically – “seeking alternative bids” and “issuing 
shares” – the former one was approved while the latter one was prohibited. 
From this aspect, the board could seek help from a potential “white knight”, as 
far as it could offer better price. This is very similar to the precedents 
established in the Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc. case 
(The Revlon Duty). On the other hand, the board is strictly prohibited from 
taking any other defensive measures such as poison pills, scorched-earth 
policy and so on. Merely judging from its thorough clarification and 
expression, the Board Neutrality Rule set up a good example for Asian countries 
who favor a shareholder centered takeover regulatory framework.  
ii. The Breakthrough Rule  
The Board Neutrality Rule can freeze the board from taking actions after 
the takeover emerges, and the Breakthrough Rule can nullify any ex ante takeover 
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defenses.  
In many Member States, even if the directors of the board could not take any 
action in takeovers due to the Board Neutrality Rule, it is still extremely difficult 
to takeover many listed companies because of the widely existence of 
“controlling minority structure”. The insiders of the company carefully utilized the 
voting leverages to magnify the voting power of their shareholding. Many de facto 
controllers of the company actually only held very small portion of the company 
shares. Their firm control over the company is achieved through multi-class share 
structure, share pyramiding or cross ownership, such unfair arrangements were 
especially common in Sweden, Germany and Finland.  
The “controlling minority structure” detached the share dividends right with the 
voting rights. Some listed companies even have various share transfer limits in their 
company bylaw, overwhelming the potential acquirers’ ability to make the bid246. 
That was why the Breakthrough Rule was invented in the first place. However, all 
those trenching ex ante defensive mechanism pales in front of the Breakthrough 
Rule, as it straightway voids all previous arrangements which enable voting 
leverage or limit share transfer - be it stated in the Articles of Associations or 
elaborated in diverse shareholding agreements. Article 11 of the European 
Directive stipulates that “[A]ny restrictions on the transfer of securities 
provided for in the articles of association of the offeree company shall not 
apply vis-à-vis the offeror during the time allowed for acceptance of the 
bid ...Any restrictions on the transfer of securities provided for in contractual 
agreements between the offeree company and holders of its securities, or in 
contractual agreements between holders of the offeree company’s securities 
entered into after the adoption of this Directive, shall not apply vis-à-vis the 
offeror during the time allowed for acceptance of the bid ...Restrictions on 
voting rights provided for in the articles of association of the offeree company 
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shall not have effect at the general meeting of shareholders which decides on 
any defensive measures...Restrictions on voting rights provided for in 
contractual agreements between the offeree company and holders of its 
securities, or in contractual agreements between holders of the offeree 
company’s securities entered into after the adoption of this Directive, shall 
not have effect at the general meeting of shareholders which decides on any 
defensive measures...Multiple-vote securities shall carry only one vote each at 
the general meeting of shareholders which decides on any defensive 
measures.”247 Moreover, “[w]here, following a bid, the offeror holds 75 % or 
more of the capital carrying voting rights, no restrictions on the transfer of 
securities or on voting rights referred to in paragraphs 2 and 3 nor any 
extraordinary rights of shareholders concerning the appointment or removal 
of board members provided for in the articles of association of the offeree 
company shall apply; multiple-vote securities shall carry only one vote each at 
the first general meeting of shareholders following closure of the bid, called 
by the offeror in order to amend the articles of association or to remove or 
appoint board members.”248 
One particular thing is that, the Directive requires “equitable 
compensation” to those shareholders whose voting leverage was nullified by the 
Breakthrough Rule,249 but it does not clarify how this compensation should be 
fulfilled. Such responsibility falls on the head of each Member States and is left 
unsolved even until today. 
In summary, the Breakthrough Rule makes the controlling shareholder and 
incumbent directors of the board impossible to have disproportionate control 
power over the company. They are no longer shielded by voting leverages and 
restriction on share transfer; rather, they have to compete with the acquirer for 
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further corporate control. This kind of rules are seldom seen in other countries 
or regions, but they do largely decrease the agency cost between minority 
shareholder and the controlling shareholders. Despite it is the most controversial 
rule in the European Directive and very few companies had adopted it, it showed 
us a prospect of how to largely encourage the prosperity of hostile takeovers in 
countries with complicated ownership structures.  
iii. The Optional Arrangements Rule 
If it were not for the Optional Arrangements Rule, the European Directive would 
have not been passed in the European Congress.  
The Board Neutrality Rule and the Breakthrough Rule, without doubt, are both 
very extreme rules in takeovers, the former one put a blanket ban on ex post defenses, 
and the latter nullified all ex ante defenses. The Optional Arrangements Rule gives 
each Member State the freedom to apply or not apply those two extreme rules. Article 
12 of the European Directive entitles the Member States the right to “[r]eserve the 
right not to require companies…which have their registered offices within their 
territories to apply Article 9(2) and (3) and/or Article 11.”250 Article 12 nevertheless 
grants the listed companies to apply the Board Neutrality Rule and the Breakthrough 
Rule at their will so far as it is approved by the general meeting of shareholders: 
“[W]here Member States make use of the option provided for in paragraph 1, they 
shall nevertheless grant companies which have their registered offices within their 
territories the option, which shall be reversible, of applying Article 9(2) and (3) 
and/or Article 11, without prejudice…”251 
The Optional Arrangements Rule was a necessary compromise for the Directive 
to pass, as the majority of Member States opposed the Breakthrough Rule and 
approximately half of the Member States expressed their objection to the Board 
Neutrality Rule. On the other hand, it provides the Member States with more liberty in 
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applying the European Directive; the local authorities could, in a way, put the interest 
of their nation before the interest of the E.U. – a step ahead for the Member States, but 
a retrogress for the integration of an internal market. Extreme as the Board Neutrality 
Rule and Breakthrough Rule were, if fully implemented, it could provide large 
certainty to its capital market, which, according to the author of this paper, is the most 
significant thing in hostile takeover regulation. 
Some scholars do not view the Optional Arrangements Rule as an entirely bad 
thing. For them, the optional arrangements of voluntary application of the Board 
Neutrality Rule and the Breakthrough Rule was one of the most creative clause 
in the European Directive, it safeguards that the takeover regulations in 
Europe today are diverse and manifold.252 Despite the same foundation, each 
Member State has large discretionary power in adopting core rules that are 
suitable for them. Naturally, the discretionary power ultimately goes to the 
shareholders as they have the definitive power on whether to write certain 
rules into their Articles of Association in their general meetings. In addition, 
as we will discuss in the next paragraphs, when faced with acquirers who does 
not apply those rules, companies choose to adopt them can temporarily 
discontinue its application of those rules. 
Despite the merits mentioned above, the Optional Arrangements Rule did make 
the “level playing fields” impossible to achieve within the E.U. Under such context, 
some Member States required their directors of the board to remain silent in takeovers, 
while others allowed their boards to fire at their will, which was unfair. The same 
logic could apply to the Breakthrough Rule, too. In summary, the Optional 
Arrangements Rule could pacify the debates and controversies among the Member 
States, but it would exacerbate the internal contradictions within the Directive and 
thereby cause new problems. 
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iv. The Reciprocity Exception Rule 
The Optional Arrangements Rule has led to a dramatic change in the balance of 
power between the acquirers and the target companies. Apparently, companies 
applying the Board Neutrality Rule and the Breakthrough Rule may found themselves 
in a disadvantage situation when facing takeovers. What concerns the legislators was 
that some of those companies were actually the companies with better corporate 
governance – as they are the companies voluntarily obey the Directive in the first 
place. To reduce the harm of the Optional Arrangements Rule, the Reciprocity 
Exception Rule was introduced into the European Directive as a balance: “[M]ember 
States may, under the conditions determined by national law, exempt companies 
which apply Article 9(2) and (3) and/or Article 11 from applying Article 9(2) and (3) 
and/or Article 11 if they become the subject of an offer launched by a company which 
does not apply the same Articles as they do, or by a company controlled, directly or 
indirectly, by the latter.”253 
However, the adoption of the Reciprocity Exception Rule has to be approved by 
the general meeting of shareholders. In other words, the Reciprocity Exception Rule 
itself was optional, too, just like the Board Neutrality Rule and the Breakthrough Rule 
v. The Mandatory Bid Rule 
In the U.K., once the acquirer has obtained 30% of the voting rights of 
the company, the Mandatory Bid Rule applies, and the acquirer will have to 
bid for all outstanding shares of the company. The European Directive had its 
Mandatory Bid Rule, too: “[W]here a natural or legal person, as a result of 
his/her own acquisition or the acquisition by persons acting in concert with 
him/her, holds securities of a company as referred to in Article 1(1) which, 
added to any existing holdings of those securities of his/hers and the holdings 
of those securities of persons acting in concert with him/her, directly or 
indirectly give him/her a specified percentage of voting rights in that company, 
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giving him/her control of that company, Member States shall ensure that such 
a person is required to make a bid as a means of protecting the minority 
shareholders of that company. Such a bid shall be addressed at the earliest 
opportunity to all the holders of those securities for all their holdings at the 
equitable price…”254 The so-called equitable price is actually the “highest” 
price an acquirer paid for the same shares within a certain period, a period 
which each Member States have the discretionary power to set for themselves. 
The supervisory authority in each member state are empowered to adjust the 
“equitable price” according to the declared criteria. 255 
In addition, the European Council allows every Member States to 
determine the “percentage of voting rights which confers control” according to 
their own circumstances256, thus the trigger of the Member States varies from 
lowest 25% to highest 66% 257  in practice. Every Member States have 
exemptions of the Mandatory Bid Rule, too, and some of the exemption 
requirement was too easy that the Mandatory Bid Rule was merely a 
decoration. In summary, the European Directive leaves the Member States 
with too much room to design their own Mandatory Bids Rule. 
vi. The Sell-out Right and Squeeze-out Right 
The Takeover Directive offers minority shareholders a sell-out right 
enabling them to require the majority shareholder bidder to buy their securities 
following a takeover offer if the bidder holds securities representing 90% of 
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the capital carrying voting rights and 90% of the voting rights in the target 
company: “[M]ember States shall ensure that an offeror is able to require all 
the holders of the remaining securities to sell him/her those securities at a fair 
price. Member States shall introduce that right in one of the following 
situations: (a) where the offeror holds securities representing not less than 
90 % of the capital carrying voting rights and 90 % of the voting rights in the 
offeree company, or (b) where, following acceptance of the bid, he/she has 
acquired or has firmly contracted to acquire securities representing not less 
than 90 % of the offeree company’s capital carrying voting rights and 90 % of 
the voting rights comprised in the bid.”258 This sell-out right goes hand in 
hand with a squeeze-out right that allows a majority shareholder bidder to 
require the remaining minority shareholders to sell out their shareholdings at a 
fair consideration: “[M]ember States shall ensure that a holder of remaining 
securities is able to require the offeror to buy his/her securities from him/her 
at a fair price under the same circumstances.” 259 Under either situation, the 
acquirer (or the majority shareholder) must pay for a reasonable share price in 
cash or the same transferable security in the previous tender offer. The right of 
sell-out and squeeze-out is a preemptory norm for all Member States. 
Shareholders can exercise these rights within three months after the tender 
offer takeover. 
The Sell-out Right and the Squeeze-out Right has perfectly considered the 
desperate need of the minority shareholders as well as the de facto controllers of the 
company; it is a trouble-free arrangement for the participants of the takeover. In 
practice, most Member States had has a 90% threshold for the sell-out and 
squeeze-out right. 
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3. The Transposition Status of European Directive 
Ostensibly, the European Directive has been promulgated smoothly at the 
Member States level; until May 2017, except Croatia’s situation was unclear, all 
other Member States had introduced their new takeover law based on the 
European Directive. However, as we have explained above, the European 
Directive has offered the Member States too much freedom in applying the 
proposed rules. Moreover, some Member States worked very hard on semantics 
and verbalism, providing even more freedom to the directors of the board in 
adopting defensive takeover measures. In conclusion, the European Directive is 
“shareholder centered” in nature, but the Member State's application of the 
Directive are somehow more pro directors in practice. 
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IV. Historical Retrospect of the Hostile Takover Modes 
In the previous chapter, we displayed in detail the three different approaches 
of the U.S., the U.K. and the E.U. in hostile takeover regulations; but how did 
those differences happen? A historical retrospect in the formation of the law 
may provide part of the answer. 
 
A. U.S.: From Federal Oversight to Judical Deference of Board’s 
Business Judgement 
The most significant part of the U.S. hostile takeover regulatory framework were 
the Delaware legal precedents in the 1980s, but the “gene” of those precedents could 
trace back to the 1920s.  
Before the establishment of a federal regulator on securities, every State of the 
U.S. used to have its own Blue Sky Laws - the very law that regulated stock exchange 
activities and securities issuances. The goal of the former Blue Sky Laws was to 
protect the general public from fraud and to set reasonable threshold for companies to 
be listed.260 However, the Blue Sky Laws were, more or less, flawed; they failed to 
provide adequate protection and oversight. Many companies circumvented the Blue 
Sky Laws’ listing norms thorough fiscal fraud and false information disclosure; and, 
as the Blue Sky Laws were only State laws in nature, the interstate sales of stocks and 
securities through mail and phone were a regulatory black hole. These illicit 
exchanges sow the seeds for the financial collapse at the end of 1920s. 261 
Because of thriving stock trading, the Dow Jones Index grew from 75 points of 
1921 to 363 points of 1929 at an average growth rate of 33% per year. On October 24 
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1929, the U.S. financial system was, all of a sudden, crashed. 262The stock market 
directly hit abyss overnight. During the two weeks from October 29th to November 
13th, approximately $30,000,000,000 were vanished, equivalent to the total 
expenditure of the U.S. in the World War I.263 In July 1932, the Dow Jones Index hit 
its ground of 40.56. In the first period of the “Great Depression”, more than 10500 
banks went bankruptcy, which counted for almost half of the U.S. Banks; more than 
100,000 enterprises went broke. 264 
When President Franklin Delano Roosevelt assumed office in 1933, he launched 
a series of economic reform, trying to reconstructing American’s banking and 
securities industry. 265As the previous Blue Sky Laws were too weak and outdated, the 
U.S. congress consecutively passed the Securities Act of 1933 and Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 by hearing, aiming at regulating the primary market and the 
secondary market respectively. The Securities Laws passed in the 1930s were all 
“investor-oriented”, trying to protect them from the “bully of the greedy (Wall Street) 
insiders”. 266 
The Securities Act of 1933 was referred to as the “Truth in Securities Law”; 267it 
was built based on the previous Blue Sky Laws, but only more effective - providing 
substantial protections to investors nation-wide. It established a standard information 
disclosure system, with a detailed and sufficient disclosure requirement. The merit of 
the Securities Act was to give investors solid information to make their decision; in 
other words, it was the vendors’ duty to truthfully display all relevant facts, but was 
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the investors’ freewill to decide whether to buy or not based on these facts. 268 
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 was a response to the corporate scandals in 
the 1920s and 1930s; therefore, it was “anti-fraud” in nature. It also established the 
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (hereinafter the “SEC”) as the highest 
authority in federal securities regulation. The SEC was an independent agency of the 
United States federal government; it is now primarily responsible for enforcing the 
federal securities laws269, proposing securities rules, and regulating the securities 
industry, the nation's stock exchanges, options exchanges, and other activities and 
organizations, including the electronic securities markets in the United States. 270 
The Securities Act of 1933 and Securities Exchange Act of 1934 were the key 
components of the Roosevelt’s New Deal, with which the populist Congress 
successfully took this opportunity to federalize the securities regulation. Moreover, 
the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 separated the commercial banking and investment 
banking. Since then, the separated securities firms and investment banks were 
prevented from taking deposits, and securities firms and investment banks were 
prohibited of dealing in non-governmental securities for customers and investing in 
non-investment grade securities for themselves. The Glass-Steagall Act also 
established the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation to maintain stability and public 
confidence in the nation's financial system by insuring deposits, examining and 
supervising financial institutions for safety and soundness and consumer protection 
and so on.271 The populist government passed the Banking Act of 1935, which 
dramatically changed the structure and power distribution in the Federal Reserve 
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System that began with the Banking Act of 1933. It strengthened the tradition of 
separate operation and management of commercial and investment banks, and largely 
impaired the uncontrolled power of the arrogant bankers and capitalists. 
More than 10,000 banks went bankruptcy from 1930 onwards, but the stringent 
supervisory laws afterwards were the true disasters for the banking industry – they 
directly fragmentized the already very divded capitalist power.272 The establishment 
of the SEC superseded the autonomous supervision and management of the industry 
once for all – stifling the self-supervision practice in the cradle.  
Hostile takeovers emerged in the 1950s after the U.S. stock market finally 
recovered to its normal level in the 1920s. The year of 1954 marked the first corporate 
control fight in the U.S., when the Populist of Wall Street Robert Ralph Young 
launched a proxy fight for the control of the New York Central Railroad. With the 
assistance from Sid Williams Richardson and Clint Murchiso, Robert Ralph Young 
finally obtained the control of New York Central Railroad. 273One year after, Louis 
Wolfson, inspired by Robert Ralph Young, launched a proxy fight for the control of 
the Montgomery Ward. Louis’ successful takeover led to the resign of the former CEO 
Sewell Avery, who was regarded as over conservative in corporate major issues. The 
end of 1950s saw numerous proxy contests in American companies.274  
As the prosperity of proxy battles largely hinged on the rebellious shareholders’ 
persuation power and the extent to which the incumbent shareholders were 
dissatisfied with the management, it was not an effective way for corporate control at 
all.275 Under this background, the tender offer came into being, and it directly 
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fostered the growth of corporate raiders in the Wall Street, who made profits through 
plundering corporate resources and pillaging company assets.  
Tender offer was, indeed, an effective weapon for corporate control. While the 
proxy contesters could only offer shareholders illusory future, tender offerors pay 
substantial cash in exchange for shareholders’ stocks and the rights attached to it. 
Hostile takeovers thereby became much frequent than before in the 1960s. Corporate 
scholars began noticing the positive effect of the hostile takeovers. Henry Manne first 
observed hostile takeovers’ potential threat for the improvements of corporate 
governance. 276 More and more law firms and accounting firms joined the feast of 
hostile takeovers; investment banks and commercial banks also became itch to lean 
their fingers on the pie.277 The capital market was unprecedentedly flourish, and 
people’s attitudes towards hostile takeovers were changing tremendously.  
Shortly after the wide adoption of the tender offer, the so-called “Saturday night 
special tender offer” appeared very frequently. This kind of tender offer usually 
required the shareholders to reply in a very short term, and purchase shares on a “first 
come, first serve” basis – pressuring shareholders to tender.278 Even worse, some 
acquirers constructed two-tier tender offers – first comers get cash, late comers get 
trash bond with the same “cash price” in exchange of their shares. As these coercive 
tender offers disturbed the capital market, in 1965, New Jersey Senator Harrison 
Williams began lobbying the Congress to draft stricter standards for tender offers. The 
Senate Committee on Banking and Currency and the SEC then worked along with 
Senator Harrison Williams to draft a law to provide better and more adequate 
protections for shareholders of the target company in tender offers. Eventually, the 
Williams Act was passed by the congress of 1968 was the technical amendment 
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to the Rule 13 and Rule 14 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and the 
modern era of federal regulation of tender offers began. To this end, the 
Williams Act enhanced the rules governing takeover offers into two pillars: 
first, it required the bidders to disclose information about the offer properly; 
and, second, it established thorough procedural requirements governing tender 
offers. 
Like we previously mentioned, Rule 13(d) of the Williams Act imposed 
stricter information disclosure requirements on the acquirers: any person 
directly or indirectly becomes the “beneficial owner of more than 5 per 
centum” of company shares must “within ten days after such acquisition or 
within such shorter time” file a statement containing information about the 
investors as well as the transactions to the SEC. 279 The consequence of 
violating the disclosure requirement are fine penalty and even criminal 
punishments. 280  Moreover, despite the fact that the SEC had the law 
enforcement authority over the majority rules in the Securities Exchange Act, 
the 13(d) Rule was one of the very few that the target company could use as a 
basis for prosecution. 
Rule 14 intended to guarantee equal treatment and protection for 
shareholders. The Rule 14 (d)-10 was referred to as the “Best Price Rule”, which 
required the bidder to pay shareholders the highest price possible even shareholders 
had previously agreed to an inferior price. The Rule 14(d) also forbade share purchase 
at the “first come, first serve” basis, rather, the bidder had to buy all the pre-offer 
shares according to the pre-sale ratio; in addition, shareholders were allowed to 
withdraw their offer within 7 days after they tendered. 281 The Rule 14(e) mandated a 
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tender offer to be kept open to public for at least 20 days,282 leaving shareholders 
abundant time to consider whether to tender or not. 
In conclusion, the Williams Act ruled out every possibility for the bidder to adopt 
coercive tender offers against the target shareholders. However, it changed the subtle 
balance of the acquirer and the target company as well; it on one hand provided the 
target shareholders more flexibility in making decisions, it at the same time offered 
the target board more room to adopt defenses. Even worse, to some extent, the 
Williams Act pushed the bidder with takeover attempt to work alone with corporate 
insiders or the controlling shareholder, which in turn increased the agency cost 
between minority shareholders and majority shareholders. 
 
At the private law side, the commercial law of Delaware was undergone huge 
changes since late 1960s as well.  
In the 1950s, Delaware as the “State with the most prominent corporate law in 
the U.S.” was tarnishing, but the 1967 Amendments to Delaware’s General 
Corporation Law put it back to the throne, again.283 It gave primacy to the Business 
Judgement Rule and largely expanded the liability exemptions for directors. 
Additionally, it established a loose accreditation criterion for self-interested 
transactions, and narrowed the use of appraisal rights of dissent shareholders.284 The 
“board centered” law attracted numerous companies to incorporate in Delaware, and 
the most important hostile takeover disputes were all ruled in the Delaware courts, 
who shaped the takeover regime of the U.S. as the legal pioneer. 
In Unocal Corp V. Mesa Petroleum Co. of 1985, the court had to decide 
whether the target company was legitimate to defense hostile takeover by buying 
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back its shares. The court first realized that the board's decision was under the 
consumption that the directors were acting based on bona fide and informed 
judgement, hence they should be protected by the Business Judgement Rule. However, 
the court at the same time recognized that the directors were “of a necessity” 
confronted with a conflict of interest that they may very possible lose their job if the 
takeover succeeds. In addition, because of the existence of such conflict of interest, 
the direct application of the Business Judgement Rule was inappropriate; therefore, a 
scientific interim standard – the Unocal test – became necessary. At the beginning, the 
court was not entirely confident in applying such a two tier test ; the footnote 10 of the 
case verdict delineates the conflict of Justice Moore. On one hand, it pointed out that 
the directors had more information than the shareholders to make decisions in 
takeovers; on the other hand, from other countries’ experiences, it was not a bad thing 
for the board to remain neutral and passive. Justice Moore had to cite carefully from 
the prominent academic works from “Shareholder Centrism” supporter Martin Lipton, 
who pointed out that “[o]ver 50 percent of target companies, who resisted hostile 
takeovers, later traded at higher market prices than the rejected offer price, or were 
acquired after the tender offer was defeated by another company at a price higher 
than the offer price.”285 He also made reference to the works of “Board Centrism” 
advocator Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischer, who argued that cash tender offers 
“increase everyone’s welfare”286 and challenged Martin Lipton’s economic rationale  
permitting directors to defense hostile takeovers.287 Eventually, the court abandoned 
the Passive Board Theory and did not require shareholder’ approval before directors’ 
action: “[i]t has been suggested that a board’s response to a takeover threat should be 
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a passive one. However, that clearly is not the law of Delaware, and as the proponents 
of this rule of passivity readily concede, it has not been adopted either by courts or 
state legislatures.”288 
The Unocal’s verdict illustrated that the legal climate that favored the board was 
unlikely to change in any single trials, as the Delaware court had to base every trial on 
previous precedents – and if they want to make a change, they could only do it little 
by little. Th well entrenched Business Judgement Rule had set the tone for directors 
taking defensive measures in hostile takeovers, thus the director’ primacy was very 
difficult to overturn even in the future.  
The same trial logic applies to the subsequent hostile takeover cases. For 
example, in the Unitrin, Inc. v. American General Corp., case, the Delaware 
court had to judge, whether the adoption of a poison pill and a share 
repurchase scheme had violated the directors’ fiduciary duty. Justice Holland 
stuck closely to the framework of the Unocal test, inquiring the Unitrin board 
whether they had grounded reason to believe that American General 
Corporation’s acquisition would damage Unitrin’s future plan, and whether 
their defenses were in proportion to the threats imposed. The court, took a 
small step further, questioning Unitrin’s response might be “draconian”, as the 
defenses deprived everyone else the opportunity to obtain control of the 
company even through normal proxy contests. The court was very cautious in 
limiting the directors’ discretionary power in taking defensive; to achieve so,  
Justice Holland cited more than 30 academic works in the verdict to support 
his judgement. 289 Under huge influences of the works by Gregg Kanter,290 the 
court imbedded the a new Unitrin test ahead of the Unocal Test – the board 
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had to prove their defenses were not draconian first, before these anti-takeover 
measures are put under the scrutiny of the Unocal test.  
In summary, the Delaware court hewed closely with former precedents in hostile 
takeover disputes, and the “board primacy” tradition had already rooted too deeply to 
be challenged. Even if the law had to be changed in order to cater the need of the 
market, it could only evolve at a very moderate speed. Most importantly, the 
numerous trial precedents of Delaware had formed the climate of letting the directors’ 
fire “freely” against unwanted takeovers. All in all, the fiduciary duty reviewed 
system established in the precedents was nothing more than an intermediate standard 
between the loose Business Judgement Rule and the strict Substantive Justice 
Principle, which almost had the tendency of giving the directors whatever they want.  
 
B. U.K.: From Shareholder Centrism to Self-regulatory System 
Now let us have a historical review of the U.K.’s approach. Just the like the U.S., 
hostile takeovers first emerged in the U.K. in the 1950s. After the World War II, the 
high inflation rate elevated the price of fixed assets, especially the land.291 As the 
fiscal information of companies were not as transparent as today, the investors could 
only judge the value of the shares through the amount of dividends. In other words, 
the value increase of the companies’ assets were not reflected directly at the share 
price. The government-imposed dividend restriction in the 1950s led to the hoard of 
cash of many companies, and acute investors sniffed profitable opportunities.292 
In 1953, the Russia-immigrant businessman Charles Clore realized that the value 
of the Shoe Retailer J. Sears was severely undervalued. J. Sears owned plenty of 
commercial houses and land in central London, and their values were not reflected in 
the share price. Charles Clore then launched a tender offer for all outstanding shares 
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of J. Sears at the open market, and the tender offer price was much higher than the 
market price. The J. Sears management was horrified, they immediately promised to 
increase its dividends and reevaluate the company assets so that the share price could 
truly reflect its value, but such promises came too late. Charles Clore then 
successfully obtained the control of the Shoe Retailer J. Sears. 293 
In the same year of 1953, the England Financier Harold Samuel announced his 
hostile takeover attempt over the Savoy Hotel Group. As the price of the fixed assets 
skyrocketed in the past few years, Savoy’s share price did not fully reflect its true 
value. Harold Samuel intended to transform Savoy’s Berkeley Hotel into commercial 
office premises for better profit. The Savoy’s board began taking defensive measures 
against Harold’s attack. The board sold the Savoy’s Berkeley Hotel to a new business 
entity – the Worcester Limited, who later rented the Savoy’s Berkeley Hotel back to 
the Savoy’s Group, on condition that the buildings and constructions associated with 
Berkeley could only be used as hotels. As the Savoy board was the de facto controller 
of the Worcester Limited, this Assets Lock-up Strategy was directed wholly by 
the Savoy Board. 294  
At that time, hostile takeover was not a decent way for corporate control, and the 
previous hostile takeover attempts of both Charles Clore and Harold Samuel had 
drawn controversies nation-wide. However, in the Harold case, an even larger 
controversy aroused around the board’s self-trenching behaviors when facing 
takeovers – they deployed defensive measures without seeking approvals from their 
general assembly. The shareholders contested constantly, which led to the 
investigation from the United Kingdom’s Board of Trade, who later ruled that the 
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board’s ultra vires had breached their fiduciary duty.295 
However, it was until the end of the 1950s was the regulation on hostile takeover 
officially put on the agenda. At the end of 1958, the Tube Investments of U.K., the 
U.S. Reynolds Metal Company and the Aluminum Company of America all publicly 
announced their acquisition attempt of the British Aluminum. Without thorough 
discussions with the general assembly, the British Aluminum board reached a 
cooperative intention with the Aluminum Company of America, and directly rejected 
the other two companies. The board agreed to issue a large amount of new shares to 
the Aluminum Company of America so that it could hold 1/3 shares of the British 
Aluminum. The shareholders were kept unknown from this deal until the Tube 
Investments of U.K. and the U.S. Reynolds Metal Company bypassed the British 
Aluminum board and sent out a general tender offer for its all outstanding shares. The 
board then intended to exclude the Tube Investments of U.K. and the U.S. Reynolds 
Metal Company’s tender offer by publishing the fait accompli deal. The shareholders 
were outraged by the board’s behavior, and the board tried to bribe the shareholders 
by largely increasing the share dividends. However, this could not stop the irritated 
shareholders selling their shares to the “hostile” tender offerors. At last, the board 
completely lost the control of the company very fast.296 
The mal-practice of the British Aluminum board shocked the whole industry, and 
the call on stricter regulations on the board’s behavior was overwhelming. As the 
mergers and acquisitions appeared much more frequently than before in the past few 
years, the major players in the game felt obliged to take actions before the congress 
would. In July 1959, the Bank of England quietly formed a legislation committee,  
members of which were representatives from commercial banks, investment 
organizations, large commercial associations and the stock exchange. In October 1959, 
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under the close cooperation with the Issuing Houses Association, the Accepting 
Houses Committee, the British Insurance Association and London Stock Exchange, 
the Bank of England released the Notes on Amalgamation of British Businesses – the 
first hostile takeover law in the U.K. history. As it was mainly written by the 
Marquess of Queensberry, it was also referred to as the Queensberry Rule.297 “Active 
shareholders, passive directors” was the quintessence of the Note, and it was divided 
into two parts – principle and procedure. The four fundamental principles were: “1. 
There should be no interference with the free market in shares and securities of 
companies. 2. It is for a shareholder to decide for himself whether to sell or retain his 
shares. 3. To enable him to come to a considered decision, the shareholder should 
have in suitable form and at the right time all relevant information, and it is the duty 
of the Board of his company to make every effort to ensure that such information is 
provided and to give him their advice. 4. Every effort should be made to avoid 
disturbance in the normal price level of shares until the relevant information has been 
made available.”298  
The Bank of England released this self-supervisory rule just before the Prime 
Minister Harold Macmillan announced the intention to revise the Companies’ Act in 
November 1959.299 Despite the fact that the Notes on Amalgamation of British 
Businesses was in many aspects flawed, it was commonly accepted in the U.K in the 
following years.300 The lack of a law enforcement agency was the Notes’ biggest 
weakness, and some people began to deem a governmental institution with regulatory 
authority – just like the Securities and Exchange Commission in the U.S. – was the 
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only solution for a stable market for corporate control. Luckily, in July 1967, the 
Prime Minister Harold Macmillan expressed clearly that: currently, imperative law 
was not the best solution for England. 301 
When the U.S. Congress was trying to carry out the Williams Act, the investors 
and their associations in the U.K. drafted and released the City Code on Takeovers 
and Mergers at the end of March 1968. Based primarily on the Queensberry 
Rule, the newly released City Code had specifically addressed all the issues 
that was unable to solve by the Note. 302  In addition, it specified the 
shareholders’ absolute authority in takeover related issues. Most importantly, 
the Panel on Takeovers and Mergers was established on March 27th 1968 based 
on the City Code. The Panel had nine committee members initially, 
representing the banks, large corporations, business associations and industrial 
unions. For those commercial elites, ex ante interference was more efficient 
than ex post adjudication.  
The inchoate performance of the Takeover Panel was not as good as expected, it 
was overwhelmed by the steady flow of cases. The bidders were repeatedly 
challenging the bottom-line of the City Code that even if the Takeover Panel was kept 
constantly on the run, it could not babysit every aspects in various transaction deals303. 
In November 1968, the Prime Minister expressed his confidence in the City Code, but 
at the same time pointed out that if the Takeover Panel failed to reform immediately 
for better working flow and higher efficiency, the government would have no choice 
but solve the problem through public legislation. 304 
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The Takeover Panel acted swiftly to evolve itself. In 1968, Lord Shawcross305 
was invited as the non-executive chairman of the Takeover Panel, and more full-time 
conciliation professionals were hired to solve the knotty cases. An Appeal Committee 
was introduced into the dispute solving procedure, paralleled with the common court. 
Lord Pearce306 was invited as the chairman of the Appeals Committee of the 
Takeover Panel; he served on this position until 1976.  
Most important, the sanction and penalty power for the Takeover Panel 
had been inexorably on the increase. The Board of Trade supported the 
Takeover Panel’s back by agreeing to inflict administrative punishments on 
undisciplined bidders. The London Stock Exchange also expressed their will 
to work along with the Takeover Panel to delist companies out of line. Soon, 
the Council of Stock Exchange, the Association of British Insurers, the 
Association of Unit Trust Managers, the Association of Investment Trust 
Companies all unanimously agreed to endorse the Takeover Panel. 
With the whole industry as its back, the Takeover Panel and its City Code 
successfully became the ultimate authority in takeover disputes. Despite the 
left-leaning Labor Governments in the 1970s, the Takeover Panel proved its 
irreplaceability through its impeccable performances and proactive 
self-improvements.307 All in all, the history of the Takeover Panel and the City Code 
was the history of a self-regulatory system racing with the administrative legislation. 
In order to survive, the Takeover Panel had to constantly improve itself to better cater 
the need of the market, meanwhile, it must keep its good reputation as legislative 
interventionism may resurge at any time. In the end, this thoroughly 
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hammered-regulatory framework has blended itself into the U.K.’s capital market, 
outmatching any possible regulators established by a legislative system. 
 
C. E.U.: From European Community Shareholder Centrism to 
Member States Board Centrism 
The formation of the European Directive was a long history as well, but it 
commenced later than the U.S. and the U.K. The notion of “a united European 
takeover law” started from the middle of the 1970s, when the European Council 
discussed intensely on how to integrate its internal market. In a landmark 
document - Completing the internal market: white paper from the commission to 
the European Council of 1985, the European Committee mentioned the 
necessity of improving the tender offer procedure. In 1989, the European 
Committee drafted the Proposal for a Thirteenth Council Directive on Company 
Law Concerning Takeover and Other General Bids based on the U.K. City Code. 
This proposal contained basic equal treatment rule for shareholders and 
delineated the rudiment of the general duty of the acquirers as well as the target 
management. 308 The acquirers were required to obey a stricter information 
disclosure requirement, and once they obtained the shares of the target company 
to a certain degree, they have to bid mandatorily for all the outstanding shares of 
the company.309 
Under drastic critics from the U.K. and Germany, this proposal did not get 
through. Although it was based primarily on the City Code, the U.K. 
Department of Trade and Industry feared that codifying the non-statutory 
self-regulation code might impair Takeover Panel's speed and flexibility. On the 
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other hand, the European's industry feared that such a united law might pave the 
way for trivial suits all over Europe. 
A new takeover directive proposal came into being in 1996 after intense 
negotiations with other Member States. This new proposal was more 
conservative than before, calling off some of the controversial rules and 
regulations.310 To address the U.K.'s fear of losing discretionary power, Article 
4(6) clarified the supervisory authority in each member state: “[T]his Directive 
does not affect the powers of the Member States to designate judicial or other 
authorities responsible for dealing with disputes and for deciding on 
irregularities committed in the bid procedure nor does it affect the power of 
Member States to regulate whether and under which circumstances parties to a 
bid are entitled to bring administrative or judicial proceedings. In particular, 
this Directive does not affect the power which courts may have in a Member 
State to decline to hear legal proceedings and to decide whether or not such 
proceedings affect the outcome of a bid. This Directive shall not affect the 
powers of the Member States to determine the legal position concerning the 
liability of supervisory authorities or concerning litigation between the parties 
to a bid”.311 
However, this new proposal again failed to unify the interests of all 
Member States. The Takeover Panel in the U.K. feared that it might open the 
Pandora's Box for expensive litigations. The Netherlands expressed their 
concerns over the absolute ban on takeover defenses by directors of the board 
without shareholders’ approval. France insisted to add employment protection 
clauses into the Directive. 312 
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After a series of failure in the beginning of 2000s, the Committee asked the 
leading scholar in European corporate governance - Jaap Winter to establish a 
team unit to propose and draft another unified Takeover Directive. Winter's 
mission was to bring up a proposal that strengthens and unifies European 
Industry by improving the efficiency of a “united market in Europe”. This time, 
“a level playing field” for European market of corporate control was the prior 
concern. Bearing this in mind, Winter's team invented the “Breakthrough Rule” 
and other institutional arrangements to ensure the shareholders are being treated 
equally in takeovers. 313 
However, Winter's creative but aggressive proposal faced even severer 
attacks; the “Breakthrough Rule” had led to fierce debates. Sweden and 
Germany openly expressed their opposition of the “Breakthrough Rule” as it 
nullified more than half of their listed companies' dual equity structure and 
loose up the share transfer limitations in their family enterprises.314 
After continuous negotiations and compromises, the Italian Representative 
worked out the idea of allowing corporations to freely apply the rules from the 
Directive; in other words, not all the rules from the Directive had to be 
mandatory. This compromise proposal solved the long time haggle between the 
Member States and thereby acquired wide-range acknowledgement. The 
Member States could now freely choose the rules and regulations from the 
Directive according to their market needs as far as relative and reasonable 
protections for minority shareholders were in place.315  
In 2004, The European Directive on Takeover Bids was finally passed and 
came into effect afterwards – it “harmonized” the takeover regulation of all 
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Member States by giving up the most important essence of the notion of “a 
united European takeover law” – unification. The original goals of the European 
Directive were abandoned in its drafting process; because of pork-barrel politics, 
the European Council had to compromise again and again to reach the final 
“consent” – in the end, some target board does not have to remain “neutral” in 
takeovers and the share transfer limit and controlling minority structures remain as 
pervasive as they were. In summary, the European Council suggested at the E.U. level 
that a “Shareholder Centrism” law was optimal, but some Member States firmly believe 
that “Board Centrism” was of their best interests; therefore, though began from the U.K. 
City Code, the European Directive ended far away from its original design.  
 
The formation process of the takeover regulatory framework in the U.S., 
the U.K. and the E.U. all had their own historical necessity. While the U.S. 
mode favored the directors Business Judgement to an extreme extent, the U.K. 
self-regulatory system on the contrary entitled the shareholders with the primary 
decision power in major corporate issues. The E.U.’s European Directive was 
largely inspired by the U.K. City Code, but some of the Member States opposed 
a shareholders-supreme law from the beginning to the end. In conclusion, just 
like the Path dependence theory has implied, historical factors and localities had 
set the basic tones for the hostile takeover regulatory frameworks long long ago, 
even though some of the past circumstances are now no longer relevant. 
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V. Explanations of Divergence: The Path Dependence 
In the previous chapter, we looked back on the history of the formation of 
the takeover laws in the U.S., the U.K, and the E.U. During this process, the 
legislative needs, economic demands, political gambles and power clashes 
shaped three different hostile takeover regulatory frameworks. The history 
retrospect has explained the inevitability of the formation of three different 
hostile takeover regulatory modes, yet it did not fully reveal the path 
dependence nature of the takeover regulations. How did the regulatory systems 
entrench themselves? What accounts the most for the systemic inertia of the 
three regimes? Professor John Armour and David A. Skeel Jr. attributed the 
differences to the different roles of the institutional investors played in the 
formation of the law. 316 Enlightened by their theory, this research attributes the 
discrepancies and formation of the path dependence features of the U.S., the 
U.K. and the E.U. hostile takeover regime to the different roles of different 
interest groups in history and the contests between them. These interest groups 
include: the institutional investors, industry associations, labor unions, large 
conglomerates and so on.  
 
A. U.S.: Wane of Wall Street and Rise of Delaware Courts 
Before the establishment of the SEC, the financial industry of the U.S. had 
undergone more than 100 years of incomplete self-regulation. In 1791, William 
Duer resigned as the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury; he then took advantage 
of his previous position for opportunistic profits in the bond market. Duer’s 
speculative behavior gave rise to the first financial panic in the U.S. history, 
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causing great property damages to many New York citizens. Under this context, 
24 stockbrokers and merchants signed the so-called Buttonwood Agreement 
under the tallest buttonwood tree in the Wall Street area on May 17th, 1792, 
setting the parameters for securities trading in the first incarnation of the New 
York Stock Exchange.317 They made the promise and pledge to each other that 
they would “[n]ot buy or sell from this day for any person whatsoever, any kind 
of Public Stock, at a less rate than one quarter per cent Commission on the 
Specie value”.318 
On March 8th, 1917, based on the rough Buttonwood Agreement, the 
subscribers and brokers almost indiscriminately imitated the constitution of the 
Philadelphia Stock Exchange and drafted the Constitution of the New York & 
Stock Exchange Board. In 1863, the name “New York Stock & Exchange Board” 
was shortened to its nowadays form - the “New York Stock Exchange”.319 
Until the enactment of the Securities Act of 1933, the self-regulatory 
rules of the New York Stock Exchange were the most important legal resource 
of the federal securities law. Essentially, the New York Stock Exchange was a 
private independent legal entity; all the listed companies were its member and 
were bound by the constitution and listing rules of the NYSE. Therefore, the 
Stock Exchange itself was the most prominent self-regulatory entity at that 
time. At first, all the listed companies in the New York Stock Exchange were 
requested to provide their shareholders with annual balance sheet and income 
statement.320 Since 1920, all the listed companies had to disclosure significant 
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information quarterly. Since 1928, all the financial statements published by 
the listed companies must be examined by an independent auditor. 321 
However, as we mentioned in the previous chapter, the financial crisis of 
the 1929 led to a populist Congress federalizing the regulation and oversight 
of the securities market. During the federalization process, the institutional 
investors (mainly from Wall Street) were considered as the major villain in the 
financial crisis. The general public blamed the “greedy Wall Street” for their 
wealth destruction. The populist government immediately took advantage of 
the situation and promulgated the paradigm of mandatory federal oversight.322 
The rise of the SEC as the main regulator marked the fall of the self-regulatory 
tradition. Since then, self-regulation was no longer a choice for the U.S. 
securities market. Although some customary laws were still active in the 
1930s, they were all coded into the federal securities law afterwards. In the 
1960s, there were very few self-regulatory rules, for example, the 
“Gentleman’s Code”, which forbade White Shoe Investment Banks to take part 
in hostile takeovers, but they all did not last long before they vanished 
forever.323 
An interesting phenomenon in the U.S. is that, whenever the economic 
depression happens, the Wall Street is usually the first to be blamed. When hostile 
takeovers first emerged in the U.S. history in the 1950s, the general public, politicians 
and regulators were all outraged by the hostile attempt. The “Saturday Special Tender 
Offer” from 1960 onward promoted the outbreak of hostile takeovers. The Wall Street, 
again, was to be blamed. In promoting the Williams Act, Senator Williams Harrison 
spoke candidly that he wanted to ensure the management of the company to have 
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enough “gunpowder” to fight back the Wall Street “corporate raiders” and “white 
collar pirates”. 324  Indeed, the Wall Street investors were at the same time 
shareholders and acquirers of the listed companies. Those institutional investors were 
regarded as either filthy insiders or barbarians to the companies “with good traditions”. 
Because of this, it was rational to always put them under the scrutiny of the federal 
laws. With reputation this notorious, institutional investors, such as the pension funds, 
insurance funds or hedge funds, were impossible (and of no use) to oppose federal 
oversight of the securities and banking industry. When the follow-up laws came into 
being subsequently, the status of the SEC was trenched and there was no room at all 
for the institutional investors to overturn the game rule and restore self-oversight.325   
Historically, the SEC had never sought greater substantial power, for example, 
the power to review the merit of the tender offer; as a result, the judicial authority of 
takeover disputes naturally decentralized to State courts.326 The directors of the board 
were the “repeated player” in those trials and they had greater resources to deal with 
the suits. Therefore, the acquirers were less likely to win in litigations. No wonder the 
accumulated legal precedents formed a legal regime more pro management than pro 
shareholders.  
In summary, the shutdown of the self-regulations in the 1930s, continuous 
notorious reputation of the Wall Street institutional investors, and the court-based 
fiduciary duty review system together shaped the current U.S. hostile takeover 
regulatory framework: it is a pro-management system with no room for institutional 
investors’ self-regulation. 
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B. U.K.: Formidable Institutional Investors and Unfading 
Takeover Panel 
Institutional investors, industrial associations and unions played a much 
more important role in the formation of the U.K. hostile takeover law.327 We 
mentioned in the previous chapters that, the institutional investors (especially 
those associated with the Wall Street) were of bad reputations in the U.S., they 
were blamed for all previous financial crisis. The widespread detestation of the 
financial trust and securities fraud led to a centralized regulation on U.S.’s 
capital market. However, in the U.K., the situation was totally the opposite. 
Institutional investors such as pension bund, unit trust and so on, were the most 
important players in takeovers. Most importantly, their growth had never 
suffered any political resistance; some of the policies even fostered the growth 
of the institutional investors. For instance, the punitively high rates of marginal 
taxation applied to investment income for individuals after the World War II, 
the marginal taxation rate rise from 90% in the 1950s to 98% at the end of the 
1970s; these factors completely destroyed the investment enthusiasm of 
independent citizens. 328 Despite the Thatcher Government pushed a tax cut 
since 1979, the marginal taxation applied to investment income for individuals 
in the 1980s was still at a high level of around 40%. The Mutual Investment 
Scheme, on the other hand, largely reduced the institutional investors’ tax rate. 
The insurance funds enjoyed half of the individual investment tax rate, and the 
pension fund was almost tax-free at the end of the 1990s as the government 
intended to promote private senior-care institutions. 329Under these contexts, 
mutual investment behaviors had replaced all individual investment, and the 
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institutional investors had grown wildly – the average shareholding of 
institutional investors were rocketing from 1950 untill the early 2000s. 330 
Despite the fact that the institutional investors were the mainstream in the 
U.K. capital market, those stockholders were famous for passive and indifferent 
to the management and development of the Company.331 They never interfere 
with the corporate issues, and once the performance of the company was not 
good, they “vote with their feet”. The U.K. government always had the intention 
to encourage institutional investors to take part in corporate governance, but 
they refused to do so because of the “free rider” problem.332 In fact, in order to 
maintain sustainable growth, most institutional investors held only a very small 
portion of shares of each company they invested – the overall performance of 
the portfolios were the fund managers’ primary concern, not each individual 
companies’ income status. Moreover, the cost of cooperation was so huge that, 
only in extreme situations would the shareholders united together to overturn 
the incumbent management. Rebellions of the institutional investor shareholders 
were very rare in the U.K. history.333   
This does not mean that the hands of the institutional investors were 
completely tight in front of the board and managers of the company. To ensure 
their supremacy in the companies, the institutional investors exert every 
influences they have on legislations directly. In other words, they strongly 
preferred the laws at their favor to unnecessary participation in corporate 
governance. The preemptive rights, the ban on non-voting shares, the 
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prohibition of taking takeover defenses without the approval from the 
shareholders, the approval rights of major corporate issues and the limitations 
on board structures and directors remunerations were all optimal rules for the 
institutional investors in the U.K. In conclusion, the institutional investor 
shareholders put their energy on things that they were good at – lobbying and 
persuasion, and avoided being forced to take part in things they were not 
familiar with. Although the free rider problem still exited in lobbying, but it was 
much more efficient and cost saving than having to involve deeply in corporate 
governance. Moreover, frequently withdrawing investment from companies with 
poor performance and reinvesting the money into potentially better ones were 
extremely costly, too; cultivating a shareholder-oriented law was the most 
convenient solution that could once for all let the investors rest easy. After all, 
the agency cost was the source of the problems. 
Over the past decades, the institutional investors actively participated in the 
formation of the self-regulatory laws, and the labor unions, directors associations were 
excluded out of this process.334 By effectively lobbying the politicians and legislators, 
the glorious tradition of self-discipline was retained almost integrally. For example, in 
the 1950s, the institutional investors, industry elites, associations and unions 
were united together by the Bank of England, and they managed to adopt a 
self-discipline rule - the Notes on Amalgamation of British Businesses just before the 
official revision of the Companies Act. 335 The institutional investors even managed to 
retain the independence and authority of the City Code after Britain joined the E.U. The 
“political proximity” between the Bank of England and the British government offered 
convenience for the institutional investors, fund controllers and financers’ demands and 
appeals to be noticed by the prime minister and his cabinet. After all, the forefathers of 
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these true owners of the listed companies originally all lived in a square mile London 
city and they shared the same anxiety when modern enterprises had to separate 
ownership and control for economics of scale.336 
When Charles Clore successfully took control of the Shoe Retailer J. Sears, 
the industry was shocked, referring Charles Clore to as an “asset striper”. 
Nevertheless, the shareholders actually benefited a lot from this takeover. In the 
takeover disputes between Harold Samuel and the Savoy Hotel Group, 
shareholders were outraged not because of Harold Samuel's “hostility”, but 
because of the board's ultra vires, which was the same situation in the takeover 
battles of the British Aluminum. The Bank of England conveniently took 
advantage of these momentums, and formed a draft committee for the Notes on 
Amalgamation of British Businesses; the Institute of Directors and Association 
of British Chambers of Commerce were not invited at all. In 1968, when the 
Bank of England invited the elites and representatives to draft the City Code, 
this time, they cannot exclude the Confederation of British Industry, who 
represented the interests of the management of the large corporations. 337 
However, the doctrine of “Active shareholders, passive directors” of the 
previous Queensberry Rule was so deeply engrained that it was impossible for 
anyone to shake its status. 338 
In summary, a shareholder-supreme self-regulatory takeover law was 
formed as a result of: 1. mighty institutional investors constantly lobbying the 
legislators; 2. Bank of England’s proximity with the British Government; and 3. 
weak labor unions and directors associations being unable to change the distaste 
for ultra vires behaviors and etc. Hence, the self-regulatory tradition first 
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became a fashion and ultimately became a consensus foundation for the hostile 
takeover law in the U.K.  
 
C. E.U.: Meddlesome European Council and Troublesome 
Member States 
The protests and indignation of the institutional investors, large 
consortiums and labor unions ultimately led to the compromises of the European 
Directive. In fact, during the negotiation process of the Directive, the U.K. was 
still part of the E.U.; and the institutional investors who formerly facilitated the 
enactment of the City Code, likewise, put all their effort into lobbying and 
persuasion to oppose the Directive.  
Interest groups had their own concerns and appeals. For instance, in 2000, 
the British mobile operator Vodafone successfully acquired the German firm 
Mannesmann in a hostile takeover worth billions - the largest corporate merger 
in history.339 This merger has shocked the whole industries in Germany. In a 
proposed amendment of the 2000 version of the European Directive, the 
Rapporteur of the Legal Affairs Committee - Klaus-Heine Lhene, representative 
of the Christian Democratic Union of Germany in Dusseldorf – clearly 
advocated that the board should have the discretionary power in adopting 
anti-takeover defenses. Large German enterprises like the Volkswagen and 
BASF SE organized a march against the Board Neutrality Rule. 340Spain 
supported the German council members in exchange for greater fishing subsidy 
in the Common Agricultural Policy.341 
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Two years later, the new proposal by Jaap Winter and his team, again, 
roused intense resistance from several Europeans’ industries. In order to solidify 
the European Industry and establish a “level-playing field”, Jaap Winter 
designed the Breakthrough Rule, which could effectively nullify all ex ante 
takeover defenses. Institutional investors from Sweden and the Netherlands explicitly 
opposed the Breakthrough Rule, as more than half of their listed companies had 
dual-share structures. Large consortiums felt being humiliated by the new Directive 
proposal. For example, the Wallenberg Family controlled the telecoms tycoon Ericsson, 
the white household appliance manufacturer Electrolux, the mechanical 
equipment giant ABB，the World’s third largest pharmaceutical group Astra 
Zeneca, the World’s largest garden machines producer Husqvarna, the leading 
aircraft and automobile manufacturer SAAB and the largest airline company 
SAS through its investment vehicle – the Investor AB limited. Voting leverage 
was very common in Investor AB’s subsidiaries. Taking Ericsson as another 
example. Ericsson had issued two classes of shares – A share and B share. Each 
A share carried 1000 voting rights, while B share only carried one; the 
Wallenberg family held almost all the A shares of the company. Despite the fact 
that it only made up for approximately 7% of the outstanding shares, it ensured 
the absolute control of the company. Wallenberg Group openly challenged the 
2002 Directive proposal, claiming it violated the human rights and the 
constitution.342 
In summary, a “unified” European Directive was the product of not only 
the contests between the Member States but battles between the interest groups, 
institutional investors and large conglomerates as well. Although their 
influences were not easy to penetrate the Member States’ shell frame, but the 
discontents and objections inevitably would influence the transposition process 
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of the final European Directive, causing even larger divergences under a 
“uniformed” European Takeover Law. As a result, the European Council had 
immersed into a web of cyclic dependencies – whenever it wanted to move one step 
ahead, it ended up in two steps back – the endless contests among the Member States 
and the uncoordinated interests between the conglomerates had largely constrained its 
legal progress within. 
 
In conclusion, the different roles of different interest groups affected the outcome 
of their hostile takeover regulatory frameworks, just like some scholars have pointed out: 
“[e]ntrusting the directors in the U.S. system and shareholders in European systems 
may simply reflect the reasonable view that, in the takeover context, the decision must 
necessarily reside with those most interested and competent.” 343 
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VI. Implications of the Western Regulatory Modes  
The previous chapters illustrated that the inevitable formation of the three 
completely different hostile takeover regulatory frameworks was due to their 
special historical backgrounds, political and economic needs and the 
competitions of the interests groups. The U.S. mode was directors’ centered, 
counting on the Delaware Court’s fiduciary-duty-review-system to make up for 
the federal oversight of the securities market. The U.K. had a mature 
self-regulatory system, which put the shareholders’ rights above all others. The 
Member States of the E.U. had developed their own takeover law under an 
ostensibly “united European Takeover Law”. Before jumping into the discussion 
of how China could improve its takeover law and draw lessons from the 
developed countries, in this chapter, we compare and analyse the strength and 
weakness of the three different modes first.  
 
A. U.S.: Reflections and Implications 
1. The Defect of the Ownership Structure Theory 
In the previous chapter, we demonstrated that the different roles of 
different interest groups and the contests between them in the formation process 
of the law accounted for the discrepancies in the hostile takeover regulatory 
framework of the U.S., the U.K. and the E.U. In the past, the traditional 
ownership structure theory was widely adopted to explain such diversities. 344 
This theory illustrated that, the listed companies in the U.S. had more dispersed 
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ownership structure than their counterparts had in the U.K. or the E.U. 
Meanwhile, the controlling minority structure widely existed in the listed companies 
of Germany, Finland and the Netherlands – some powerful families controlled the 
companies firmly with only a small portion of shares. As a result, it was easier to 
takeover listed companies in the U.S. than companies in the U.K. or E.U. In order to 
protect local companies from corporate raiders, the boards in the U.S. were allowed to 
take anti-takeover defensive measures, while the boards in the U.K. or E.U. were 
prohibited from warding off unfavorable takeovers. 345 
However, recent empirical studies showed that, the ownership structure in U.S. 
listed companies was not diffused as expected, and dual-ownership structure and share 
pyramiding was very common in the U.S.346 Therefore, the traditional ownership 
structure theory was flawed, and hence was insufficient to explain the hostile takeover 
regulatory differences between the U.K., the U.S. and the E.U.  
2. The Very Possible Structural Prejudice of Court-based System  
Having strong confidence in their court system, the U.S. takeover 
regulation relies heavily on ex-post judicial review. Indeed, the U.S. courts, 
especially the Delaware courts, are quite capable. Such special infrastructure 
may not be present in other jurisdictions. 
Despite so, one very important reflection from the U.S. regulatory 
framework is that, the judicial-review system would very likely lead to the 
potential structural prejudice that favors the interest of the board.  
From the first sight, the judge-made-law system is less likely to be 
influenced by the interest groups. As every judicial decision has to be based 
carefully on previous precedents, it is almost impossible for any interest group 
to affect the legal preference, at least not within a short time. So much so, the 
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judge could only review the cases that are put in front of them. In the takeover 
domain, the most common litigations were suits brought by the acquirers, 
seeking injunctions on the takeover measures adopted by the boards. In those 
cases, the directors of the board were the repeated players in trials, and they had 
more resources and power to win the litigation. First, the boards could 
“mobilize” the fund from the company to mitigate the suits and reach  
conciliations outside the courts. Second, the boards have huge information 
superiority compared to the plaintiff; they could use various excuses and pleas 
to justify their business judgement. As a result, the boards could always got the 
result they want in those litigations. Little by little, case by case, the Delaware 
courts formed the climate of directors’ primacy in takeover disputes.347 
In fact, before the wide adoption of the City Code in the 1968, the U.K. 
courts also revealed a strong predilection for the board in takeover cases.  
In 1968, Harlowe Company acquired large sums of shares of Woodside 
from the open market. Woodside is a nationally famous gas and oil exploration 
company. Harlowe had already obtained enough shares to secure control of the 
company, but at the last moment, the Woodside board still issued plenty of new 
shares to its business partner - the Burmah Company. Harlowe then sued to the 
court, claiming that the only purpose of issuing new shares was to diffusing 
Harlowe's control. The Woodside board maintained that issuing new shares was 
for financial purpose. Even from the perspective of the Delaware court, the 
board’s self-trenching behavior was quite obvious, not to mention that under the 
Revlon Rule established in the Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings 
case - once the sale of a company become inevitable or has already begun, the 
duty of the board switches from protecting the company into obtaining the 
highest price for the benefit of the shareholders. However, the court of England 
                                                 
347 See Bainbridge, Stephen M. "Director primacy and shareholder disempowerment." Harv. L. Rev. 119 
(2005): 1735. 
VI. Implications of the Western Regulatory Modes 
119 
nevertheless supported the boards’ business judgement.  
In 1974, the Ampol Petroleum launched a hostile takeover of the RW 
Millers and secured 55% of its shares with its concerted entities. The industrial 
giant Howard Smith Limited in Australia at the same time offered an olive 
branch to RW Millers. The board was more in favor of Howard Smith’s offer, as 
they could retain in office even after the merger. Therefore, the board issued 
large amount of new shares to Howard Smith, alleging RW Millers needed the 
money to build an oil tanker. Ampol Petroleum immediately sued to the Judicial 
Committee of the Privy Council, but the committee supported the board’s 
business judgement. 348 
Following cases in the U.K., such as the Cayne And Another V Global 
Natural Resources Plc of 1982, the Criterion Props. Plc v. Stratford U.K. Props. 
LLC of 2002, all illustrated the structural prejudice of the court review system. 
Luckily for the U.K., the self-regulatory system had already become the 
mainstream. Relying too much on trials, the U.S. hostile takeover participants 
would still have to suffer from this structural prejudice. Even worse, the 
deficiencies of the Delaware law could only be made up by federal legislations, 
which may very possible lead to even larger structural prejudice in the end. 349   
3. The Limited Role of Shareholder Activism 
Starting from the 1970s, the corporate activism of hedge funds has became 
a common phenomenon in the U.S. listed companies, and the size of 
institutional shareholdings was increasing year by year. Unlike the U.K.’s 
institutional investors, their counterparts in the U.S. were very active in 
corporate governance: aggressive corporate involvement had replaced 
shareholder passivity. Not just hedge funds, other institutional investors such as 
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the pension fund and mutual fund had become much more active than before in 
the past 40 years in the U.S.  
Despite so, many distinctive features of the U.S. mode determined that, no 
matter how active the institutional shareholders could become, it is still 
extremely difficult for them to bring subversive changes to the U.S. hostile 
takeover regulatory framework. First of all, the federalization of the securities 
regulation in the 1930s laid the ground of judicial intervention and closed the 
door of self-regulatory practices once for all. Second, the negative image of the 
institutional investors are hard to change in the foreseeable future. Whenever 
the economics is in distress, the institutional investors from the Wall Street are 
to be blamed. Whatever associated with “Wall Street” are labelled with 
“greedy”, “untrustworthy” and “bloodsucker”. Third, the court-based system 
determined that, no single interest group could change the overall rules of the 
court-based review system. As every judicial decision is prudently based on 
previous legal precedents, the institutional investors have to win the trials 
repeatedly – which is too costly and time-consuming to be possible – to change 
the rules and preference of the current system. Fourth, even if the institutional 
investors could somehow persuade the legislators and SEC to enact laws that are 
at their favor, Delaware and other States (the majority of which have thir own 
anti-takeover laws to protect their incorporated companies) would fight fiercely 
to keep the already stable and well-known regulatory framework.350  
In summary, the shareholder activism of the institutional investors could 
improve the overall corporate governance in the U.S. listed companies, but it is 
almost impossible for them to bring big changes to the currently already 
entrenched hostile takeover regulatory framework. The only effective weapon 
they hold is the voting rights that come with their shareholding; if they could 
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not challenge the federal authorities hundred years ago, they certainly could not 
challenge them now.351 
 
B. U.K.: Reflections and Implications 
1. The Special Background of self-regulation 
The formation of a self-regulatory framework required the institutional investors, 
bankers and industrial associations to work in concert – and one of the most important 
prerequisite for them to achieve so was the geographical proximity they had in the 
U.K. 
Most investors, bankers and officials lived in the commercial areas of London 
since the 19th century. Over the years, they formed close ties and relationships with 
each other. These commercial elites later developed different associations and social 
groups that best reflect their interests. The associations and groups then promoted the 
laws that were favored them. The management class who worked for those people and 
get paid from those people, unfortunately, did not form any groups or associations that 
were strong enough to challenge the institutions established by bankers and 
investors. 352 
Even until today, the financial and economical center of the U.K. is still London, 
alone. Larger banks, financial institutions and industrial associations are all located in 
the London city, providing great convenience for the Takeover Panel to borrow 
professionals from other institutions and switch information with them.  
In the U.S., the situation is just the opposite. Despite the fact that bankers, 
investors were once gathered in Wall Street, they are now dispersed everywhere in 
different States. Even in the past, the political center of the U.S. – Washington was 
380 kilometers from New York. As a result, it is more difficult for investors and 
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bankers in the U.S. to affect legislation than their counterparts in the U.K.; only  
federal securities laws could better oversee every state across the nation. 353 
2. Incomparable Advantages of Self-regulatory Mode 
Comparing with the U.S. and the E.U. mode, the self-regulatory framework 
of the U.K. is incredibly more efficient in terms of cost and time, offering more 
certainty to the capital market.  
Litigations are costly in every country. In the U.S. and in the E.U. Member 
States where the takeover disputes were solved in the court, the acquirers and 
the target boards have to afford far-flung litigation costs and expensive legal 
service fees; but in the U.K., the necessary funding to support the Takeover 
Panel comes from service charges in tender offers and the sales of the City 
Code. 354 Of course, legal professionals more or less have to participate in 
takeovers in the U.K., too, but their main jobs are to offer legal consultations or 
to draft legal documents. As a result, takeover participants do not have to bear 
sky-high price disputes resolutions costs.  
The Takeover Panel tackles with takeover disputes with no delay: the 
professional councils respond to appeals very quickly and involve almost 
immediately. Forasmuch, deliberate and tactical suits became unnecessary. The 
English Court of Appeal clearly forbids anyone using litigations to interfere 
with the real-time decisions from the Takeover Panel. In the R.v.Panel on 
Take-Overs and Mergers case of 1986, the Data Fin Company was unhappy with 
the decision from the Takeover Panel, and the Master of the Rolls Sir John 
Donaldson decided that the Takeover Panel’s decision was so vital that it must 
withstand judicial review. Nevertheless, even the Takeover Panel’s decision was 
overturned in the future in judicial reviews; it only could have influences on 
                                                 
353 See Fox, Justin, and Alan Sklar. The myth of the rational market: A history of risk, reward, and 
delusion on Wall Street. New York: Harper Business, 2009. 
354 Armour, John, and David A. Skeel Jr. "Who writes the rules for hostile takeovers, and why-the 
peculiar divergence of US and U.K. takeover regulation." Geo. LJ 95 (2006): 1727. 
VI. Implications of the Western Regulatory Modes 
123 
future cases.355 As a result, takeover disputes were always solved within a week 
in the U.K. On the contrary, in the U.S., takeover disputes could last for years. 
For instance, in 2003, Oracle launched a hostile takeover of People Soft, and the 
antitrust review alone took 18 months.356 
Most importantly, the Takeover Panel could proactively amends the City 
Code to cater the needs of the market. The council members would gather 
together on a monthly basis to discuss difficult cases and the newest financial 
innovation. In comparison, the Delaware court is relatively passive and lagging, 
as the judges could only rule and discuss the cases in front of them. In order to 
overcome such procedural flaws, the Delaware judges would frequently refer to 
the latest academic findings and articles; moreover, the steady flow of takeover 
cases also compensate the courts’ lag in takeovers. Still, it could not match the 
speed with the U.K. hostile takeover regulatory framework, as the Takeover 
Panel could directly add or adjust the contents in the City Code to reflect the 
market changes. 
3. Functional Premise of Self-regulatory Mode 
In order for the self-regulatory mode to be effective and long lasting, the 
motives of the regulator must be compatible with those of the stockholders of 
the company – increasing overall profitability and cutting unnecessary costs. 357 
Like we mentioned in the previous Chapter, the U.S. securities market had 
undergone a self-regulatory history for more than 100 years. The Stock 
Exchange itself was the most prominent self-regulatory entity before 1933, as 
all the listed companies were its members and were bound by the constitution 
and listing rules of the NYSE.358 Until the enactment of the Securities Act, the 
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self-regulatory rules of the New York Stock Exchange were the most important 
legal resource of the federal securities law. However, the brokers and traders 
had very different self-interest motives; they might froze any deals that would 
delist the target company, even if the deal were beneficial to both the offeror 
and the offeree. With the rise of the NASDAQ and AMEX, the NYSE had every 
reason to make their members happy; it always compromised whenever its listed 
companies threatened to leave. Therefore, the overall profitability of the 
company was not the self-regulator’s main concern from the beginning to the 
end. 359 
Indeed, the self-regulatory system of the U.K. was shaped by institutional 
investors with various motives, but the overall profitability of the company was 
always their mutual concern, as they had to be responsible for investors who put 
their money in the institutions. In summary, only when regulators focusing 
solely on increasing the overall profitability of the listed companies could a 
self-regulatory hostile takeover framework function well. 
 
C. E.U.: Reflections and Implications 
The Status Quo of the European Directive illustrates how the Directive has 
failed to fulfill its original goal and purpose.  
1. Limitations of the Board Neutrality Rule 
Until May 2017, nineteen Member States chose to adopt the Board Neutrality 
Rule; however, except Malta, other eighteen States originally had samilar rules in their 
company laws much earlier before the implementation of the European Directive. 360 
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From the implementation status, most of the Member States that objected the Board 
Neutrality Rule stayed where they were – the European Directive did not make any 
difference at all. 
Even worse, in the nineteen Member States who adopted the Board Neutrality 
Rule, seven of them at the same time applied the Reciprocity Exception Rule. In the 
past, the board of directors in the listed companies of these Member States were 
strictly prohibited from taking any defensive measures in hostile takeovers; now with 
the Reciprocity Exception Rule, the Board Neutrality Rule automatically disapply in a 
reciprocity situation. As a result, the Reciprocity Exception Rule in fact allowed the 
boards of directors to adopt anti-takeover measures under certain circumstances; it 
expanded the boards’ direction power instead of putting limit to it. Despite the fact 
that under the Reciprocity Exception Rule, the boards still have to obtain ex ante 
approval for potential defenses from the general assembly every eighteen month361, 
this does not change the fact that the board now could legitimately circumvent the 
previous strict “non-frustrating” restrictions in takeovers. 
In the Member States where the Board Neutrality Rule is not applicable, three of 
them - Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands had imposed certain limitations for 
taking defensive measures, but their boards were still given extremely large room to 
outmaneuver the acquirers and bidders in takeovers. 362  
2. Limitations of the Breakthrough Rule 
Invented by Jaap Winter and his team in an effort to create a "level-playing field" 
among the E.U. Member States, the Breakthrough Rule was supposed to be the most 
powerful weapon to nullify various ex ante anti-takeover defenses. Despite it was 
carefully stipulated in the European Directive, only the Baltic States363 chose to apply 
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the Breakthrough Rule. 
In 2006 when the European Directive was first applied, the 25 E.U. Member 
States had 7042 listed companies in total. At that time, Estonia only had 16 listed 
companies, while Latvia had 40 and Lithuania had 43. Together they counted for less 
than 1.4% listed companies within the E.U. Even worse, Hungary used to have rules 
similar to the Breakthrough Rule, but it took advantage of this opportunity to ablish 
all of them.364 
Moreover, companies applying the Breakthrough Rule were more likely to be 
acquired in takeovers. Some acquirers even applied the Breakthrough Rule themselves 
so that their target company would not be under the protection of the Reciprocity 
Exception Rule. As a result, companies with the Breakthrough Rule were easily 
acquired by some other companies with the Breakthrough Rule.365 
In recent years, the corporate governance in Europe is improving, many Member 
States, for example, Germany and Finland, have attempted to eliminate the voting 
leverages and ex ante defenses through legislation. With the gradual decrease of the ex 
ante defenses, it is imaginable that the Breakthrough Rule would become even more 
unnecessary in the near future. 366 
3. Disastrous Effect of the Optional Arrangements Rule 
In the author’s opinion, the Optional Arrangements Rule single-handedly led to 
the failure of the European Directive; because of its existence, the vision of a “united 
European takeover law” and a “level-playing field” could never achieve within the 
E.U. As Member States can freely choose to adopt or not adopt the core rules of the 
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European Directive, the Optional Arrangements Rule largely undermined the legal 
effects of the European Directive. As a result, Member States without the Board 
Neutrality Rule in the first place could continue to preclude the Board Neutrality Rule; 
it also directly exempted most of the Member States from applying the Breakthrough 
Rule.  
4. Abused Use of the Reciprocity Exception Rule 
More than half of the Member States had adopted the Reciprocity Exception 
Rule,367 and in the rest of the Member States, more than half of their listed companies 
had adopted the Reciprocity Exception Rule, 368  to avoid being stuck in a 
disadvantageous situation in takeovers. The Reciprocity Exception Rule intended to 
shape a “level-playing field” as much as possible after the Optional Arrangements 
Rule came into being, but acquirers with ulterior motives had taken advantage of this 
rule for disproportionate gain; some bidders strategically applied the Reciprocity 
Exception Rule, so that their target boardscould not adopt defensive measures in 
reciprocity situations.369 
5. Defects of the Mandatory Bid Rule 
The original purpose of the European Directive was to harmonize the 
takeover rules among its Member States, to create a level playing field for 
takeover activities and to protect shareholders, especially the minority 
shareholders’ legitimate rights. The Mandatory Bid Rule was introduced into 
the European Directive to ensure that every shareholder could have a fair 
opportunity to exit in takeovers.  
    Shareholder protection was a common sense among all the Member 
States of the E.U., and this was why the Mandatory Bid Rule had not raised 
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any controversies like the Board Neutrality Rule and the Breakthrough Rule 
had in the past, even it was mandatorily required by the European Directive at 
the beginning.  
In practice, the Directive allows every Member States to set the threshold 
of the Mandatory Bid Rule according to their economic situation and practical 
needs, varying from 25% lowest to 66% highest.370 
Hungary and Slovenia had set the trigger of Mandatory Bid Rule when the 
acquirer had obtained 25% voting rights of the target company. Italy, Belgium, Cyprus, 
Germany, Finland, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and the United 
Kingdom before withdrawal from the E.U. had set the trigger of Mandatory Bid Rule 
when the acquirer had obtained 30% voting rights of the target company. Greece, 
France, Luxembourg and Slovakia had set the trigger of Mandatory Bid Rule when 
the acquirer had obtained 1/3 voting rights of the target company. Czech Republic and 
Lithuania had set the trigger of Mandatory Bid Rule when the acquirer had obtained 
40% voting rights of the target company. Latvia, Malta and Portugal had set the 
trigger of Mandatory Bid Rule when the acquirer had obtained 50% voting rights of 
the target company. Poland had set the trigger of Mandatory Bid Rule when the 
acquirer had obtained 66% voting rights of the target company. Denmark and Estonia 
did not set a substantial figure for the trigger of the Mandatory Bid Rule, but they did 
require the acquirer to send out a general tender offer for all outstanding shares of the 
target company to all the stockholders if the acquirer:  
1. holds the majority of voting rights in the company;  
2. becomes entitled to appoint or dismiss a majority of the members 
of the board of directors;  
3. obtains the right to exercise a controlling influence over the 
company on the basis of the articles of association;  
4. reaches any agreement with the company in general;  
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5. controls the majority of voting rights pursuant to an agreement 
with other shareholders;  
6. is able to exercise a controlling influence over the company and 
holds more than one-third of the voting rights.371 
Some Member States allowed the target company to lower the trigger of the 
obligation to make a mandatory bid in the company's articles of association; 372 as 
the Mandatory Bid Rule could largely increase the takeover cost of the acquirer, it has 
strong inhibitory effect for hostile takeovers. Therefore, a sudden lowering-down of 
the Mandatory Bid trigger could be an effective anti-takeover defense even the 
Breakthrough Rule could not “breakthrough”.  
On one hand, if the trigger of the Mandatory Bid Rule is too low, it could have 
huge inhibitory effects on takeovers; on the other hand, if the trigger of the Mandatory 
Bid Rule is too high, it could not provide sufficient protection for the shareholders, 
especially the minority shareholders. Hungary and Slovenia had a trigger too low that 
the potential acquirers had to unfairly bid for all shares of the company before they 
could secure control of the target company. In comparison, Latvia, Malta, Portugal 
and Poland had a trigger of 50%. Usually, acquirers do not have to obtain 50% of the 
voting rights to assume absolute control of the company, therefore, there is simply no 
need for them the across the 50% trigger and bid for unnecessary shares. Moreover, 
the controlling minority structure and voting leverages are not common in Latvia, 
Malta, Portugal or Poland, a Mandatory Bid Rule with 50% voting rights trigger could 
not offer any substantial protection for the shareholders. 373 
Another general issue for all Member States was that, almost every one of them 
had stipulated very loose exemptions for the Mandatory Bid Rule.374 In Austria, the 
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Mandatory Bid obligation could be exempted when the shareholder subject to the 
obligation cannot exert a significant influence on the target company. In 
Belgium, the executing decree provided certain exceptions from the 
Mandatory Bid Rule, for example, changes of control within the same 
corporate group, inheritance and rescue operations. In the Czech Republic, the 
law provided for exceptions from the Mandatory bid obligation, for example, 
inheritance, temporary stepping over of the mandatory bid threshold, increase 
of capital under certain circumstances, changes of control within the same 
group. In Denmark, the Mandatory Bid obligation did not apply to acquisitions 
by inheritance, gift, debt enforcement and transfer within the same group. In 
Estonia, the supervisory authority had the power to grant exemption from the 
Mandatory Bid obligation when change of control within the same corporate 
group, the dominant influence was gained for the purpose of carrying out a 
merger or division, or temporary acquisition of shares for the purpose of 
further transfer. In Germany, supervisory authority may release the offeror 
from the obligation to publish and submit a mandatory bid insofar as this 
seems justified having regard to the interests of the offeror and the 
shareholders of the target company, the way in which control was obtained, 
the shareholder structure of the company, the actual possibility of exercising 
control or the fact that the share in the target company is reduced below the 
control threshold subsequent to the acquisition of control. In Greece, the law 
provides exceptions from the mandatory bid obligation, for instance, 
temporary stepping over of the mandatory bid threshold, another person holds 
a higher percentage of the voting rights; securities have been acquired through 
the exercise of pre-emption rights during share capital increase, merger 
between affiliated companies, privatization, etc. In Finland, the law provided 
for exceptions from the mandatory bid obligation, for instance, another person 
holds a higher percentage of the voting rights, the mandatory bid threshold has 
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been stepped over because of measures taken by the target company or by 
another shareholder. In France, the supervisory authority has power to grant 
exemptions from the mandatory bid obligation in conditions such as: merger 
authorized by the shareholders in general meeting, changes of control within 
the same corporate group, changes of control in order to save a company from 
bankruptcy and so on. In Ireland, the supervisory body had the power to 
provide for derogations and waivers in the rules in relation to particular 
matters having regard to exceptional circumstances and “in other 
circumstances”. In Italy, the law currently in force provided for exceptions 
from the Mandatory Bid obligation, for instance, voluntary partial bid 
addressed to all shareholders for at least 60% of the voting capital, 
transactions aimed at rescuing companies in crisis, changes of control within 
the same corporate group, transactions of a temporary nature, mergers. In 
Lithuania, the law on the securities market provided certain exceptions from 
the Mandatory Bid Rule, such as reorganizations under certain circumstances, 
stepping over the threshold in accordance with the rules on restructuring of 
enterprises, change of control within the same corporate group and so on. In 
Luxembourg, the supervisory authority may grant exceptions under “specific 
circumstances of certain implementing rules”. In the Netherlands, no 
(immediate) obligation to launch a takeover bid would arise in the following 
situations: preference shares held by a foundation, share certificates held by a 
foundation, restructuring within a group, change of control through 
inheritance or marriage, bankruptcy, shares held by a custodian who` votes 
according to instructions. In Poland, a subsequent bid was not mandatory if the 
acquisition of the voting rights at the level of the threshold is made: 1. through 
a previous general takeover bid; 2. through an insolvency process; 3. through 
the merger of companies, if the decision of the relevant shareholders explicitly 
refers that the merger operation would give rise to a mandatory bid. In Spain, 
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exceptions to the mandatory bid rule were likely to be maintained in situations 
like unintentional acquisition of control, acquisition following a decision of 
the shareholders of the offeree company, certain operations in the context of 
bankruptcy procedures, operations within the same group. In Slovakia, in 
situations such as changes of control within the same corporate group or 
inheritance, the Mandatory Bid Rule obligation could be waived. In Slovenia, 
in situations such as inheritance, merger or division if the purpose of the 
operation was not the takeover of the target company, reduction of the capital 
of the offeree company, the Mandatory Bid Rule obligation could be waived. 
In Sweden, in situations such as temporary acquisition and inheritance, the 
Mandatory Bid Rule obligation could be waived. In the United Kingdom 
before withdrawal from the E.U., specific derogations from rules are included 
in the Takeover Code where necessary to facilitate a pragmatic approach to 
long-established practice. 375 The various exemptions and derogations had 
provided the acquirers with sufficient room to circumvent the Mandatory Bid 
Rule, undermining the fair protections for the shareholders.  
6. The Generally Applicable Sell-out and Squeeze-out Right 
The Sell-out and Squeeze-out Rights are mandatory rules for every Member 
States, and this was the first time for Greece, Spain, Luxembourg, Malta, Slovenia and 
Czech Republic to introduce such rules in their securities laws. 
Member States were given the right to set the threshold of the Sell-out and 
Squeeze-out. Austria, the Czech Republic, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Greece, 
Finland, Hungary, Ireland, Malta, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Slovenia, Sweden, 
and the United Kingdom before withdrawal from the European Union had set a 
90% threshold for both the Sell-out Right and Squeeze-out Right. Belgium, 
Germany, France, the Netherlands, Italy, Lithuania, and Slovakia had set a 95% 
                                                 
375 COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES. Report on the implementation of the 
Directive on Takeover Bids. Brussels, 21.02.2007.SEC(2007)268. Annex 3. 
VI. Implications of the Western Regulatory Modes 
133 
threshold for both the Sell-out Right and Squeeze-out Right. Latvia and 
Luxembourg had set a 95% threshold for the Sell-out Right and a 90% threshold 
for the Squeeze-out Right. 376 
7. How Free-Choice Mode Lost Its Binding Effects 
In the European Directive, all the defensive-measure related rules are “optional” 
– the Board Neutrality Rule, the Breakthrough Rule and the Reciprocity Exception 
Rule, while all the shareholders protective rules are mandatory. According to the 
statistics from the European Council, in August 2006, 72% Member States adopted 
the Board Neutrality Rule, accounting for 75% of the listed companies in the E.U. 
Only 12% Member States adopted the Breakthrough Rule, accounting for less than 
1.4% of the listed companies in the E.U. 56% Member States applied the Reciprocity 
Exception Rule, and 47% listed companies of the E.U. can pause the application of 
the Board Neutrality Rule and Breakthrough Rule in a reciprocity situation. All 
Member States applied the Mandatory Bid Rule since it was “mandatory”, but 88% 
Member States had stipulated exemptions for the Mandatory Bid Rule. 377 
From the statistics above and considering the transposition problems, the 
European Directive only had little impact in shaping a “united European takeover 
law”. The Board Neutrality obligation could be waived in reciprocity situations, and 
extremely few companies had adopted the Breakthrough Rule. The Optional 
Arrangements Rule let some directors of the board, who had accustomed to stay 
neutral, now asked for larger discretionary power in takeover defenses. The 
Mandatory Bid Rule could provide the shareholders with a fair opportunity to exit the 
company with share premium, however, many of the Member States set the trigger of 
such a Mandatory Bid Rule so high that it was nothing more than a useless decoration.  
Institutionally, if all the up-mentioned rules were mandatory for the Member 
States in the E.U. (except the Optional Arrangements Rule), the European Directive 
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may very possible fulfill its original goal to construct an integrated market with a 
level-playing field within the E.U.; it indeed could promote takeovers from happening 
and protect the legitimate rights of shareholders especially the minority shareholders. 
No matter how carefully and articulately the articles were trimmed, in reality, the 
European Directive was a falling victim to pork-barrel politics.  
 
In conclusion, every regime has its path dependence problems. Most 
importantly, the path dependence nature of the hostile takeover regulatory 
frameworks is a double-edged sword: on one hand, it may restrict future legal 
reforms; on the other hand, it could awake the “internal vigor” and turned the 
institutional inertia into endogenous force of growth. As a result, legal 
transplantation must take the two-sideness of path dependence into 
consideration, and try to enhance its advantages while inhibit the disadvantages.  
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VII. The Hostile Takeover Regulatory Law of China  
Our discussion on Chinese hostile takeover regulatory framework begins 
from this chapter. Before talking about the social and historical accounts of 
Chinese regulation, let take a close look at China’s takeover law first.  
The Chinese Securities Law of 2005 established the China Security 
Regulatory Commission, a technocrat just like the SEC in the U.S., as the main 
regulator in Chinese Securities Market. In fact, the CSRC has larger power than 
the SEC does – in the takeover domain, it has the highest and almost exclusive 
authority, despite small equity disputes were resorted to the court occasionally.  
In 2006, enlightened by the Takeover Panel of the U.K., the CSRC 
established a special unit to address takeover relative affairs specifically – the 
Audit Committee of Mergers and Acquisitions (hereinafter ACMA). The ACMA 
consists legal experts and commercial professionals borrowed from other 
institutions, banks and stock exchange. Opinions on takeover issues from the 
ACMA represent the state-of-art conclusive views of the CSRC. In recent years, 
the CSRC has lowered its administrative intervention in mergers and 
acquisitions, partly by eliminating administrative approval requirement and 
entitling oversight power to stock exchange and CSRC dispatched offices. 378 
Except the administrative regulations from the CSRC, current Chinese 
takeover activities are also governed by the People’s Republic of China’s 
Company Law (hereinafter 2014 Company Law as it came into effect on 1st 
March 2014)379, the People’s Republic of China’s Securities Law (hereinafter 
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2014 Securities Law as its last amendment is in 2014)380, and the Administrative 
Rules on Acquisition of Listed Company (hereinafter 2014 Administrative Rules 
on Acquisition as its last amendment is in 2014)381. Moreover, although not 
functioning as a substantive rule, the Guidelines on Articles of Association of 
the Companies Listed in China (hereinafter 2016 Guidelines on Articles of 
Association as its last amendment is in 2016)382 also provides useful guidelines 
for takeover disputes especially those associated with corporate charters of 
Chinese listed companies. 
 
A. Chinese Company Law 
The Company Law is essential in takeover regulation, because it allocates 
the decision power between the shareholders and the directors of the board. The 
transfer of corporate control is a major event in nature and hence it is important 
to clarify who has the authority to adopt takeover defenses. 
The Chinese Company Law is clearly shareholder centered as the 
shareholders have the ultimate power over major corporate issues such as “...(2) 
Electing and changing the directors and supervisors assumed by 
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non-representatives of the employees and deciding the matters relating to their 
salaries and compensations; (3) Deliberating and approving reports of the 
board of directors;...(6) Deliberating and approving company profit distribution 
plans and loss recovery plans; (7) Making resolutions about the increase or 
reduction of the company's registered capital; (8) Making resolutions about the 
issuance of corporate bonds;(9) Adopting resolutions about the assignment, 
split-up, change of company form, dissolution, liquidation of the company;(10) 
Revising the bylaw of the company”383. 
By contrast, the directors of the board seem to have much less power over 
corporate major issues according to Chinese Company Law. The basic role of 
directors of the board is “... (2) Implementing the resolutions made at the 
shareholders' meetings”384. The directors are also in charge of drafting the 
company’s plan on the increase or reduction of registered capital, issuance of 
corporate bonds, as well as plans on mergers and change of company forms, and 
so on. However, according to the Chinese Company Law, all those plans have to 
be approved by the shareholders assembly first before they could be carried out 
by the directors of the board.  
As most anti-takeover measures primarily concern with the major issues of 
the company, in theory, the ultimate and final decision power of takeover 
defenses lies in the hands of the shareholders rather than the directors of the 
board. Shareholders’ approval as the final check of takeover defenses largely 
limited directors’ discretion in adopting defensive measures.  
Except the rules concerning power distribution among major corporate 
issues, the 2014 Chinese Company Law also has several mandatory rules that 
prohibit certain types of takeover defenses. Article 103 stipulates, “[w]hen a 
shareholder attends a meeting of the shareholders' assembly, he shall have one 
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voting right for each share he holds. However, the company has no voting right 
for its own shares it holds.” 385This “one-share-one-vote” rule directly voids any 
shareholding arrangements aim to benefit from voting leverage mechanisms. 
Insurance of different classes of shares with different voting power is strictly 
prohibited by the Company Law. As a result, voting leverage arrangements such 
as the dual-class equity structures, which are quite common in Anglo-American 
and European countries, are hard to find in Chinese Listed Companies. However, 
this is not to say that the controlling minority structures are rare in China; many 
listed companies has achieved controlling minority arrangements through either 
stock pyramiding or circular shareholding. 
Article 126 of the Company Law requires that “[t]he issuance of shares 
shall comply with the principle of fairness and impartiality. The shares of the 
same class shall have the same rights and benefits”, meanwhile, “[t]he stocks 
issued at the same time shall be equal in price and shall be subject to the same 
conditions. The price of each share purchased by any organization or individual 
shall be the same.” 386 As all shares of the same class shall carry the same rights 
and benefits, all stocks issued at the same time shall have the same price and are 
subject to same conditions, insurance of securities that has discriminative effect 
is illegal according to the Company Law. As a result, Chinese management 
cannot adopt poison pills when facing hostile acquisitions. 
In addition, repurchase of company shares as a basic defensive measure is 
pervasive in not only the U.S. or E.U., but also even in Asian countries like 
Japan or Korea as well. However, the Company Law disqualifies the repurchase 
of company shares as a defensive measure. In China, a company can purchase its 
own shares only in the following circumstances: “… (1) To decrease the 
registered capital of the company; (2) To merge another company holding 
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shares of this company; (3) To award the employees of this company with shares; 
or (4) It is requested by any shareholder to purchase his shares because this 
shareholder objects to the company's resolution on merger or split-up made by 
the assembly of shareholders.” 387 Afterwards, the repurchased share should be 
either written off within ten days of the purchase or transferred to employees 
with n one year.  
 
B. Chinese Securities Law 
The Securities Law is also very important in regulating hostile takeovers.  
In order to prevent acquirers from collaborating with corporate insiders and 
dismantling the target company for sale, Article 47 serves as a “Disgorgement 
Statute” in Chinses Securities Law: “[w]here a director, supervisor or senior 
manager of a listed company, or a shareholder who holds 5% or more of the 
shares of a listed company sells the shares of the company within six months of 
purchasing such shares, or repurchases the shares within six months of selling 
such shares, the gains therefrom, if any, shall belong to the company, and the 
board of directors of the company shall recover such gains.” 388 This article 
effectively constrains the impulse of inside corporate raiders to get 
disproportionate revenues from cashing out at a “good” timing or dismantling 
the company for sale.  
There are several articles in the Securities Law deals with the behaviors of 
the acquirers in takeovers, the information disclosure requirement being the one 
of the most important. The Article 86 of Chinese Securities Law mandates that, 
when an investor obtained 5% shares of a listed company, he shall report 
in-written to the securities regulatory authority, stock exchange and the target 
company respectively. From this on, every 5% increase or decrease in such 
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shareholding is subjected to similar disclosure requirement, and the investor is 
not allowed to purchase any shares of the company within two days of the report 
period.389 Article 75 of the Measures for the Administration of the Takeover of 
Listed Companies defines the consequence of breaking the disclosure 
requirement: 
“[t]he CSRC shall order him to make corrections, and take 
supervisory measures such as supervisory talks, issuance of warning 
letters, ordering to suspend or stop the takeover. Before the correction, 
the related information disclosure obligors may not exercise the 
voting right of the shares as held or actually controlled thereby.”390  
In practice, this seemingly comprehensive, seamless article has raised 
many questions. First, what kind of gesture could account for corrections? To 
submit the disclosure materials although it is already too late? To pay the fine 
which is insignificant comparing to the advantages from increasing shareholding 
secretly? Second, after the investor “corrects” his wrongdoing, can he exercise 
the voting rights of the shares normally? If slight administrative penalty could 
justify the investor’s misbehavior, is not the price of breaking the disclosure 
requirement too low? 
In fact, the CSRC has a long history unwilling to severely punish investors 
or acquirers breaking the disclosure requirement. In September 1993, China 
Baoan Group (hereinafter “Baoan”) initiated a takeover attempt of Yanzhong 
Industrial Ltd (hereinafter “Yanzhong”), which is the first hostile takeover in 
China. The Securities Law at that time is even stricter, requiring investors with 
more than 5% shareholding to report and announce every 2% increase or 
decrease in their shareholding. On September 29th, Baoan and its concert party 
holds only 4.56% shares of Yanzhong, still below the 5% trigger. On September 
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30th, Baoan and its concert party suddenly purchased a huge amount of 
Yanzhong shares and accumulatively held 15.98% shares of the company. In its 
reports and announcements to the officials and the public, Baoan used a blur 
expression that it held “more than 5% shares” of Yanzhong. Yanzhong 
immediately filed complaints to the CSRC and Shenzhen Stock exchange, 
accusing Baoan of malpractice in the securities market.391 On October 26th, the 
CSRC released its report of the investigation, affirming Baoan was illegal to 
break the disclosure requirement. In this report, the CSRC “severely 
condemned” Baoan Group’s wrongdoing, but only imposed a slight 1000,000 
RMB fine. Moreover, the CSRC pointed out that, mass share transfer is normal 
in any capital market and the shares obtained by Baoan is valid.392 Because of 
this, Baoan eventually achieved its control over Yanzhong. A more recent case 
is in 2017, when Hu brothers obtained 9.59% shares of Tibet Tourism without 
fulfilling any disclosure obligation. Anhui Dispatched Office of CSRC settled 
this case by a 900,000 RMB fine.393 Previous experiences illustrate that, the 
CSRC was very tolerant of disclosure law violation, and it has never restricted 
the voting rights of the illegally obtained shares, despite the vigorous 
stipulations in the Securities Law. 
Like the Securities Exchange Act, the Chinese Securities law also strictly 
prohibits false statement, fraud and misleading behavior – which are known as 
the three original sin in Chinese securities market394.  
Issuance of new shares is another huge thing in Chinese Securities domain. 
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Article 13 requires the company who makes public issuance of new shares meet 
certain conditions: “(1) having a sound and well-functioning organizational 
structure; (2) having sustainable profitability and being financially sound; (3) 
having had no false entries in its financial and accounting documents for three 
years immediately preceding the application, and no other major illegal 
activities attributable to it; and (4) such other conditions as may be so 
prescribed by the securities regulatory authority under the State Council and so 
approved by the State Council”. 395 
These rules on share insurance makes it almost impossible for management 
to frustrate a hostile takeover by issuing new shares. The target company has to 
achieve very good business performance in order to issue new shares. Most of 
the up-mentioned conditions are difficult to meet for companies under takeovers; 
if they are really so profitable, their share price would be high enough to ward 
off the corporate raiders in the first place. Moreover, in China, even if insurance 
of new shares does not have to meet the merits-review requirements, the board 
still cannot count on defending the barbarians through issuing new shares as it 
would still take longer than expected to obtain approval from the governmental 
authority. According to the Securities Law: “[t]he securities regulatory 
authority under the State Council shall establish an issuance examination 
commission which shall, pursuant to law, examine the applications for share 
issuance.” 396 
Tender Offer regulation is a major part in the Securities Law, and so is the 
Mandatory Bid Rule. In China, an investor may acquire a listed company 
through tender offer, negotiations or other lawful means. 397  Tender offer 
provides shareholders with adequate protection and certainty. Just like the 
Williams Act of in the U.S., the Chinese securities law also prohibits coercive 
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tender offers. To achieve so, the law states that, the price of the shares must not 
be lower than the highest price at which the purchaser obtains within 6 months 
before the tender offer398, and shareholders can choose either cash or equitable 
legal transferable securities at their will399. Normally, the open term for the 
tender offer is no less than 30 days and no more than 60 days.400When the term 
of tender offer expires, the purchaser have to purchase all the preliminarily 
accepted shares. In partial tender offers, if there are more accepted shares than 
needed, the purchaser shall purchase the shares according to the sellers’ 
shareholding ratio. 401 Those safeguarding provisions in Chinese law aim at 
protecting shareholders from coercive tender offers and ensuring all 
shareholders are treated equally in takeovers. Comparing to tender offer, 
share-purchases through negotiations or other lawful means are usually more 
private, and do not necessarily have to alarm the public shareholders until the 
transaction is done or is inevitably to be done. In this way, it is more efficient 
and of lower cost for the acquirers. 
Through whatever means of acquisition, when an acquirer or investor holds 
30% of the issued shares of a listed company, further acquisition of the company 
shares must via tender offer402. China transplanted this Mandatory Bid Rule 
from the U.K. to protect the lawful rights and interests of the minority 
shareholders. 
If an investor adopts the means of tender offer to purchase shares of a listed 
company on his will, he may choose to either send out a general tender offer for 
all outstanding shares of the company, or send out a partial tender offer for part 
of the company shares. Either way the tender offer is to all shareholders of the 
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listed company. 403 In contrast with the U.K. and the E.U., partial tender offer is 
an important part of the current Chinese Mandatory Bid Rule. Only in rare 
situations does the acquirer have to send out general tender offer.  
Rules clarifying the availability and extent of the defensive measures are 
not stipulated in the Securities Law. The whole Chapter four of 2014 Securities 
Law is about the acquisition of listed companies in China, but not one single 
rule addresses takeover defenses directly. The Article 101 supplements that 
“[t]he securities regulatory authority under the State Council shall formulate 
specific measures for acquisition of listed companies in accordance with the 
principles of this Law...” 404  In accordance with this article came the 
Administrative Rules on Acquisition (also referred to as “the Takeover Measure” 
or “Chinese Takeover Measure”), first edition of which was promulgated by 
CSRC in 2002. 
  
C. Administrative Rules on Acquisition 
The 2014 Administrative Rules on Acquisition is now the core of Chinese 
anti-takeover regulation. The first version of Administrative Rules on 
Acquisition was promulgated by CSRC in 2002, and was the first regulation 
with direct and clear rules on takeover defenses. 
1. Fiduciary Duty in Chinese Law 
Article 8 is a general rule on directors’ duty when employing anti-takeover 
activities:“[t]he directors, supervisors and senior managers of a target company 
shall assume the duty of loyalty and duty of care, and shall equally treat all the 
purchasers that intend to take over the above company.” 405 
In terms of Chinese fiduciary duty, Article 8 used the term of “duty of 
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loyalty” and “duty of care”. Correspondingly, the same terminology can be well 
found in Article 148 of the Chinese Company Law: “[t]he directors, supervisors 
and senior managers shall comply with the laws, administrative regulations, 
and bylaw. They shall bear the duty of loyalty and duty of care…”406 The “duty 
of loyalty” and “duty of care” are sometimes interpreted as “obligation of 
fidelity” and “obligation of diligence” in Chinese corporate law, but they 
function equivalently to the “fiduciary duty” in the Anglo-American legal 
regime. The Company Law uses a series of prohibitive stipulations to define 
what “duty of loyalty” is. For example, “[n]o director, supervisor or senior 
manager may accept any bribe or other illegal gains by taking the advantage of 
his powers, or encroach on the property of the company” 407 and “[n]o director 
or senior manager may commit any of the following acts: (1) Misappropriating 
the company's fund…(6) Taking commissions on the transactions between others 
and the company into his own pocket;(7) Illegally disclosing the company's 
confidential information…” 408and so on. 
The Company Law does not elaborately define the “duty of care”, it only 
reveals the consequence directors, supervisors or senior managers have to afford 
when they failing to obey so in Article 150: “[w]here any director, supervisor 
or senior manager violates any law, administrative regulation, or the bylaw 
during the course of performing his duties, if any loss is caused to the company, 
he shall be liable for compensation.” 409 
When the Company Law is somehow ambiguous about what “duty of care” 
should be, the Guidelines on Articles of Association has reiterate it clearly in its 
recommended templates of corporate charter for listed companies. For example, 
“[m]anagement should exercise their powers prudently, conscientiously, and 
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diligently, and ensure all commercial activities of the company conforms with 
the law，administrative rule and national economic policy, and commercial 
activities of the company should not exceed its scope of business” 410, and 
“[m]anagement should provide the board of supervisors with information and 
materials in need, should not hinder them performing their duty” 411. At the 
same time, the Guidelines on Articles of Association has made it clear that 
companies can add by their own the “duties of care” that the directors shall 
comply in their company bylaw. 412 
2. Board Neutrality Rule in Chinese Law 
Article 33 of the 2014 Administrative Rules on Acquisition provides some 
guidance for the Board Neutrality Rule: “[D]uring the period after the 
announcement of a takeover bid and before the completion of the takeover bid, 
except for continuing ordinary business and executing resolutions made by the 
general meeting of shareholders, target company management, without the 
ratification of the general shareholders’ meeting, should not cause major 
impacts on the assets, liabilities, entitlements or business performances of the 
target company by disposing of assets, engaging in external investments, 
adjusting the main businesses, providing guarantees or loans and others.”413 
Although it can be interpreted from several perspectives, the basic 
principle in this article was supposed to be, without shareholder approval, 
directors of the board should not take any action in response to an imminent 
threat. As we will discuss in the next chapters, this Chinese Board Neutrality 
Rule has very big loopholes thus does not function well in takeovers.  
3. Sell-out right in Chinese Law 
Under certain conditions, a full-scope general tender offer may become 
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mandatory after a partial tender offer takeover. The Takeover Guideline and the 
2014 Securities Law simultaneously endow minority shareholders with the right 
to empty their shareholdings when the equity distribution of the target company 
does not conform to the requirements for listing in stock exchanges any more. 
The shareholders other than the acquirer who still holds shares of the target 
company have the right to sell their shares to the acquirer who caused the 
alternation of equity distribution under the same conditions in the partial tender 
offer and the acquirer must purchase all those shares.414 In other words, if the 
acquirer purchases the shares of a listed company through partial tender offer to 
the extent that the company is no longer eligible for listing, then the partial 
tender offer ultimately becomes a general tender offer, and the acquirer is 
responsible for all the shares that other shareholders want to sell. Those shares 
remained in other shareholders’ hands are either the shares shareholders did not 
plan to sell originally, or the preliminarily accepted shares that exceeds the 
acquirer’s designated amount in the previous tender offer; and now, they all 
become the acquirers’ liability.  
The Chinese stipulation is quite similar to the sell-out right specified in the 
European Directive. The European Directive offers minority shareholders a 
sell-out right enabling them to require the majority shareholder bidder to buy 
their securities following a takeover offer if the bidder holds securities 
representing 90% of the capital carrying voting rights and 90% of the voting 
rights in the target company. This sell-out right goes hand in hand with a 
squeeze-out right that allows a majority shareholder bidder to require the 
remaining minority shareholders to sell out their shareholdings at a fair 
consideration. 415  Under either situation, the acquirer (or the majority 
shareholder) must pay for a reasonable share price in cash or the same 
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transferable security in the previous tender offer. The right of sell-out and 
squeeze-out is a preemptory norm for all Member States. Shareholders can 
exercise these rights within three months after the tender offer takeover. In 
practice, while most Member States has a 90% threshold for the sell-out and 
squeeze-out right, over one fourth Member States increased their threshold to 
95%416; Latvia and Luxenberg set a 90% threshold for the sell-out right and 95% 
threshold for the squeeze-out right. 417 
In China, the sell-out right does not have a squeeze-out right 
correspondingly, and the sell-out right itself is not entitled directly to 
shareholders. Every member state of the E.U. has a specific threshold for 
shareholders to exercise the sell-out right, but in China, the sell-out right 
triggers “automatically” once the company loses its listing status, regardless of 
the bidder’s shareholding percentage, nor the public shareholders’ will.  
The Securities Law mandates the requirement of equity distribution if a 
company wants to be officially “listed”. The public-offered shares shall be more 
than 25% of the total shares of the company; and for companies with a 
registered capital over 400 million RMB, the percentage of its public-offered 
shares shall not be less than 10% of its total shares.418  
The public-offered shares refer to shares held by public individuals rather 
than legal persons or institutions.419 Suppose a small listed company with 100% 
circulating shares (an “absolute public” company). According to the Chinese 
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Law, if any acquirers obtained 75% of the company share, the company is no 
longer eligible for listing, and the acquirer has to afford all the remaining shares 
of the company. In this case, the threshold for shareholders exercising their 
sell-out right is 75%. However, in most listed companies in China, legal persons 
and institutional investors usually possess a certain percentage of shares, and 
most listed companies more or less have some non-public shares420, thus the 
threshold for exercising the sell-out right of public shareholders is even lower 
than 75%. In extreme situations, a company may not be eligible for listing if any 
acquirers obtained even less than 30% of the issued shares. 421 
 
D. Guidelines on Articles of Association 
Guidelines on Articles of Association is not a substantive law in nature, it 
is more like a guidance book on how should listed companies construct their 
company bylaw to maximum the corporate governance efficiency. It works as an 
common template of corporate charter (not a very good one, though), and so 
long as it does not violate relevant law and regulations, listed companies can 
add more practical rules according to their needs or adjust certain phrases or 
expressions in the Guideline to satisfy particular needs. 
Although no need for ratification to do so, such amendments should be 
specially announced to the public when the board makes announcement of 
revision of the articles of association. Therefore, listed companies are able to 
introduce takeover defenses in their corporate charters as far as they do not 
violate the on-going law and conform with the procedural rule of announcement. 
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VIII. Dilemma of Chinese Hostile Takeover Regulation 
China’s seemingly comprehensive, conclusive law is more problematic 
than thorough, not only did it fail to provide explicit answers in certain conflicts; 
it also exacerbated the internal contradictions of the provisions. As the target 
board had relatively limited ex post takeover defensive measures under the current law, 
they then take advantages of their de facto controlling powers to introduce 
self-trenching ex ante anti-takeover provisions into the articles of associations. On the 
other hand, facing target board ignoring the duty of care and duty of diligence in 
takeovers, the acquirers also went wild and frequently broke the bottom line of the 
Securities Law. Breaches of the tender offer procedural requirements, violations of 
information disclosure rules and other questionable behaviors are common practices. 422 
When acquirers and the target boards were nearly a draw, the China Securities 
Regulatory Commission usually engaged and “hosted” the tiebreaker. The prominent 
hostile takeover cases in this chapter will illustrate that, almost every pending dispute 
was solved by the CSRC’s administrative intervention - the intentions of the “above” 
has replaced the contradictive clauses and become the only decisive factors in hostile 
takeovers.  
As the corporate charter has to be approved in the general meetings of 
shareholders, theoretically the shareholders have the review and decisive power 
of such provisions. However, due to the inherent agency costs exist between the 
management and shareholders, directors of the board usually use their position 
to affect the corporate charter in favor of their interests.  
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A. The Board Centrism Anti-takeover Provisions 
Lack of the necessary knowledge and information being one cause, lack of 
unity being another, shareholders in China seldom give constructive suggestions 
in hostile takeovers, and the board usually take the lead in major resolutions. 
Falling to distinguish the boards’ deeper intentions from rhetoric persuasion and 
glorified jargons, shareholders usually vote for yes on issues that eventually 
may have adverse effect on them. The self-binding anti-takeover provisions 
(hereinafter the “ATPs”) in articles of associations are good examples.  
In late 2015, a series of takeover conflicts emerged in China, including the 
famous “Baowan Dispute”. The tense atmosphere in the Chinese capital market 
resulted in numerous A-share listed companies scrambling to add ATPs in their 
corporate charters. Official data indicates that, in 2016 alone, more than 600 A 
share companies revised their corporate charters to adopt ATPs. 423Until June 
2017, more than 620 Chinese A share companies have adopted ATPs. 424 
In China, defending hostile takeover by revising the corporate charter is not 
something new. The first case happened in 1998, when Dagang Oilfield tried to 
takeover Shanghai ACE. On July 1st 1998, Dagang Oilfield and its concert party 
collectively obtained 5.0001% Shares of Shanghai ACE and thereby became its 
largest shareholder. With astonishment and anger, the management of Shanghai 
ACE unanimously resisted the Dagang Oilfield’s attempt, and consecutively 
amended its articles of associations twice.  
The first amendment required nomination of the directors to strictly follow 
a three-step procedure: first, the board should consult with the Shareholders’ 
assembly, the shareholders then propose their candidates. Second, the board 
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reviews the background and qualifications of the candidates, then select out one 
or two they deem appropriate, or disqualify them all. Third, the board submits 
the final list at shareholders’ annual meeting or interim meeting for approval. In 
this way, the board of Shanghai ACE virtually had the veto power of any 
unfavorable personnel change proposed by any shareholders, including the 
acquirer shareholder. Straight after, the Shanghai ACE drastically increased the 
qualifications for shareholders to nominate directors: only shareholders 
individually or collectively hold 10% voting rights (exclude proxy) for more 
than 6 months have the right to propose candidates into the board. Moreover, 
shareholders have to submit related materials in written 20 days ahead of the 
shareholders’ meeting. 425 
Dagang Oilfield publicly questioned the validity of those anti-takeover 
provisions. As there was not sufficient substantial law for reference, both 
Dagang Oilfield and Shanghai ACE invited corporate scholars and legal 
professionals to discuss and debate the (un)reasonableness of those articles. 
Experts of different side, not hard to imagine, drew completely opposite 
conclusions. Experts pro-Dagang Oilfield claimed that, the Company Law 
entitles shareholders to right to decide major company issues and nominate 
management representatives of their own, thus the board should not expropriate 
shareholders legitimate right for their own purpose. In comtemporary Company 
Law, there was no authorizing provisions at all on shareholders’ qualification of 
nominating directors, as a result, the enhanced requirements in Shanghai ACE’s 
articles of association lacked theoretic support. However, as time was so 
pressing in takeovers, Dagang Oilfield did not wait for responses from the 
officials but further increased its shareholdings of Shanghai ACE to 10.0116% 
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in order to exercise the right to call on an interim shareholders’ meeting.426 
Eventually, under the conciliation of the CSRC, both party made a concession. 
Shanghai ACE agreed to remove its ATPs from the articles of associations, on 
condition that Dagang Oilfield promised not to reelect the board of directors 
after taking-over. 427 
Almost a decade from the Shanghai ACE takeover battle, the Company 
Law, Securities Law, the Takeover Measure and the Guidelines for Articles of 
the Association have undergone revisions and amendment for several times, yet 
there is still no grounded applicable validity rules for the ATPs. In this chapter, 
the author teased out 9 different types of anti-takeover provisions from 850 
randomly chosen A-share listed company articles. 
1. First Type of ATP 
The first type ATP injects a shareholding duration requirement for 
shareholders to exercise their right of bringing up proposals, nominating 
directors, proxy solicitation or chairing the general assembly. Contemporarily, 
this type of ATP is the most common one. 
For instance, the article 86 of KENNEDE Electronics MFG. Co., Ltd 
stipulates that: The list of candidates for director and supervisor shall be 
proposed to the general assembly for voting. Only shareholders who 
consecutively individually or together hold more than 10% of the company 
shares for more than 90 days can nominate candidates for directors and 
supervisors.428 Some companies go even further and extend the shareholding 
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VIII. Dilemma of Chinese Hostile Takeover Regulation 
154 
requirement to 180 days429 or even 365days430. 
The Article 35 of Zhenyuan Pharmaceutical has a 
180-days-shareholding-requirement, it also stipulates that numbers of 
candidates in the interim proposal shall not exceed 1/9 of the directors and 1/5 
of the supervisors 431. Temporarily Zhenyuan Pharmaceutical has exactly 9 
directors of the board as well as 5 supervisors, thus shareholders can only 
nominate one director and one supervisor at most each year. The most 
exaggerated one is the article 79 of Shanghai Dazhong Public Utilities, which 
mandates that shareholders have to hold 20% company shares for more than 
three years in order to bring up proposals on mergers and division of the 
company, or to change the incumbent directors and supervisors. 432 
2. Second Type of ATP 
The second type ATP is very similar to the first type, which raises the 
shareholding limit for shareholders to exercise their legitimate right. 
For instance, the Article 82 of Tiantan Biological requires shareholders to 
individually or collectively hold more than 5% company shares in order to 
nominate. 433 Some companies increase this shareholding limit to 10% 434or 
                                                                                                                                               
Articles of Association （Revised 2015） .（DB/OL） .[2017-06-21].Stock Code：603718）  
429 Article 83, Hunan Er-Kang Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd. Articles of Association（October 2016） .
（DB/OL）.[2017-06-21].Stock Code：300267）（Article 82, Shanghai Ersansiwu Internet Technology 
Co., Ltd. Articles of Association（April 2017）.（DB/OL）.[2017-06-21].Stock Code：002195）（Article 
80, Zhuhai Letong Ink Co., Ltd. Articles of Association（April 2016） .（DB/OL） .[2017-06-21].Stock 
Code：002319 
430  Shanghai BizConf Telecom Co.,Ltd. Articles of Association （ Revised March 2017 ） .
（DB/OL） .[2017-06-21].Stock Code：300578 
431  Zhejiang Zhenyuan Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd. Articles of Association （ April 2017 ） .
（DB/OL） .[2017-06-21].Stock Code：000705 
432 Shanghai Dazhong Public Utilities (Group) Co., Ltd. Articles of Association（Revised in 2017） .
（DB/OL） .[2017-06-21].Stock Code：600635 
433  Beijing Tiantan Biological Products Co., Ltd. Articles of Association（ Revised in 2016） .
（DB/OL） .[2017-06-21].Stock Code：600161 
434 Article 102, Hunan Mendale Household Textiles Co., Ltd. Articles of Association（February 2016）.
（DB/OL） .[2017-06-21].Stock Code：002397 
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even to 15%435. Asymchem Laboratories Inc. imposed a 5% shareholding limit 
for nominating directors and a 10% shareholding limit nominating independent 
directors.436 
3. Third Type of ATP 
The third type ATP prevents shareholders from exercising their nomination 
rights by increasing the difficulty of exercising the nomination rights .  
The Article 82 of Jinzhou Port prescribes the procedure for electing 
directors or supervisors. First, shareholders with more than 3% shareholding can 
recommend candidates to the board; Second, the board appoints an special 
committee to examine the candidates, and the committee shall submit a report to 
the board; Third, the board reviews the report and finalize the candidate lists by 
voting; Fourth, the board submit the final candidate lists for approval from the 
general assembly.437  
Not all listed companies have a complicated electing process like Jinzhou 
Port. For example, the Article 82 of Datun Energy claims that: When electing 
directors or supervisors, the board “negotiates” with the majority shareholders438 
first about the nomination method and electoral process, and then the board 
proposes the candidates list for voting by the general assembly.439According to 
this article, it is the board who makes final decisions on the candidates’ list; 
shareholders’ opinions are just “informative”. The Article 82 of Bengang Steel 
                                                 
435 Article 82, Shanghai Yiwei Communication Techonology Co., Ltd. Articles of Association（May 
2017）.（DB/OL）.[2017-06-21].Stock Code：300590. For details of the cases mentioned above, please 
refer to Fengmian Zhou."Adopting Anti-takeover Provisions: Listed Companies in China Violate Basic 
Shareholders' Rights."Legal Online. 2017-06-05. Available at 
https://www.sohu.com/a/146245421_120809. 
436 Article 96 and Article 136, Tianjing Asymchem Laboratories Inc. Articles of Association（December 
2016） .（DB/OL） .[2017-06-21].Stock Code：002821 
437  Liaoning Jinzhou Port Co., Ltd. Articles of Association （ November 2016 ） .
（DB/OL） .[2017-06-21].Stock Code：600190 
438 In this case, the majority shareholders refers to those holds more than 3% of the Datun Energy Share 
439  Shanghai Datun Energy Co., Ltd. Articles of Association （ Revised in 2015 ） .
（DB/OL） .[2017-06-21].Stock Code：600508 
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Plates specifies that: the controlling shareholder can recommend suitable 
candidates to the board, who later brings the final candidates list for approval 
from the general assembly.440  
Some companies directly deprive shareholders of the right to nominate. 
Both the Article 82 of China Sun Pharmaceutical Machinery and the Article 82 
of Zhenhua Heavy Industry enable the board of directors to nominate directors 
while enable the supervisory board to nominate supervisors.441 Although such 
nominations do have to obtain final approvals from the general assembly, but 
this does not change the fact that the shareholders have no say in who should 
become their new directors or supervisors. In this way, general assembly only 
plays a symbolic role in corporate affairs.  
4. Fourth Type of ATP 
The fourth type ATP strengthens the reporting obligation of the acquirers 
by lowering the disclosure requirement trigger. The Article 45 of Yahua 
Industiral requires investors and the concerted action person to make a formal 
report to the board of directors in written within 3 days when they obtained 3% 
of the company share.442 Yili Industrial Group demands formal report in written 
to the board from acquirers with 3% shares.443 This provision were amended in 
April 2017, and the disclosure requirement trigger was raised to 5%.444 
 
                                                 
440  Liaoning Bengang Steel Plates Co., Ltd. Articles of Association （ June 2017 ） .
（DB/OL） .[2017-06-21].Stock Code：000761 
441441 Hunan China Sun Pharmaceutical Machinery Co.,Ltd. Articles of Association（ June 2017） .
（DB/OL）.[2017-06-21].Stock Code：300216）（Shanghai Zhenhua Heavy Industry Co., Ltd. Articles 
of Association（Revised in 2008） .（DB/OL） .[2017-06-21].Stock Code：600320 
442  Sichuan Yahua Industiral Group Co., Ltd. Articles of Association （ July 2016 ） .
（DB/OL） .[2017-06-21].Stock Code：002497 
443  Inner Mongolia Yili Industrial Group Co., Ltd. Articles of Association （ April 2015） .
（DB/OL） .[2016-09-26].Stock Code：600887 
444 Inner Mongolia Yili Industrial Group Co., Ltd. Articles of Association （Revised in April 2017） .
（DB/OL） .[2016-09-26].Stock Code：600887 
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5. Fifth Type of ATP 
In Chinese Company Law, resolutions at shareholders’ meetings consist of 
ordinary resolutions and special resolutions.445 Ordinary resolutions only need 
half of the voting rights to adopt a proposal while special resolutions need at 
least 2/3 of the voting rights. 446 In reality, while most company matters are in 
nature “ordinary”, the fifth kind of ATP of APT deliberately classifies 
acquisition related issues into special resolutions, or directly raises the voting 
rights requirement for a proposal to pass.  
Take Fangda Group as an example. In September 2016, Fangda Group 
successively amended its Articles of Association and Rules of Procedure of the 
Board. Hereafter, any proposal to issue new shares or adjust the Articles of 
Association requires both three quarters voting rights from the general assemble 
as well as the board meeting.447 Even worse, some listed companies raises the 
voting rights requirement to four fifths in regard to proposals from the acquirers 
concerning board adjustment, asset purchase or sale, outbound investment, 
amendment of articles, share incentive scheme and etc.448 
6. Sixth Type of ATP 
The sixth type of ATP draws experiences from the “staggered board” 
provision from the U.S. The staggered board provision is a common 
anti-takeover defense which involves arrangements that the re-election of 
directors to the board be spread out over time and have service contracts which 
preclude removal without due cause. In this way, even if the acquirers obtained 
sufficient shares of the company, it is still impossible for them to reshuffle the 
                                                 
445 2014 Company Law, Article 16, Article 121, Article 142, Article 161 and Article 166. 
446 Id，Article 103 
447  China Fangda Group Co., Ltd. Articles of Association （ Revised September 2016 ） .
（DB/OL） .[2016-09-26].Stock Code：000055 
448 Baoshen Zhu. "Investor Service Center Paid Attention to Six Types of Inappropriate Anti-takeove 
Provisions: Company Bylaw Should not Transcend Law". Securities Daily. 2017-05-24. Available at 
http://www.ccstock.cn/stock/gupiaoyaowen/2017-05-24/A1495614939531.html. 
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board in a short term. 
The Article 106 of Blackcow Food Company Limited stipulates that, the 
board shall consist of nine directors, one of which being the chairperson. In 
order to maintain the stability and continuity of business decisions and to 
protect the legitimate interests of the shareholders, 2/3 of the directors of the 
previous fiscal year must retain on board after every reelection. 449 The Article 
107 of Fukong Interactive Entertainment and the Article 106 of Yuan Long Ping 
High-Tech specifically stipulate that, in times of hostile takeover, the general 
assembly can only appoint at most one third of directors every year.450 The 
Article 95 of Guoguang Electric mandates that shareholder's meeting can elect 
new directors or supervisors to replace old ones. Before a director's and 
supervisor's period of service expires, the shareholders’ meeting cannot 
terminate his duties without a reason. Newly-elected directors cannot exceed 
one third of the board members and newly-elected supervisors cannot exceed 2/3 
of the supervisors' board.451 452 
7. Seventh Type of ATP 
The Seventh type of ATP borrows the practice from the U.S., too - A 
“golden parachute” is an agreement between a company and its management 
specifying that the incumbent directors will receive certain significant benefits 
if they lost their position as a result of a merger or takeover. Such severance 
agreement is very usual in the U.S., and now many executives of Chinese listed 
                                                 
449  Blackcow Food Company Limited. Articles of Association （ October 2016 ）
（DB/OL） .[2017-06-21].Stock Code：002387 
450  Shanghai Fukong Interactive Entertainment Co.,Ltd. Articles of Association （ February ）
（DB/OL） .[2017-06-21].Stock Code：600634）（Yuan Long Ping High-Tech Agriculture Co., Ltd. 
Articles of Association（January 2016）（DB/OL） .[2017-06-21].Stock Code：000998 
451  Guoguang Electric Company Limited. Articles of Association （ April 2016 ） .
（DB/OL） .[2017-06-21].Stock Code：002045.  
452 See Fengmian Zhou."Strange Company Bylaw Violate the Law: Reappointment of Director without 
Shareholders' Approval. "Legal Online. 2017-06-15. Available at 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2017-06/15/c_129633286.htm. 
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companies bind themselves with exaggerated “change-in-control benefits” to 
scare away unwanted takeovers.  
On July 6th, China Baoan Group announced its intention to added a golden 
parachute provision in its article of associations:“[B]efore the service term due, 
directors, supervisors or senior management of the company shall not be 
dismissed without a reason. Termination of duty before term expiration because 
of takeover must obtain confirmation from the person involved, and the company 
must give the person with a lump-sum payment up to no less than 10 times of his 
annual salary and welfare combined along with reasonable compensations 
according to standards in the Chinese Labor Contract Law.” Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange then addressed its inquiries to the Baoan Group, ask for explanations 
of the reasons and background. Two weeks later, Baoan Group responded to 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange. Baoan Group has a relative dispersed ownership 
structure; fearing that hostile takeover may bring chaos to normal production 
activities, the board proposed to the general assembly the severance agreement 
so as to reduce the threat of hostile takeover. 453 At last, Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange approved Baoan Group’s amendment and the golden parachute 
formally became the article 10 in Baoan’s corporate charter. 454 
8. Eighth Type of ATP 
The eighth type of ATP endows the board the right to defend takeovers 
upon on the request from the block shareholder rather than the general assembly. 
This type of ATP is not very common. 
For example, the Article 43 of Tecon Animal Husbandry Bio-Technology 
stipulates that: When facing hostile takeovers, shareholders collectively or 
individually hold more than 20% company share have the right to request the 
                                                 
453 Hongchen Xie. "What is the Gold Parachute? An Inquiry into Baoan's Practice." Everyday Economic 
News. 2016-06-23. Available at http://www.nbd.com.cn/articles/2016-06-23/1015388.html. 
454 China Baoan Group Co., Ltd. Articles of Association（June 2016）（DB/OL） .[2017-06-21].Stock 
Code：000009 
VIII. Dilemma of Chinese Hostile Takeover Regulation 
160 
board to take anti-takeover measures which do not conflict with the present law. 
The board shall act immediately upon such request, and shall notify other 
shareholders of potential takeover defenses. 455 
9. Ninth Type of ATP 
The ninth type of ATP requires all majority shareholders to act in concert in 
hostile takeovers; defect shareholders may face civil charges from other 
shareholders. 456 
For instance, the Article 31 of Huanghe Enterprise requests the top 5 
majority shareholders to act unanimously in takeovers, shareholder who fails to 
behave in accordance with others loses his 25% shareholding as compensation to 
other shareholders. 457 
B. The “CSRC centralism” Path Dependence 
Excessive administrative interventions from the supervisory authority 
could be observed in several takeover cases in the past three decades. Except the 
Shenzhen Baoan Group Co., Ltd tookover Shanghai Yanzhong Industrial Co., 
Ltd case and the Dagang Oilfield Group Ltd tookover Shanghai ACE Co., Ltd. 
case, which we talked in detail in the previous chapters, there are also several 
hostile takeover cases in China that worth mentioning. 
1. Shanghai Xinlv Fuxing City Development Co., Ltd VS Liaoning Jindi 
Construction Group Co., Ltd 
In 2002, Shanghai Xinlv Fuxing City Development Co., Ltd (hereinafter 
Xinlv) intended to take over Liaoning Jindi Construction Group Co., Ltd 
                                                 
455 Xinjiang Tecon Animal Husbandry Bio-Technology Co,. Ltd. Articles of Association（Revised 
November 2016） .（DB/OL） .[2017-06-21].Stock Code：002100 
456 The cases of this chapter mainly referred to the Articles of Associations of the listed companies 
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(hereinafter Jindi), this is one of the very few cases in China when the target 
company employed the “Scorch Earth” strategy – stripping out its valuable 
assets to make the target company less attractive. The target board also found 
their way to reject the nomination of directors by the hostile acquirer. This 
takeover batter lasts for four years. At last, under the coordination of the CSRC, 
Xinlv finally paved its way for the control of Jindi in 2006.458 
2. Wanhe Group VS ST Meiya Co., Ltd. 
The target company - ST Meiya Co., Ltd (hereinafter Meiya) was in severe 
financial distress for more than 2 years. In 2003, its former controlling 
shareholder - Guangdong Heshan State Asset Regulator, transferred its state 
shares in Meiya to Wanhe Group by agreement without negotiating with the 
management. Wanhe then obtained 27.49% shares of Meiya at 1.0107RMB per 
share. This disclosed contract had aroused strong objections from the incumbent 
management, who claimed in the media and in the general meeting that this 
share transfer would impair the long-term interest of the company, and the 
acquirer had no relevant experiences in running an entity far different from its 
own business domain.459 Almost all other shareholders and employees of Meiya 
objected this share transfer. Under the pressure, Guangdong Heshan State Asset 
Regulator had to cancel its cooperation with Wanhe Group and negotiated with 
the Meiya management.460 
3. GOME Electrical Appliances Holding Limited VS Sanlian Commercial 
Co.,Ltd. 
In February 2008, Longjidao Construction Limited Company (hereinafter 
Longjidao), a company of only 10 million registered capital, obtained 10.9% 
                                                 
458 Linyao Tang. "Power Allocation in Hostile Takeover Regulation: Rethinking Chinese Fiduciary 
Duty, Board Neutrality Rule and Shareholder Rights." TOHOKU Law Review 47 (2017):157. 
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shares of Sanlian Commercial Co.,Ltd (hereinafter Sanlian) through judicial 
auction in Shandong Province. Longjidao was further found out to be a ‘shadow’ 
acquirer, and the real acquirer behind the curtain was GOME Electrical 
Appliances Holding Limited (hereinafter GOME) – the nationwide electronic 
device retail giant in China. GOME announced its takeover of Longjidao and 
thereby gained the control of the Sanlian. Sanlian then filed a lawsuit to the 
High Court of Shandong Province, claiming that the indirect takeover by GOME 
breached the information disclosure and suspension requirements. However, the 
case was rejected by the court, alleging that the lawsuit was filed in a wrong 
procedure and did not fall in the criteria for case acceptance.461 In the end, 
Sanlian was acquired by GOME. 462 
4. Maoye International Holdings Ltd VS Shenzhen International Enterprises 
Co., Ltd 
From November 7th to December 16th 2008, Maoye International Holdings 
Ltd (hereinafter Maoye) and its affiliations increased their shareholding in 
Shenzhen International Enterprises Co., Ltd (hereinafter Shenzhen International) 
to 10% of its total shares. Shenzhen International attempted to use a poison pill 
which including a share allotment plan and director nomination limitation to 
frustrate Maoye’s attack. However, the second largest shareholder of Shenzhen 
International - Shenzhen Tefa Group abstained in the vote on the poison pill, 
and the poison pill didn't pass. Shenzhen International then organized the 
shareholder group to protest Maoye's hostile takeover, and the takeover 
failed. 463 
Poison pills were hardly seen in Chinese takeover market. Many observers 
like the author were still wondering what would happen if the motion of the 
                                                 
461 See Xin, Zhang, and China Securities Regulatory Commission. "Do Mergers and Acquisitions Create 
Value: Evidence from Chinese Listed Companies [J]." Economic Research Journal 6 (2003): 1-10. 
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poison pill by Shenzhen International Enterprises was approval by the general 
meetings of shareholders. 464 
5. Baoneng Group VS Vanke Co., Ltd 
China Vanke Co., Ltd (hereinafter Vanke) is the leading real estate 
company in China, with its main business in real estate development and 
property service. Vanke has covered 66 cities in mainland China by the end of 
2015, and has now been involved in dozens of real estate development projects 
in Hong Kong, Singapore, San Francisco, New York City and London. 465 
Baoneng Group (hereinafter Baoneng) was founded in Shenzhen, too, but it is 
much less known and much smaller in size than Vanke. Baoneng has a rather 
diversified business domain including real estate, finance, logistics, medical 
service, agriculture and so on. 
From July to December, 2015, Baoneng and its affiliations acting in 
concert consecutively acquired large sums of Vanke-A Share from the stock 
market. By December 17th, 2015, Baoneng group collectively held 
approximately 24% of total shares of Vanke, exceeded the China Resources 
Corporation and became Vanke’s largest shareholder. Baoneng funded its 
acquisition through issuing corporation bond and the highly-controversial 
Universal Life Insurance.466 
Chairman of Vanke, Mr. Shi WANG declared Baoneng as an unwelcome 
person, and began taking defensive measures as responses. Upon his request, 
China Resources Corporation as Vanke’s stable shareholder increased its 
shareholding, but did not surpass Baoneng's shareholding. On December 24th, 
Vanke annouced AnBang Insuance to be its white knight, but AnBang 
                                                 
464 See Cai, Wei. "Hostile takeovers and takeover defences in China." Hong Kong LJ 42 (2012): 901. 
465 CHINA VANKE CO., LTD., available at http://www.vanke.com/en/about.aspx, (last visited 17th 
January 2017). 
466 The driving force behind Baoneng’s assault on Vanke, available at 
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eventually did not achieve enough shareholding to defend Baoneng. Lucky for 
Vanke, the staggered provision in its corporate charters made Baoneng Group 
impossible to fully control the board in the following 18 months. 467 
From December 21st 2015, Vanke-A share was suspended for trading for 
several months. On March 13th, 2016, Vanke suddenly in the annual company 
report announced its memo on major asset transaction with Shenzhen Metro - 
another white knight for Vanke instead of the previous one. But only four days 
later, China Resources Corporation, who has supported Vanke unconditionally 
for the past decades, publicly objected Vanke's cooperation with Shenzhen 
Memo and claimed that the management of Vanke had bypassed the board of 
directors to reach this agreement. On June 17th, the Vanke board approved the 
cooperation with Shenzhen Metro, despite all three directors from China 
Resource Cooperation objected it. China Resource Cooperation subsequently 
claim the board meeting had procedural irregularities. China Resource 
Corporation invited many legal professionals and academic scholars to issue 
opinions about the illegitimacy of Vanke's Board meeting. And although experts 
had “in accordance” claimed that the board meeting procedure was illegal thus 
its legal impact should be nullified,468 no decisive conclusion was drawn from 
the CSRC or the court.469 
On July 4th, 2016, Vanke A share resumed trading in the stock exchange, 
and it went all the way down as expected. Baoneng continued to increase its 
shareholding from July 5th, and cumulatively obtained 24.972% of Vanke's 
shares with its concerted party. Baoneng was very determined to become 
Vanke’s controlling shareholder so that it could veto any resolution of the 
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468 China Resources opposes proposal to oust Vanke board, available at 
https://www.ft.com/content/e8a4cbce-3e98-11e6-8716-a4a71e8140b0, (last visited January 24th, 2017). 
469 Linyao Tang. "Power Allocation in Hostile Takeover Regulation: Rethinking Chinese Fiduciary 
Duty, Board Neutrality Rule and Shareholder Rights." TOHOKU Law Review 47 (2017):160-161. 
VIII. Dilemma of Chinese Hostile Takeover Regulation 
165 
incumbent board.  
Baoneng’s attack was so severe, the management of Vanke had so seek 
external help from the “above”. On July 19th, Vanke filed complaints to CSRC 
and Shenzhen Stock Exchange, alleging that the funds Baoneng used to finance 
its acquisition is illegal.470 In August 2016, the takeover dispute had a twist, 
when the Evergrande Group – another Chinese real estate giant announced its 
participation into the takeover battle. 471 
On August 21st, Vanke disclosured its financial report of the previous year 
- 31 huge projects were suspended because of the Baowan Dispute. Vanke's 
cooperative partners, clients and minority shareholders expressed their concerns 
and worries about Vanke's future. 
On December 3rd, 2016, chairman of the CSRC, Mr. LIU Shiyu suddenly 
condemned the “barbaric” leveraged company buy-outs by some “asset 
managers using illegal funds”. Liu said that, China’s capital markets had seen a 
series of “abnormal phenomena” lately, challenging the bottom line of China's 
financial law and regulations.472 Shortly after Liu’s Speech, the sales of the new 
universal life product offered by Foresea Life, a subsidiary under Baoneng 
Group, was suspended by the Chinese Insurance Regulatory Commission, and 
Baoneng Group had to stop its bulk-purchase of Vanke’s shares on the open 
market.  
Although Baoneng's current repayment schedule was not overwhelming yet, 
it may very possible face huge capital pressure if any massive surrender 
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happened. Baoneng was roundly condemned by the Chinese regulators after it 
funded the purchase of 43 billion yuan on Vanke’s shares through insurance 
premiums generated by Foresea’s universal life insurance product.473  
Under the pressure from the “above”, on January 12th, China Resource 
Cooperation transferred all its Vanke A-share to Shenzhen Metro thorough share 
transfer agreement. One day later, the Evergrande Group made an public 
announcement stating that they have no intention further acquire Vanke’s share. 
Baoneng Group and Shenzhen Metro all made conservative statement that “for 
their strategy on development, it’s too early to exclude the possibility that they 
may further increase their shares in Vanke in the next 12 months”.474 However, 
in the February of 2017, the Baoneng’s Head, the property tycoon, Mr. Yao 
Zhenhua was banned from working in the insurance industry by the CIRC for 10 
years in China.475 Till this end, Baoneng’s hostile takeover attempt failed.  
6. Other takeover cases in China 
The Chinese securities market has grown rapidly from its establishment in 
the early 1990s. There were numerous hostile attempts during the past three 
decades, some of them succeeded, while others failed. Except the cases we 
mentioned above, there were other examples worth noting. Most target 
companies adopted defensive tactics as response. Some of the defensive tactics 
are until now finally known to the public. 476  
In 1996, Guanzhou Sanxin Industry attempted to takeover Shanghai 
Shenhua Shareholdings Co., Ltd, but was defeated by the white knight.  
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In 1999, Guangzhou Tongbaihui Service Co., Ltd’s hostile takeover of 
Shandong Shengli Corporation Limited was defeated by the controlling 
shareholder increasing its shareholding. 
In 2001, three takeover attempted were seen in China. First, Huajian 
Electronic Co., Ltd tried to obtain control of Jinan Baihuo Co., Ltd, however, 
the takeover was rejected by the board of directors of the target company, who 
defeated the acquirer by passing a board resolution. 
The second case was Yuxin Group takeovers Founder Yanzhong 
Technology Group. Yuxing Group become Founder Yanzhong Technology 
Group Co., Ltd's largest shareholder by purchasing shares from the secondary 
market. The acquirer prepared to submit a proposal to the general meeting in 
order to select their directors into the board. The corporate charter authorized 
the incumbent board to review the director candidates, but the standards and 
requirements were very vague and ambiguous. As the incumbent management 
and the largest shareholder could not settle their disputes, the acquirer attempted 
to call on an interim shareholder meeting, which was frustrated by the 
incumbent management by filing a lawsuit to the court, claiming the call on 
interim shareholder meeting did not follow the due process.477 
The third case in 2001 was Shanghai High Resolution Digital Vision 
System Co., Ltd’s takeover of Founder Yanzhong Technology Group Co., Ltd, 
and the latter frustrated the takeover bid by increasing shareholding. 478 
 
In conclusion, deficient and contradictory laws gave rise to the 
uncertainties in the capital market. On one hand, the target board had very limited ex 
post takeover defensive measures under the current law, they then introduced various ex 
ante anti-takeover provisions into their articles of associations utilizing their de facto 
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controlling powers. The duty of care and duty of diligence in Chinese law were 
stipulated through a series of positive and negative lists; this parody of the U.S. 
fiduciary duty failed to provide a comprehensive and fair standard to review the board’s 
behaviors. On the other hand, facing unruly managements, the acquirers also went wild 
and frequently broke the bottom line of the Securities Law. Breaches of the tender offer 
procedural requirements, violations of information disclosure rule and other 
questionable behaviors are common practices. Such loopholes came from 
over-complicated legislations that were vague and obscure in nature. Previous hostile 
takeover cases illustrated that, many pending dispute was solved by the China Securities 
Regulatory Commission’s administrative intervention; the intentions of the “above” 
have outweighed the substantial law to decide the outcomes of hostile takeovers. 
CSRC’s intervention may temporarily ease the disputes and conflicts, but this would 
form even heavier reliance on administrative interference in hostile takeovers.  
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IX. Reflections of Chinese Regulatory System: A 
Comparison 
A. Reflections of the Regulatory Framework 
Some scholars believed that, the Chinese takeover laws were mainly 
transplanted from the U.K. 479  The Audit Committee of Mergers and 
Acquisitions under the CSRC was regarded as the counterpart of the Takeover 
Panel in the U.K., and the Administrative Rules on Acquisition was the Chinese 
version of the City Code. However, the ACMA is obviously not a self-regulatory 
entity; it only had very limited authority in takeover disputes. Moreover, 
Chinese courts every now and then also took part in takeover related case trials; 
it is too farfetched to consider the Chinese mode similar to the U.K.’s. 480 
On the other hand, the Chinese hostile takeover regulatory framework bears 
resemblance to the U.S. mode as well. The CSRC has the ultimate authority 
oversighting the securities market; it functions in a similar way just like the SEC 
to some extent.  
 
B. Reflections of the Substantive Law 
In terms of legal clauses and provisions, China has transplanted the 
takeover law from the U.K., U.S and the E.U.  
First, in parallel with the City Code and the Companies Act of the U.K., the 
Chinese Company Law is ostensibly “shareholder centered” – the general 
assembly seems to be the highest authority in corporate issues, and the board of 
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comparative economics 32.4 (2004): 599-616. See also Cai, Wei. "Hostile takeovers and takeover 
defences in China." Hong Kong LJ 42 (2012): 901. 
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directors are responsible for carrying out the general assembly’s resolutions. 481 
In theory, as all defensive measures, no matter ex ante or ex post, more or less 
concern corporate issues which need the majority approval from the 
shareholders – hence in theory, it is the general assembly not the board of 
directors who should have the right to order defensive measures.  
Second, just like the takeover laws of the U.K. and E.U., the Chinese 
Company Law directly banned certain takeover defenses such as poison pills, 
dual ownership structure482 and so on. Equal treatment of shareholders has 
become a basic principle in the Chinese law. 483 In addition, the Securities Law 
had rigorous merit-review requirements484 for the target board to issue shares 
and bonds, making share repurchase schemes485, share issuance schemes and 
convertible securities issuance plans 486  impossible to defend hostile 
takeovers. 487  
Third, in tender offer regulation and investors’ protection, the Chinese 
Securities Law has learnt a lot from the Securities Exchange Act of the U.S.; 
insider trading, market manipulation, false statement and fraud behavior were 
strictly prohibited. Chinese Securities Law and the Administrative Rules on 
Acquisition also have similar information disclosure and tender offer procedural 
requirements similar to the William’s Act. 488 Disgorgement Statute and share 
transfer restrictions for corporate insiders could also be found in the Chinese 
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Securities Law. 489  
Fourth, Chinese law put considerable attention on the board’s fiduciary 
duty in takeovers. The Administrative Rules on Acquisition requires the 
directors to “assume the duty of loyalty and duty of care” in takeovers. 490 The 
Chinese Company Law explained what “duty of loyalty” is through a series of 
prohibitive stipulations. 491  The Guidelines on Articles of Association has 
suggested the meaning of the “duty of care”. 492 
Fifth, the Chinese Securities Law borrowed the Mandatory Bid Rule from 
the City Code and the European Directive, mandating acquirers reaching 30% 
shareholding of the target company to send out tender offers, either partial or 
full, to all shareholders of the target company. 493 Likewise to most of the 
Member States within the E.U., the Securities Law also left abundant room for 
the exemption of tender offer. 494  
Sixth, the Administrative Rules on Acquisition borrowed the Board 
Neutrality Rule from the U.K. and the E.U., but modified the original one into a 
less rigorous one. This is the same case with the Selling-out Right495 from the 
European Directive.  
However, China’s seemingly comprehensive, conclusive law is more 
problematic than thorough, not only did it fail to provide explicit answers in 
certain conflicts; it also failed to divide the work clearly between the court and 
the CSRC. Apparently, the articles and clauses were contradictive with each 
other, and the goal of the Chinese law was therefore blurred – should the law 
give primacy to shareholders protection, or should the law respect the directors 
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of the boards’ business judgement? In summary, it is urgent to amend the 
present hostile takeover related laws in order to provide certainties for the 
participants and players in the Chinese capital market.  
 
C. Reflections of the Supervisory Practice 
The “Shareholder Centrism” over “Board Centrism” debate in corporate 
law is always an interesting topic in takeover researches. As we mentioned in 
the previous chapter, the Chinese Company law has a long history of 
empowering the shareholders other than the directors, but most minority 
shareholders remain rationally apathetic in corporate governance, which led to 
the “Majority Shareholder Centrism” in the past few decades. The Company 
Law endows shareholders “individually or collectively holds 3% of the company 
share” the right to bring interim proposal for discussion on the general 
assembly;496 in comparison, minority shareholders’ appeals and opinions seem 
insignificant. Yet this scenario is undergone rapid change nowadays, but not to a 
good direction. When hostile takeovers began to rise in China, the “Majority 
Shareholder Centrism” began to fall. 
The emergence of the agency cost between management and shareholders 
in China inevitably blurred the original legal pattern of “Shareholder Centrism” 
or “Majority Shareholder Centrism” promoted by the Chinese Company Law. 
This is especially true in corporate control transfer situations. Hostile takeover 
manifests the divisions and discords inside the target company: usually, most 
shareholders regard hostile takeover as an ideal way to get away with their 
shares with a considerable premium, but once the takeover succeeds, directors 
of the board will lose the whole empire that they have been building for years. 
From this aspect, hostile takeover is not only a battle between potentates of the 
company and covetous bidders, but a fierce skirmish between the board of 
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directors and the shareholders assembly as well. From the fact that most hostile 
takeovers eventually fail in China, the management and the board of directors 
seem to have gained an upper hand. Consolidation of the board control gradually 
challenges the general assembly’s authority, and the vested interests group 
wants to further solidify their power.Associations is now the new battlefield for 
the management and the shareholders of the company.  
Lack of the necessary knowledge and information being one cause, lack of 
unity being another, shareholders in China seldom give constructive suggestions 
in hostile takeovers, and the board usually take the lead in major resolutions. 
Falling to distinguish the boards’ deeper intentions from rhetoric persuasion and 
glorified jargons, shareholders usually vote for yes on issues that eventually 
may have adverse effect on them. The self-binding anti-takeover provisions in 
articles of associations are a good examples, as we have seen in the previous 
chapters. From the previous cases we analyzed, the board usually bypassed the 
general assembly and adopted anti-takeover defenses – the shareholder primacy 
clauses in the Company Law are nothing more than decorations in hostile 
takeovers.  
 
D. Chinese Fiduciary Duty: A Comparison with the U.S. 
As we have mentioned above, the Article 8 in 2014 Administrative Rules 
on Acquisition provides the general rule on directors' fiduciary duty. The Article 
148 of 2014 Chinese Company Law defined fiduciary duty as duty of loyalty 
and duty of care. Then, duty of loyalty was enumerated in several prohibitive 
stipulations in Article 148 and Article 149 in Company Law. The Company Law 
does not elaborately define the “duty of care”, it only reveals the consequence 
when directors, supervisors or senior managers have to afford when they fail to 
obey so in Article 150. The Article 98 of 2016 Guidelines on Articles of 
Association provides certain examples of how directors could fulfill their duty 
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of care to the company. 
Despite so many words and paragraphs were used to clarify what fiduciary 
duty is in Chinese corporate governance, the fiduciary duty is still too vague and 
blur for legal practitioners. All those articles in Chinese law used general terms 
such as “treat all the purchasers... in a fair manner”, “protecting interests of a 
company and its shareholders”, “should not...cause improper obstacle to 
takeovers” or “should not cause damages to the lawful rights of the said 
company or its shareholders”. Those general terms are necessary, especially for 
emergencies and new situations. However, without detailed, definitive and 
deterministic clauses to support its back, those general regulations alone left 
many critical questions in takeovers unsolved, and thereby caused mass 
uncertainty in Chinese takeover markets.497 For instance, what manner is “fair” 
and what is not? What obstacle is proper and what is not? How to define the 
lawful rights of a company? In addition, how to define the lawful rights of the 
shareholders? The answers to those questions are critical, in order to eliminate 
the uncertainties in the Chinese market. Nevertheless, another even more 
important question is that, who is responsible for the ultimate answers to those 
questions in China, the court, or CSRC？  
From the U.S. experience, we know that clarifying fiduciary duty is never 
easy. The court had realized that the directors of board inevitably face conflicts 
of interest in hostile takeovers; therefore, traditional Business Judgement Rule 
could not apply in such cases. Instead of writing down simple principles of 
fiduciary duty one by one, the Delaware court employed a two-part 
reasonableness-based tests, to determine whether it is legitimate for the board to 
take defensive measures. Under this test, the defendant - directors of the board, 
was required to prove that: first, they had reasonable ground to believe that a 
                                                 
497  See Huang, Hui. "The new takeover regulation in China: Evolution and enhancement." The 
International Lawyer (2008): 153-175. 
IX. Reflections of Chinese Regulatory System: A Comparison 
175 
danger to corporate policy and effectiveness existed because of another person’s 
stock ownership, and; second, the defensive measure that they were taking was 
reasonable in relation to the threat posed.498 Compare to Chinese practice, this 
two-part reasonableness-based test is definitely better because: first, it is more 
flexible in defining fiduciary duty; second, it is more stable and produced more 
certainty.  
In the Revlon case afterwards, the court understood that the fiduciary duty 
might require the board to take different actions under different circumstances: 
when sale of a company become inevitable or has already begun, the duty of the 
board switches from protecting the company into obtaining the highest price for 
the benefit of the shareholders. Later, the court strengthened the Unocal test in 
the Revlon case. The court realized that, whether the board had breached their 
fiduciary duty when adopting anti-takeover defenses was an objective problem 
that should be determined case by case, or in the Revlon case, defense by 
defense. The Court found that, the defenses of the Unitrin board was so 
“draconian” that no shareholders could obtain control of the company thorough 
normal proxy contest ever since. Since then, a Unitrin test became prepositive 
before the application of the Unocal test – defensive measures should first be 
not draconian, and should not be coercive to its shareholders, and then it could 
be put under the review of the proportionate test of Unocal. 499 
Over the years, the Delaware court had formed the inclination to favor the 
primacy of the board of directors over the will of the shareholders. This 
inclination continued from the early 1980s to now, and it will probably last 
forever. During this process, such well-known inclination had provided high 
level of certainty to the target company and the acquirer as well. The board had 
accustomed to adopt anti-takeover measures as responses to unfavorable 
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takeovers; and the acquirers usually strike the target company under very well 
preparation. In China, expressions and interpretations in Chinese Law on 
fiduciary duty are too general and too simple; as a result, all takeover defenses 
adopted by the management were regarded as “controversial” with different 
“reasons”,500 even when hostile takeovers per se in China were usually deemed 
“immoral”.  
The Delaware courts had practiced for years in interpreting the essential 
meaning of the fiduciary duty. China, apparently, lack the infrastructure of the 
Delaware courts in reviewing the directors behaviors in takeovers.501 Moreover, 
as the essence of the duty of case and duty of loyalty is changing constantly with 
the market and situations, the fiduciary duty is not something that could be 
described and defined accurately by merely paragraphs of words or (negative) 
standard lists.502 China is a civil law country in nature, it is almost impossible 
for us to establish a fiduciary review system just Delaware courts did, therefore, 
the U.S. mode is not optimal for China to imitate at all.  
 
E. Chinese Self-Regulation: A Comparison with the U.K. 
If the U.S. mode is not suitable for China, how about the U.K. mode? The 
hostile takeover regulatory framework of the U.K. is a self-regulatory one, 
which was formed under special commercial history. 
The early institutional investors, financiers and bankers of England all used 
to live in the London city, where they could see each other almost every day in 
their daily transactions. Being geographically near had brought many 
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conveniences for the formation of the self-regulatory system; these repeated 
traders in London gradually developed a low-cost way of management for them 
– reputational penalties among the circle were more preferable in the first place 
than expensive litigations and complicated administrative procedures. 503 
Comparably, China does not have such a solid background and long history for 
self-regulatory supervision; individual investors are still the mainstream 
participants in China.504  
Indeed, as we mentioned in the previous chapters, the institutional 
investors account largely for the formation of the self-regulatory system. The 
U.K. institutional investors were very passive in corporate governance, but were 
extremely active in shaping the law through lobbying and protesting. After 
several takeover disputes in the 1950s and 1960s, the spirit of “Passive 
Directors, Active Shareholders” became well trenched in the U.K., and this 
principle was elaborated through shareholder-oriented laws such as the 
preemptive rights, the prohibition of anti-takeover defenses and so on. In 
addition, the Takeover Panel successfully proved its irreplaceability by 
constantly improving itself. Most importantly, other major industrial 
associations and commercial groups, such as the Board of Trade, the Council of 
Stock Exchange, the Association of Unit Trust Managers, the Association of 
Investment Trust Companies and so on, consistently supported its back, which 
helped the Takeover Panel to win the race with the public authority.  
This history illustrated that, the self-regulatory entities and industrial 
associations in the U.K. were at all times more independent than their 
counterparts in China. According to the Securities Law, there are only two 
self-regulatory entities of the Chinese securities market – the Stock Exchanges 
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and the Securities Association of China. 505 However, in practice, neither the 
Stock Exchange nor the Securities Association in China has substantial 
self-regulatory power. 506 
Let us talk about the Stock Exchange first. Both Shanghai Stock Exchange 
and Shenzhen Stock Exchange lack the independence to effective supervise the 
market. Historically, the Stock Exchanges were not established by the traders, 
investors or participants in the securities market; instead, they were established 
and developed by the government in the first place. According to the Securities 
Law, the council is the decision-making organ of the Stock Exchanges 507; 
however, the law allows the CSRC to designate up to half of the council 
members. 508 Moreover, the general manager of the Stock Exchange is also 
appointed by the CSRC,509 and any revisions to the Stock Exchange Article510 
or operational rules need to obtain administrative approval from the CSRC. 511 
Therefore, the Stock exchange is in fact under the strict control of the CSRC.  
The self-regulation of the Securities Association of China is even weaker 
than the Stock Exchange. The former presidents of the Securities Association of 
China all held positions simultaneously in the CSRC, and approximately half of 
the council members were appointed directly by the CSRC. Therefore, the 
Securities Association could not really represent the well-being and interests of 
its members, but the will of the CSRC. 
Compare with the Takeover Panel, what the self-regulatory entities in 
China lack the most is the substantial punitive power that could effectively 
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discipline the participants in the securities market. 512 The Securities Law did 
not specify the punitive measures the Stock Exchange could impose when its 
members broke the rules. In practice, the Stock Exchange could suspend or 
terminate the transaction deals of misbehaving investors. As punishments this 
severe could trigger turbulence and chain reactions in the market, more 
moderate measures are needed. However, except the above severe penalties, all 
other measures the Stock Exchange could adopt, such as public criticism, are 
either too light or have no inhibitive effect at all. On the other hand, the 
Securities Association of China almost have no punitive power at all, it at best 
has the right to mediate between its members and inspect its members’ activities 
that may violate its articles of association. Both the Stock Exchange and the 
Securities Association of China lack the investigation power and means 
necessary to constraint their members’ behaviors. Despite self-regulation is not 
a tradition in the U.S., the National Association of Securities Dealers could do 
much more than their counterparts in China. 
 
F. Chinese Board Neutrality Rule: A Comparison with the E.U. 
The Board Neutrality Rule in the European Directive were mainly 
borrowed from the No Frustrating Action Principle in the City Code – the board 
should remain neutral and take no actions that may frustrate the bid unless 
authorized by the shareholders. Therefore, almost all ex post takeover defenses 
are the violations of the Board Neutrality Rule. The Board Neutrality Rule was 
equivocally clear in the European Directive, but during the transforming process, 
several Member States have played literal games to reduce the limitations of the 
Board Neutrality Rule.  
The Chinese law of the Board Neutrality Rule is even worse, in that it is 
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not equivocally clear per se. 513The Article 33 of the 2014 Administrative Rules 
on Acquisition provides substantive guidance for the Board Neutrality Rule. 
“[d]uring the period after the announcement of a takeover bid and before the 
completion of the takeover bid, target company management...without the 
ratification of the general shareholders’ meeting, should not cause major 
impacts on the assets, liabilities, entitlements or business performances of the 
target company by disposing of assets, engaging in external investments, 
adjusting the main businesses, providing guarantees or loans and others.”514 
The principle of this term was supposed to be “for management of the 
target company, without shareholders approve, no defensive measures should be 
taken”. However, from the literal meaning of the article, there are lots of things 
the board actually could do before and during the takeover bid. First of all, 
“During the period after the announcement of a takeover bid and before the 
completion of the takeover bid…” means this article does not apply to 
defensives measures employed “before the announcement of a takeover bid”. 
Second, “should not cause major impacts on the assets, liabilities, entitlements 
or business performances of the target company...” means this article does not 
apply to takeover defenses that “do not cause major impacts on the assets, 
liabilities, entitlements or business performances of the target company”. In 
other words, under Article 33, as far as defensive measures do not cause major 
impact on the target company, or such measures were taken before the 
announcement of the bid, then the management does not need shareholders’ 
approval for taking such defenses.515 
Therefore, instead of prevent the management from taking defensive 
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measures, Article 33 provides the board with a loophole, through which the 
board could circumvent shareholders’ approval and adopt certain types of 
defensive measures accredited by the law. When fiduciary duty in Chinese law 
seems to be too broad and too general, the Board Neutrality Rule is over 
specified. 
The No Frustrating Action Principle in the City Code clearly forbids the 
board to take any actions that may frustrate the bid; its key elements were clear 
and unequivocal, almost with no exceptions. Despite the flawed transposition 
process, the Board Neutrality Rule in the European Directive was thorough as 
well. According to the Article 9 in the Directive, once the board are aware of the 
offer bids, it should not take any actions that may frustrate the acquisition 
activity before obtaining authorization from shareholders, except finding 
alternative potential offeror to join the bid.516 Article 9 (1) through (6) has 
thoroughly considered the time span and all different kinds of situations, also 
the procedure of obtaining authorization. If China is to embrace the Board 
Neutrality Rule, the City Code and the European Directive are good examples, 
while the Member States’ malpractices are negative examples. In summary, 
takeover laws should be clear-cut enough so that the participants could adjust 
their behaviors towards a certain direction.517 
 
G. Chinese Mandatory Bid Rule: A Comparison with the U.K. 
and the E.U. 
Through whatever means of acquisition, when an acquirer or investor holds 
30% of the issued shares of a listed company, further acquisition of the company 
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shares must via tender offer518. China transplanted this Mandatory Bid Rule 
from European countries to protect the lawful rights and interests of the 
minority shareholders. 
In the U.K., the City Code clearly mandates that “any person, or together 
with persons acting in concert with him, acquires shares carrying 30% or more 
of the voting rights of a company whether by a series of transactions over a 
period of time or not”, shall launch an overall tender offer for all the 
outstanding shares of the target company. 519  In the E.U., the European 
Directive has similar clauses. When natural or legal person holds securities of a 
listed company to a certain level, mandatory bid through tender offer “shall be 
addressed at the earliest opportunity to all the holders of those securities for all 
their holdings”.520 In the U.S., the Williams Act of United States has no such 
Mandatory Bid Rule, it only requires all the shareholders to be treated equally in 
a fair manner, and acquirers shall purchase shares on a pro rata basis if the 
preliminary accepted shares exceed their estimation. 521 
In the U.K., once the acquirer obtained 30% of the voting rights of the 
company, the Mandatory Bid Rule applies. The European Council allows every 
Member States to determine the “percentage of voting rights which confers 
control” according to their own circumstances522, thus the trigger of the Member 
States varies from lowest 25% to highest 66%523. Interestingly, in Denmark and 
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Estonia, there is no fixed number of the Mandatory Bid Rule trigger, the rule 
applies whenever the acquirer “holds the majority of voting rights in the 
company or becomes entitled to appoint or dismiss a majority of the members of 
the board of directors”524. Despite the minute threshold difference between the 
U.K. and the E.U. Member States, once the Mandatory Bid Rule is triggered, the 
acquirer has to bid for all the company shares through a general tender offer; no 
partial tender offer is allowed except extreme conditions.  
In contrast with the U.K. and the E.U., partial tender offer is an important 
part of the current Chinese Mandatory Bid Rule. Only in rare situations do the 
acquirers have to send out general tender offer: the Chinese Mandatory Bid Rule 
requires acquirers holding 30% of the issued shares and acquirers holding 30% 
of the total shares sending out either partial tender offer or general tender offer 
under different circumstances, for part or all outstanding shares of the company. 
In other words, whenever an acquirer or investor, individually or collectively, 
steps over the 30% issued shares line, tender offer seems to be the only 
legitimate way of acquisition; but whether general tender offer is compulsory 
varies from case to case. 525 
Obviously, partial tender offer is more cost-efficient than general tender 
offer. 526 After all, general tender offer is way too money consuming and usually 
leads to the failure of whole takeover attempt. On the other hand, the general 
tender offer can provide shareholders with far more certainty and convenience 
by ensuring all shareholders have the equal chance to sell out their 
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shareholdings at a premium.527 Under current Chinese law, stepping over the 
30% trigger point through normal security trading or tender offer provides 
acquirers in China with the legitimate right to send out a partial offer in 
takeovers instead of having to bid for all the outstanding shares. From this 
aspect, the Chinese Mandatory Bid Rule is more acquirer-friendly than 
shareholder-supreme; it promotes hostile takeovers from happening at the cost 
of minority shareholder protection. In reality, in partial tender offers, when 
preliminarily accepted shares exceed the purchasers’ original plan, certain 
percentage of shares are detained in the hands of shareholders, price of which 
may very possible plummet after the takeover. In addition, the minority 
shareholder further may take a heavy toll once an acquirer chasing short-term 
gain consolidates its control power of the target company, as repeatedly 
observed in Chinese security market.528 In summary, the current Mandatory Bid 
Rule in China is very problematic and needs modification urgently.  
H. Chinese Sell-out Right: A Comparison with the E.U. 
In any Case, the acquirer should not be the only one to bear the 
consequences of listed company going private. When purpose of the acquirer is 
to delist the target company, it is reasonable that the acquirer shall 
unconditionally accept all the preliminarily accepted shares including those 
exceed the acquirer’s designated amount, but demanding the acquirer to swallow 
all the company shares simply because the ownership distribution falls out of 
the listing norm is not reasonable at all. For instance, an acquirer with 30% 
shares planned to further purchase 5% shares through tender offer; meanwhile, 
other majority shareholders with more than 5% shares of the company slightly 
increase their shareholding by, say 4.99%, which is slightly below the 5% line to 
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make public announcement.529 Under these circumstances, if the company loses 
its listing status, requiring the acquirer alone to buy out all the trivial shares is 
not fair at all, because all other majority shareholders are together responsible 
for the status quo, too. 530 
The judicial purpose of sell-out right is to protect the rights and interests of 
minority shareholders by offering them a fair opportunity to decently exit. In 
European countries, for a bidder with 90% of the capital carrying voting rights 
and 90% of the voting rights in the target company, taking care of the rest 10% 
is not a big deal. However, in China, the bidder has to take care of the remaining 
25% and usually more shares of the company, yet very possible the bidder is 
still far away from being a “controlling shareholder” when this happens. In 
China and most countries, very few acquirers intend to buy out a whole 
company in takeovers, other usually only bid for lowest necessary proportion of 
shares. After all, acquisitions are too costly and every penny counts. In China, 
the bidder is responsible for formally reporting to CSRC about the quantity and 
proportion of the designated shares, amount of capital required for the takeover, 
and sources and guarantees of capital before sending out tender offer.531 They 
have to prove that they are financially sustainable for the designated tender offer. 
Nonetheless, most of the acquirers are far from well prepared for the remaining 
shares after the tender offer. Without enough funds, the sell-out right of 
shareholders is just words on page, yet it is not realistic for the law to require all 
acquires preparing enough money for all outstanding shares of the company in 
partial tender offers. 
In some cases, the amount of remaining shares is even bigger than the 
                                                 
529 See 2014 Takeover Measure, Art. 14 and Art. 16. In share transactions, 5% is the trigger of 
mandatory report obligation. 
530 Tang Linyao. "Technical Rules in Chinese M&A: A Scrutiny." Tohoku Law Review. (49)2018: 
49-50. 
531 See 2014 Takeover Measure, Art. 29 (1), Art. 29 (4), Art. 29 (6). 
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amount of shares acquirer predetermined to bid. Compulsorily requiring the 
bidder to satisfy the sell-out right of the shareholders may result in the 
acquirers’ opportunistic behavior, forcing them to dismantle the target company 
for quick cash.  
Even if the acquirer do have to ability to afford the remaining shares, and 
obtained 100% shares of the target company in the end, it may still not be a 
good thing – the originally-was equity investor is now forced to be responsible 
for a business he is not fully familiar with. This may in turn hurt the company in 
the end, for the company may achieve greater development under the control, or 
joint-control of former industry professionals. Indeed, when exercising the 
sell-out right, the minority shareholders’ interests are under through protection 
and they can exit the company in a fair manner, but the costs are long-term 
interests of the employees, creditors, affiliated companies and others who bear 
connections with the target company. 532 
 
From the comparison between the Chinese takeover law and the Western 
takeover law, not only do we realize that there is huge room for improvement of 
the Chinese takeover law, we now also understand what and how the Chinese 
regime could be improved. Apparently, simply changing the words of the laws 
and clauses could do very little to fill up the loopholes and to mitigate the 
side-effects of the CSRC dependence. Based on these insights, we will talk 
about the reconstruction of the Chinese hostile takeover regulatory framework 
in the conclusion chapter.
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X. Conclusions: The Reconstruction of the Chinese 
Hostile Takeover Regulation 
A. Optimal Choice of Modes of China 
Law that intends to please every side of the participants without doubt 
leads to uncertainty. As we mentioned in Chapter 2, consistency is the foremost 
merit in hostile takeover regulations. A good hostile takeover regulation should 
be consistent and bring certainty to the capital market. Over the time, the 
participants could adjust their behaviors according to the established preference 
of the law.  
In order to achieve so, the law has to take sides; more specifically, good 
takeover law must take sides between the board of directors and the 
shareholders assembly. The U.S. regulatory framework, apparently, chose the 
side of the directors, while the U.K. regulatory framework worshiped the 
shareholders’ power. The E.U. mode, though designed based on the U.K. mode, 
yielded the legal effect similar to the U.S. in the transposition process from the 
E.U. level to its Member States. In a cognitive aspect, the unpleasant transition 
process of the European Directive mirrors the failure of many Asian countries 
transplanting their takeover law from abroad, notably, China. So much so, the 
European Directive itself offered a paradigm of codifying together the merits of 
the U.K. City Code as well as the pioneer practice of the Delaware court, which 
could be regarded as an excellent template for other Asian countries.  
In chapter 4, we pointed out that, the formation of the three original 
regulatory framework had their historical inevitability, in other words, every 
incumbent law and system had its uniqueness and special background. In the 
previous chapter, we illustrated that the non-repeatability of the U.K’s 
self-regulatory framework. Pondering that China is a civil law country, the 
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U.S.’s trial-dominant mode is also not an imitable option. That leaves the 
European Directive being the nearest paradigm for Asian countries to learn from 
the practice of the Anglo-American countries.  
In chapter 5, we demonstrated that, the different roles of institutional 
investors, and the contests between different interest groups counted largely for 
the nuance of the different regulatory frameworks. In the formation of any law, 
the market evolution and economic appeals are also crucial background factors 
as well. Similarly, future China’s hostile takeover law-making must take several 
local and contemporaneous factors into consideration, for example, the relative 
short history of China’s capital market, the status quo of large companies’ 
corporate governance, the aftershock of the share split reform, the practical need 
to normalize the insurance funds and debt equity, the call of a nation-wide 
supply-side reform and the sustainable growth of the economy.  
In China, the corporate governance problem is especially severe compared 
to its counterparts in the U.S. or U.K. The No.1 corporate governance problem 
in China is the agency costs because of the controlling block holder and 
insiders’ control because of no functional proprietor of the state-owned shares. 
A very large proportion of shares in Chinese listed companies are state-owned 
shares, however, the State-owned Asset Supervision and Administration 
Commission performed badly over the past two decades. As a result, the 
state-owned largest shareholder as the supervision entity of the management is 
virtually non-existent; insider control problems are serious as always. 533 
Moreover, the supervisory board and independent director system functioned 
awfully in China. 534 Due to poor institutional transplantation, it is almost 
                                                 
533 HUANG, Xing-luan, and Shen Weitao. "A study on Government Intervention Insider Control and 
M&As' Performance of Chinese Listed Companies [J]." Economic Management Journal 6 (2009). 
534 See Linyao Tang. "Independent Directors and Insider Control in Chinese Listed Companies: A 
Practical Economic Analytical Framework of Law." Tohoku Law Review. 48 (2017): 65-85. See also 
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impossible for the supervisory board to “supervise” the management, and 
independent directors in China are nothing more than “rubber stamps” of the 
board of directors. 535 
Under these circumstances, takeover, especially hostile takeover, may be a 
cure to Chinese corporate governance, especially when China gradually open its 
capital markets. In order to sustain growth, the Chinese government adopted the 
supply-side reform to vitalize Chinese enterprises. As a result, the whole 
industries are in desperate need of takeovers and reorganizations to better utilize 
social resources. In other words, a legal framework which facilitates takeovers 
is more optimal for China. The U.K. and the E.U. approach in nature better 
facilitates takeovers than the U.S. approach, from this aspect, China should 
adopt a “board neutrality rule” centered takeover regime and discard the 
“fiduciary duty” centered regulatory approach, in order to stimulate takeovers 
from happening. 536 
Considering China is not a case law system country, and the U.K.’s 
self-regulatory framework is impossible to form through any institutional 
innovation or reform, Chinese takeover regime could only step by step evolve 
into an investor-friendly hostile takeover regulatory framework.  
Originally, China had transplanted its hostile takeover law from the U.S., the U.K. 
and the E.U. After 15 years of local practice, China had formed its unique regulatory 
framework (and path dependence) in its semi-market economy. On one hand, the target 
board had very limited ex post takeover defensive measures under the current law, they 
then introduced various ex ante anti-takeover provisions into their articles of 
associations utilizing their de facto controlling powers. The duty of care and duty of 
diligence in Chinese law were stipulated through a series of positive and negative lists; 
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this parody of the U.S. fiduciary duty failed to provide a comprehensive and fair 
standard to review the board’s behaviors. On the other hand, facing unruly 
managements, the acquirers also went wild and frequently broke the bottom line of the 
Securities Law. Breaches of the tender offer procedural requirements, violations of 
information disclosure rule and other questionable behaviors are common practices. 
Such loopholes came from over-complicated legislations that were vague and obscure in 
nature. Previous hostile takeover cases illustrated that, almost every pending dispute 
was solved by the China Securities Regulatory Commission’s administrative 
intervention; the intentions from the “above” have outweighed the substantial law to 
decide the outcomes of hostile takeovers.  
With this in mind, it can be seen how actual amendments to the law would be 
of little to no use in improving the hostile takeover regulations in China. That is 
why the main priority should be to discard the “CSRC centralism” dependeny 
path. To fulfill this goal, first of all, the Administrative Rules on Acquisition of 
Listed Company should make it clear that without shareholder approval, the 
board of directors should not take any defensive measures. This is not to suggest 
a blanket ban on all takeover defenses, but rather, to allow the shareholders the 
right of having the final say of adopting ex post defenses. 
Second, the fundamental rights of shareholders as stipulated in the 
Company Law should be respected in takeover activities. Shareholders’ right to 
vote on major issues, to elect and nominate directors of the board and to call on 
interim meetings should not be violated by any means.  
Third, the self-regulation from the Stock Exchange and Securities 
Association of China should be largely strengthened. Despite the public 
authority of the CSRC shall not be challenged, the CSRC could delegate more 
power to the self-regulatory entities to achieve higher supervisory efficiency. 
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B. Modification of the Board Neutrality Rule 
There are at least four benefits to the market and shareholders of takeovers 
above: better allocation of resources, synergy effects between cooperation, 
better corporate governance and more precise market estimation.537 Then, why 
should the law intervene in takeovers? One reason is that the naturally existed 
conflicts of interests, or in other words, agency costs between different 
participants in takeovers, are to some extent avoidable sometimes.  
In Chapter II we revealed those agency costs in detail. The first agency cost 
exists between the management and shareholders. When takeover emerges, it 
brings premiums for shareholders, which is good for them. However, this is 
definitely a nightmare for the incumbent management, who will almost 
absolutely be replaced if takeover succeeds. Therefore, instead of thinking what 
is best for the company and shareholders, the management intends to think for 
themselves at this time and they would find every possibility to outmaneuver the 
acquirers by adopting various defensive measures. If the management 
successfully frustrate the offer bids, the shareholders would not be able to enjoy 
the premiums of the offer and if the takeover is really a value-adding one, the 
board of directors are entrenching their control at the cost of better management 
and long-term revenue of the company. 
Another type of agency cost exists between the dominant shareholders and 
minority shareholders. There are two kinds of agency costs among dominant 
shareholders and minority shareholders. The first one is, when a company has a 
controlling shareholder, this shareholder usually also controls the board using 
his overwhelming voting rights. Hence, when takeovers are imminent, this 
dominant shareholder can cut deals with the acquirer, offering them his portion 
of the total shares to save the trouble of public offering, by doing so the 
controlling shareholder could enjoy the premiums of share prices alone and do 
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not necessarily have to share with other shareholders. There are even worse 
situations, too, when a dominant shareholder had get used to exploit the 
company resources at the expenses of minority shareholders. When takeover 
happens, this dominant shareholder and the board representing this shareholder 
does not want to lose control of the company, and together they hit back those 
potential reformers of the company who may eventually bring good to 
shareholders of the company as whole. In addition, by frustrating the acquirers' 
attempt because of personal reasons, the dominant shareholder closed the gate 
for minority shareholders to cash out at a reasonable market price, or to have a 
better management of the company in the future.538 
In sum, the ultimate goal of the Company Law is to reduce the agency costs 
that come with opportunism. Those agency costs usually come into being 
between: first, shareholders and the management; second, minority shareholders 
and controlling shareholders. 
In fact, different jurisprudence has different types and levels of agency 
costs. In countries where share ownership structure is dispersed, the agency 
costs between minority shareholders and controlling shareholders are almost 
non-existent, but the shareholders and management agency costs are relatively 
high. On the contrary, in countries where share ownership structure is 
concentrated, the agency costs between shareholders and the management are 
low, but minority shareholders and controlling shareholders' agency costs are 
high. 539 In light of this, the Company Law in different countries have different 
goals and systematic design. When the U.S. law are designed to mitigate the 
agency costs between the shareholders and the management board through a 
Business Judgement Rule centered legal system, countries with concentrated 
ownership structures like China and most Member States of the European Union 
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have to deal with the agency costs between minority shareholders and 
controlling shareholders more. 
We illustrated that China should take an U.K. alike regulatory path using 
E.U.’s codifying technique, therefore, the Board Neutrality Rule must become 
the center of the future takeover regulatory framework. However, the naturally 
high agency costs among minority shareholders and controlling shareholders 
determined that a “broad” Board Neutrality Rule is grossly inadequate - at least 
not good enough for China. 
Based on the E.U. and the U.K.’s terminology, a “modified” Board 
Neutrality Rule should be applied in China. In the normal Board Neutrality Rule, 
when takeover happens, directors of the board should not take any actions that 
may frustrate the offer bid unless the general meeting of shareholders say 
otherwise. In this “modified” Board Neutrality Rule, when takeovers are 
imminent, directors of the board should not take any actions that may frustrate 
the offer bid unless the majority of minority shareholders say otherwise. As 
individual investors are widespread and they thereby need the protection from 
the law most, it is better to let the minority shareholders, instead of the general 
assembly, to have the conclusive power of taking takeover defenses.  
In China, minority shareholders are scoffed with the nickname of “chives”, 
because they are easily “harvested” by majority shareholders in the Chinese 
stock market. The knotty problem behind is the much poorer corporate 
governance environment in China compared to its counterpart in the U.K or E.U. 
Another important question arised with this modified Board Neutrality 
Rule: who, or what kind of shareholders should be labelled as “minority 
shareholders” in the Chinese listed companies? As ownership structure is 
different from company to company, only the general assembly could judge the 
upper limit of shareholding of the “minority shareholders”. Therefore, every 
companies’ corporate charter should have the clear standards of “minority 
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shareholders” according to the companies’ ownership structure, and such 
standards should be subjected to change on a yearly basis. On the other hand, if 
the minority shareholders really only make up an extremely small portion of 
company shareholders, then it is not appropriate for a group of people this small 
to decide the major issues in takeovers; instead, it should be the non-controlling 
shareholder, as well as the minority shareholders together to decide whether 
takeover defenses should be adopted. In this situation, the corporate charter only 
have to define the shareholding threshold of the controlling shareholders, and 
exclude them in the resolution.540 
This “modified” Board Neutrality Rule has three advantages. First of all, it 
largely mitigates the agency costs between minority shareholders and 
controlling shareholders. Second, it encourages takeovers from happening, as 
the adoption of defensive measures are more difficult than before. Third, it 
benefits the shareholders as a whole by empowering them with real decisive 
power. 
Indeed, the disadvantages of this “modified” Board Neutrality Rule is also 
obvious. First, the minority shareholders are usually much dispersed, and it is 
very hard to gather them together to vote. In addition, the minority shareholders 
have little knowledge and information about the company business; it is difficult 
for them to make really splendid decision. Vote proxy mechanism through 
internet those days could to certain degree mitigate these two disadvantages, but 
it also brings new agency costs between the minority shareholder and the proxy 
entity as well. In sum, the “modified Board Neutrality Rule” is an ideal solution 
to mitigate the agency costs, but to what degree is it effective largely depends 
on other factors as well, the “legal infrastructures” in Chinese capital market 
being the most important ones. 
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C. Protection of Shareholders Rights and Reduction of 
Anti-takeover Provisions 
Corporate Charter had become the second battlefield in corporate control 
disputes. 
Bidders become shareholders of the target company by acquiring its shares. 
It is difficult to discriminate acquirer shareholders in ex ante defenses, thus 
intrinsically, most ATPs have to sacrifice all shareholders’ interests in order to 
lay a yoke upon the acquirer. Although those articles did pass with super 
majority vote in the general assembly for different reasons, it does not 
necessarily mean that the law should allow and recognize those self-trenching 
clauses. As we have presented in part VIII, many ATPs blatantly violated the 
on-going laws and administrative regulations 
In August 2016, the CSRC publicly voiced its concerns about the 
ever-growing ATPs. Spokesperson of the CSRC expressed that, ATPs should not 
become convenient weapons for corporate control. The CSRC would take 
actions against those ATPs that restrict shareholders’ legitimate rights.541 One 
month later, the Shanghai Stock Exchange positively declared that they would 
strengthen the supervision of ATPs. Both Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange required their listed companies to disclose the legal basis, reason and 
necessity for the introduction of ATPs in their articles of associations. Since 
then, many listed companies have received the inquiry letters from the Stock 
Exchanges regarding the amendment of their corporate charters as well. 
However, faced with numerous deliberately glorified and ambiguous replies, the 
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stock exchanges are reluctant to take any further actions. 542 At the end, such 
ostensibly strict but in fact moderate inquiries in turn become judicial deference 
for these unreasonable ATPs. In the author’s opinion, the ATPs must be dealt 
with caution and care. 
1. The First, Second and Third Type of ATPs 
The first, second and third type of ATPs create barriers for shareholders 
exercising their right to propose motions, to nominate directors or supervisors, 
to initiate proxy solicitation or to chair the general assembly. Such limitations 
are achieved by imposing long shareholding period requirement, raising 
shareholding percentage requirement and changing the electoral procedure, 
respectively. 
The Administrative Rules on Acquisition clearly addresses that “[t]he 
decisions made and the measures taken by the board of directors of the company 
under takeover for the takeover” shall not “set any improper obstacle to the 
takeover by misusing its authorities” and shall not “damage the legitimate rights 
and interests of the company”.543 In light of this principle, the board can take 
proper defensive measures against takeovers, but not at the expense of 
shareholders’ legitimate rights. Yet what rights are “legitimate” under the 
Chinese Law?  
The Company Law defines the authority and function of the shareholders’ 
assembly; it has the right to determine the company's operational guidelines and 
investment plans, elect and change the directors and supervisors they deem 
appropriate, approve annual financial budget and profit distribution plans, make 
resolutions about changing the registered capital or issuing new shares, decide 
split-up or liquidation related affairs of the company, revise the article of 
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associations.544 Moreover, the Company Law clearly vest the right to call on an 
interim meeting in shareholders representing 10% of the voting rights or 
more. 545  Moreover, the Company Law gives shareholders separately or 
aggregately holding 3% or more of the shares of the company the right to put 
forward interim proposals for discussion. 546  The Administrative Rules on 
Acquisition reconfirmed shareholders right to bring up interim proposals.547 In 
addition, the Guidelines for Articles of the Association of Chinese Listed 
Companies suggests that list companies should not put any restrictions on proxy 
solicitation. 548 
Nevertheless, in December 2013, Notice of the General Office of the State 
Council on Further Strengthening Protection of the Lawful Rights of Small 
Investors in Capital Markets set the goal to substantially improve the ballot 
system of shareholders’ assembly and indicated that the de facto controller of 
the company shall not restrict or thwart minority shareholders exercising their 
legitimate right. 549 
Hence, it is not reasonable to add additional requirements or extra 
conditions for shareholders to exercise the rights that have been well stated in 
the Company Law. Moreover, the board should not deprive shareholders 
assembly of the righteous power to make ultimate decisions on major issues of 
the company. Deliberately increasing the statutory requirements in corporate 
charters largely infringes the most fundamental rights of the shareholders.   
2. The Fourth Type of ATP 
The fourth type ATP strengthens the reporting obligation of the acquirer by 
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lowering the disclosure requirement trigger. This kind of ATP restricts 
investors’ freedom deviously and should be nullified.  
The Securities Law requires any investors obtained 5% of the issued shares 
of a listed company to report in writing to the securities regulatory authority 
under the State Council, the stock exchanges as well as the listed company. The 
investor shall not continue to trade the share of the within this period. 
Thereafter, the investors have to report and announce publicly every 5% 
increase or decrease in such shareholdings.550 
Originally, the information disclosure duty for majority shareholders 
specified in Chinese Securities Law aimed to promote a fair and open securities 
market by inhibiting insider trading and market manipulating behaviors as much 
as possible. The 5% disclosure trigger and the share transfer upper limit has 
taken the necessity and cost of information disclosure, trade efficiency and 
stability of the stock prices into full consideration. According to many Chinese 
scholars, the 5% threshold is quite appropriate for the Chinese capital market, as 
it maintains a balance between minority shareholder protection and business 
transaction efficiency.551  
Therefore, the board shall has no right to magnify the obligation of 
information disclosure for the convenience to defend unwelcomed takeovers. 
Lowering the disclosure ratio from 5% to 3% harms the investors’ free will to 
trade and the proper right to protect commercial secrets. The enhanced 
requirement creates improper obstacles for even normal investors with no 
takeover attempt, and it inevitably lowers the efficiency in business 
transactions. 
3. The Fifth Type of ATP 
The fifth type of ATP substantially increases the votes required in certain 
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corporate matters, and confuses the ordinary resolutions with special resolutions 
in shareholders’ meeting. 
The Company Law has set the rules and procedures of shareholders’ 
meeting. Clearly, besides ordinary resolutions and special resolutions, there is 
no other optional forms of resolution.552 Most importantly, Chinese Company 
Law provides no authorizing regulations on changing the voting ratio.  Rules 
for the Shareholders' Meetings of Listed Companies from the CSRC strictly 
follows the stipulations in the Company Law, meanwhile, it provides additional 
resolutions rules for companies with preferred stock.553   
According to the Rules for the Shareholders' Meeting, preferred stock 
shareholder has to attend the shareholders meeting to exercise their voting rights. 
Resolutions on preferred stock related affairs, substantially increase or decrease 
of the registered capital and split-up or mergers of the company can only be 
adopted by common stockholders representing 2/3 or more of the common 
shares as well as preferred stockholders representing 2/3 or more of the 
preferred stocks. Even so, the new rules in the Rules for the Shareholders’ 
Meeting still strictly followed the 2/3 voting rights tradition with no more and 
no less. 554 
According to Chinese law, a shareholder has to attend the shareholders’ 
meeting so that each share he holds could count for one voting right. Most 
minority shareholders in Chinese listed companies remain rationally apathy in 
corporate governance; they seldom attend the shareholders meeting. As a result, 
the shares of the majority shareholders actually counts even more in the general 
assembly. Raising the voting ratio from 2/3 to 3/4 could lead to the consequence 
that a single majority shareholder virtually has the veto power on almost all 
significant issues of the company, which corrupts “the majority rule doctrine” in 
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principle.555 Insider control problem is still very severe in many Chinse listed 
companies; making special resolutions hard to pass manually increases the 
agency cost between the fact controller of the company and the minority 
shareholders, and greedy majority shareholder can veto down any proposal that 
may might be good for the company in the long-term.  
The Company law states that, unless otherwise specified, the corporate 
charter provides the resolution method and voting procedures of the 
shareholders’ meeting. Thus the company law only allows listed companies to 
add extra resolution methods and voting procedures on matters that was not 
specified in the law. As the Company Law has already addressed amost all 
crucial takeover related issues like increasing or decreasing the registered 
capital, issuing new shares, reorganization or split-up of the firm, there is not so 
much room for the board or the management to outmaneuver. 556 
4. The Sixth Type of ATP 
The sixth type of ATP complicates the electoral procedure of the board of 
directors in order to prevent the acquirers’ candidates from “boarding” on the 
board, which more or less impairs certain shareholders’ lawful rights. 
According to the general provisions of the Company Law, shareholders are 
entitled to enjoy asset return, participate in decision of vital issues and pick 
their representatives as management in principle. The Company Law lists the 
functions of the shareholders assembly, reaffirms shareholders’ right to elect or 
change directors or supervisors. 557 In general, any resolutions on changing or 
electing directors or supervisors must obtain absolute majority voting rights 
from the general assembly.  
About the rules of procedure to elect directors or supervisors, the Company 
law allows the shareholders’ assembly to adopt the cumulative voting system, a 
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system of voting in which the shareholder can multiply his voting rights by the 
number of candidates and vote them all for one candidate for director or 
supervisor. 558 In addition, the Rules for the Shareholders' Meeting complies 
with the Company Law. 559 
In sum, electing or changing directors and supervisors are the basic rights 
entitled to shareholders according to Company Law, and the shareholders 
assembly should have the final say of the fit candidates. Even the consecutive 
reappointment of the same director shall go through the electoral procedures at 
first. Given this, articles of associations must not deprive shareholders of the 
fundamental right to vote, and should not prolong the term of a director through 
any indirect means. In addition, the Company Law has enumerated the directors’ 
qualifications through a negative list, 560 but has no compulsive requirements at 
all. Therefore, the article of associations should not impose any additional 
requirements for director candidates. 
5. The Seventh Type of ATP 
The seventh type of ATP, the Golden Parachute, is essentially a special 
form of employment and remuneration contract. In practice, the Golden 
Parachute is also a very common equity incentive scheme that binds the 
management’s interest with the company and lessens the conflicts of interests 
between management and shareholders. Once the takeover succeeds, the 
management can get rich yields, and the shareholders especially the minority 
shareholders can exit the company with a share premium. In this way, the 
director are less adamant in consolidating their positions. On the other hand, the 
acquirer shall bear the consequence of such one-time overpay, thus they have to 
think twice before setting foot in companies with Golden Parachute. 
Golden Parachute is applicable under Chinese law. The Company has given 
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shareholders assembly the right to decide the remunerations of the directors and 
supervisors; 561 it also has given the board the right to decide the salary and 
rewards of the senior management.562 Adding Golden Parachute into articles of 
associations belongs to special resolutions of the company, it requires 2/3 voting 
rights on the general assembly. In 2016, the CSRC formulate the Measures for 
the Administration of Equity Incentives of Listed Companies to “[f]orm a 
close-knit community of interests between the owner and laborer, arouse the 
enthusiasm of the senior management and core employees, stable the elites' 
teams and improve corporate governance.”563 The Equity Incentives Measure 
encourages incentives for directors and senior management for the stability and 
consistency of the company. 564 
However, we should realize that, the compensation paid to the management 
should not be excessive. It is the company who ultimately bears the burden of 
every fiscal expenditure. Overcompensation for directors in takeovers is 
detrimental to the interests of both the shareholders and company. One general 
principle of the Administrative Rules on Acquisition is that, controllers of the 
company must not abuse their power and rights to damage the legitimate rights 
and interests of the company and other shareholders,565 yet there is no specific 
regulations about the reasonable range of compensations that do not cause 
damages to the company or shareholders; future law must set a clear standard of 
the Golden Parachute in China.   
                                                 
561 Id. Article 37. 
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http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/shenzhen/ztzl/ssgsjgxx/jgfg/sszl/201607/t20160725_301111.htm. 
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6. Autonomy of Bylaw Shall Not Violate Jus Cogens 
The Administrative Rules on Acquisition has the Chinese version of Board 
Neutrality Rule,566 which is similar to the approach taken by the City Code in 
the U.K. Before the completion of a takeover bid, target company management 
should not cause major impacts on the assets, liabilities, entitlements or 
business performances of the target company by disposing of assets, engaging in 
external investments, adjusting the main businesses, providing guarantees or 
loans and others. The only thing the management can do is to conduct ordinary 
business operations and implement resolutions made by the general assembly.567 
Therefore, when takeover bids emerge, without the clear authorization from the 
shareholders meeting, the board of directors shall remain neutral and calm. The 
company law clearly guarantees the “one share one vote” principle with no 
exceptions, 568 thus despite the fact that the majority shareholders hold the 
“majority” of company shares, their opinions and decisions do not fully reflect 
the shareholders meeting’s will.  
In sum, board of directors shall not take defensive measures without the 
authorization from the shareholders meeting, and the majority shareholders’ 
request cannot replace the authorization from the shareholders meeting. The 
Xinjiang Tecon’s articles of associations attempted to replace the general 
assembly’s resolution by majority shareholders’ (20%) request in written,569 but 
such written notice cannot justify the board’s ultra vires behavior. Moreover, 
the article of association did not give specific explanation of what defensive 
measures are enforceable for the board; it clearly ignores the other shareholders 
opinions. Such articles should be nullified as it goes against the jus cogens. 
                                                 
566 Id. Article 33. 
567 The Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, The City Code on Takeovers and Mergers (12th ed. 2016)，Part 
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7. Freedom of Shareholders Are Sacred 
The “act in concert” provision restricts shareholders’ free will to decide. 
However, the liberty to decide is shareholders’ basic right entitled by the 
Company Law.570 A very intrinsic principle of the Administrative Rules on 
Acquisition is that no one shall damage the legitimate rights and interests of a 
target listed company and its shareholders through takeovers.571 Demanding 
dissent shareholders to indemnify other shareholders is a blatant violation to this 
general rule. 25% of the shareholding as indemnity is quite ridiculous, and may 
well exceed the ceiling of civil compensation. By forcing the top five 
shareholders to act together in hostile takeovers, the previous mentioned 
Lanzhou Huanghe’s ATP is protecting certain shareholders’ interest by 
extorting other shareholders. 572 This kind of ATP should be nullified. 
D. Improvement of the Mandatory Bid Rule 
The Chinese Mandatory Bid Rule has an initial trigger of 30% issued 
shares, while the U.K. and most E.U. Member States set the threshold at 30% 
shares carrying voting rights. Considering the non-tradable state-owned shares 
account for a proportion impossible to ignore in total shares of most listed 
companies, the initial trigger point of Chinese Mandatory Bid Rule is much 
lower than the U.K. and major E.U. Member States. For wide range minority 
shareholders, it might be a good thing; but such a low-threshold Mandatory Bid 
Rule inevitably hinder takeovers from happening in the first place. Fewer 
takeovers means even fewer exit channel for minority shareholders, thus it is 
hard to say such a low-threshold of Mandatory Bid Rule is at the interest of 
minority shareholders. 
Even from the aspect of the policy maker, setting the trigger low was trying 
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to protect minority shareholders, but allowing partial tender offers overflow the 
security market is definitely not. In the U.K. and all the E.U. Member States, 
once the acquirers trigger the Mandatory Bid Rule, general tender offer becomes 
compulsory while partial tender offer is strictly prohibited. This is to ensure 
equal and fair treatment for all shareholders without any omission. From the 
experiences of the U.K. and the E.U., when obtaining shares to the extent of 
triggering the Mandatory Bid Rule, the acquirer usually holds sufficient voting 
rights that may confer control, and the minority shareholders are in a weaker 
position. Therefore, the compulsory requirement of general tender offer only has 
very little inhibiting effect on takeovers, but can improve minority shareholders’ 
well-being significantly.  
In sum, current Chinese Mandatory Bid Rule has a trigger so low that 
hostile takeovers can hardly happen; beyond that, partial offers instead of 
general offers are too frequently allowed in takeovers that the interests and 
lawful rights of minority shareholders are ignored. A higher trigger, combined 
with a stricter general tender offer requirement is optimal and imminent for 
Chinese securities market. Likewise, considering state-owned shares percentage 
varies from company to company, and almost every listed company in China has 
its unique equity distribution, a flexible trigger is crucial. Denmark and Estonia 
has set a good example for China: “[w]henever an acquirer holds the majority of 
voting rights in the company or becomes entitled to appoint or dismiss a 
majority of the members of the board of directors, he shall launch a general 
tender offer for all the outstanding shares of the target company.”573 As when 
the acquirer could be deemed as “holding the majority of voting rights in the 
company or becoming entitled to appoint or dismiss a majority of the members 
of the board of directors”, it is optimal for the general assembly of shareholders 
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to decide, instead of a fixed standard from CSRC. 
 
E. Suggestions for the Sell-out Right 
In the European Directives, a bidirectional sell-out right and squeeze-out 
right co-exist with each other, whether to exercise these rights or not depends on 
the acquirers’ or the shareholders’ will. When this happens, the acquirer has 
obtained more than absolute control of the company, while the minority 
shareholders’ together hold only insignificant amount of the company shares. In 
China, only sell-out right is entitled to majority shareholders, and the trigger of 
the sell-out right is much lower than that of the E.U. Member States. 574 
Maximizing shareholders’ value and protecting minority shareholders’ 
interests is crucial in any countries’ Company Law. Nevertheless, it is also 
crucial to realize that, the acquirer, or the bidder per se, is a shareholder of the 
company. General tender offer, like any other tender offers, usually opens to 
public for more than 30 days. After the general tender offer, shares remained in 
other shareholders’ hands are shares they do not want to sell after thorough 
consideration. In many cases, when equity distribution of the company does not 
match the requirements in Securities Law, the acquirer is still far away from 
becoming a controlling shareholder. In companies with institutional investors as 
the majority shareholders, or in companies with state-owned shares as the 
majority, even if the acquirer buys out all the remainders, still, he could not 
become the de facto controller of the company. 
Usually, a listed company losing its listing status is not solely due to an 
individual acquirer’s purchase. When momentum is strong, any shareholders of 
the company may slightly increase their shareholdings, including the majority 
shareholders and institutional shareholders. Thus, the acquirer should not be the 
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only one to accept the residual shares when shareholders exercise the sell-out 
right.  
Luckily, when a listed company is at the edge of delisting, CSRC would 
notify the acquirer, and the acquirer can choose to reduce his shareholding to 
such an extent that the company stays listed; but again, the responsibility 
unfairly falls on the shoulder of the acquirer alone.  
In sum, the threshold of the current Chinese Sell-out Right is too low; like 
most E.U. Member States, 90% is an optimal line for shareholders sell-out right. 
Moreover, it is rational that when minority shareholders exercise the sell-out 
right, all majority shareholders (according to their shareholding ratio) are 
together responsible for the remnant shares, but the acquirer reserves a 
preemptive right to acquire all the remnant shares. Meanwhile, if the acquirer 
choose to reduce his shareholding to keep the company stays listing, then he has 
the right to request other majority shareholders to do the same (according to 
their share-increasing ratio). 575 
 
F. Empowering the Instituional Investors in China 
In Chapter V, we illustrated how interest groups such as institutional 
investors, industry associations, labor unions, large conglomerates and so on 
accounted for the differences of the takeover regulatory modes between the U.K 
and the U.S. 576 Indeed, strengthening the scales and rights of the institutional 
investors could ultimately push China’s relatively primitive takeover law into a 
modern one. 
In contemporary China, the institutional investors in the capital market are 
securities companies, different types of funds, large enterprises, financial 
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companies, commercial banks and Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors 
(QFII). The social security funds, investment funds, insurance funds and private 
equity are relative active funds in Chinese market, and large enterprises 
involving in security transactions are mainly state-owned enterprises and listed 
companies.  
The Chinese institutional investors had undergone three phases. Phase I – 
the embryonic stage began from 1990 and ended in 1998, when securities 
companies were almost the only player in the securities market. 577 Phase II 
began from 1999 and ended in 2008, during this period the government allowed 
state-owned and state-controlled listed companies enter the stock market, 
symbolizing the growth of the institutional investors parallel with individual 
investors. Since December 2002, the State Council began carrying out the 
institution of Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors, and foreign capitals 
poured into China since 2004. From October 2004, insurance funds were 
allowed to enter the stock market. 578  Phase III began from 2008, when 
institutional investors grew rapidly, and formed the prospects as we see today.  
The year of 2016 saw a series of hostile bids for old industrial corporations 
launched by insurance funds in the open market. The Insurance funds were so 
active that the China Insurance Regulatory Commission put a sudden restraint 
order on Insurance Funds in the end of 2016. Generally speaking, the Chinese 
institutional investors are not as mighty as their counterparts are in the Western 
countries.  
Relying on institutional investors to aggressively shape the Chinese 
takeover law is not possible in the forseeable future. First of all, in China, the 
individual investors still account for the majority in the stock market, and they 
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are too dispersed to become investment communities. Second, current 
established institutional investors are not strong enough to form political 
associations that have the power to lobby the legislators. Third, the market 
infrastructure and legal supports for institutional investors are grossly 
inadequate. Currently, the Chinese institutional investors faced several share 
transfer limit when they want to dump their shareholdings. Psychologies of herd 
instinct and great fool exert strong influence on the institutional investors' 
decisions, which give rise to myopic behaviors that corrode the market. 579  
Rather, we should realize that, this is not to say that the growth of the 
institutional investors in China is not important for future law making. The U.K. 
experience illustrated that, the development and expansion of the institutional 
investors were the foundation for the improvement of the self-regulatory 
framework. In light of the U.K.’s practice, before we talk about how to promote 
the limited self-regulation under the current regulatory framework, the 
importance of the institutional investors must be correctly recognized; China 
must continue encouraging institutional investors emerge and grow. 
 
G. Discriminatory Treatment for Acquirers with Different Fund 
Source 
In recent years, the major concerns of Chinese takeover regulation are not 
only on the agency costs. The supervisory authority also pays attentions to the 
source of the funds used in takeovers. Most of takeovers are leveraged buyout, 
which means the funds to acquire the target company are borrowed elsewhere to 
satisfy the cost of acquisition. The assets of the company being acquired are 
often used as collateral for the loans, along with the assets of the acquiring 
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company. The purpose of leveraged buyouts is to “allow companies to make 
large acquisitions without having to commit a lot of capital.” 580 
Currently the CIRC have worked out several substantive rules prohibiting 
insurance funds entering the market of corporate control. The CSRC, on the 
other hand, publically expressed its concerns on the sources of the money 
repeatedly since the Baowan Dispute. In the highlight case of Baoneng taking 
over Vanke and Baoneng taking over Gree Electronics, the majority of the funds 
used by the acquirer are capitals with leverages, and most of them were  
insurance funds. In fact, the CSRC’s discontent with hostile takeovers in recent 
years was mainly because the leverage ratio of some takeovers were amazingly 
high.  
In light of the situation, a good solution to monitor the institutional 
investors’ fund resource is to allow different treatment to investors with 
different funding source. The law should allow moderate discriminative 
treatments to acquirers of different funding sources and leverage ratio. The 
management should be allowed to have the discretionary power of adopting 
defensive measures when faced with intruders funded by high-leverage ratio 
capital or insurance funds. Moreover, the supervisory body should meticulously 
define the parameters of leverage ratio, in other words, what could be regarded 
as “high” leverage ratio. In practice, when faced with imminent takeovers, the 
management of the company can make complaints to CSRC or to the stock 
exchanges, who then decides if the leverage ratio of the acquirer is too high. If 
the leverage ratio is indeed very high, the management of the company could be 
allowed to take defensive measures without the approval from shareholders. 
Otherwise, the management must strictly obey the modified Board Neutrality 
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Rule. 581 
By discriminating different kinds of acquirers by their funding sources and 
leverage ratio, the market itself spontaneous put an end to exaggerated leverage 
buy-outs without hampering good takeovers from happening. Moreover, it is the 
the shareholders assembly, who should be given the opportunity to discuss the 
merit of the takeovers, not the management board.  
 
G. Advices for the Limited Self-regulation in China 
Compare with the U.K., China lacks the soil of inner-industrial 
self-regulation. However, this is not to say that limited self-regulation is 
impossible or not important for China. Currently, both Stock Exchange and the 
Securities Association of China did not achieve very good autonomous 
supervision result, but they both have abundant rooms for improvement.  
There are several things to do in order to improve the self-supervision of 
the Stock Exchange. First, the law should acknowledge the independent legal 
person status of the Stock Exchange and stop regard it as an administrative 
appendage of the CSRC or the State Council. Currently, the Stock Exchanges 
are more of state-owned public institution than independent commercial entity; 
the CSRC has vertical control over almost all the major issues of the Stock 
Exchanges, not to mention it controls firmly the power of appointment and 
approval. The completely corporate governance structure of the Stock 
Exchanges should be changed, starting from decreasing the number of 
designated directors and council members. In addition, the Stock Exchanges 
should be given the right to elect its own chairman and vice-chairman. Second, 
the division of labor between the CSRC and Stock Exchanges should be 
clear-cut, and the Stock Exchanges should be given more substantial 
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supervisory rights, especially the rights closely related to its members. For 
example, the right of mediation, the right of investigation and the arbitration 
right are all extremely crucial for the Stock Exchanges if they want to establish 
unshakable authority in a self-regulation manner. Moreover, the Stock 
Exchanges do not necessarily have to obtain approval from the CSRC on issues 
like amendment of the articles of associations, amendment of its business rule, 
accepting new members and so on. In these occasions, all that the Stock 
Exchanges should do is to record and report those changes to the supervisory 
authority for future possible legal review. Third, there should be more 
investigation methods and punitive measures available for the Stock Exchanges 
so that the Stock Exchanges could punish misbehaving listed companies; for 
instance, fine penalty is always a better option than having to suspend the 
trade. 582 
The autonomous supervision of the Securities Association of China could 
also be improved in the following ways. First, the law should recognize the 
Securities Association as an autonomous organization rather than a dispatched 
institution of the CSRC. The CSRC should avoid administrative interference to 
the Securities Association, and should only keep abstinent right of supervision. 
Second, the Securities Association should be given more duty and rights. 
Currently, the Securities Association has the right to conciliate in-between its 
members, it should also be given the right of arbitration, too, as court trial might 
be the worst solution for disputes among securities companies. Third, the 
Securities Association should represent the interests of its members, not the 
official government. Member-interests-supreme could tie the Securities 
Association more closely with its members, mitigating the barriers the 
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Securities Association would face when implementing its policies. 583 
The highest realm for self-regulation is when reputational punishment 
replaces punitive measures. Maybe, only the U.K. have reached this condition 
over its long history. However, for China, even limited self-regulation, should it 
be effective, could reduce the misbehaviors in the securities market to an 
incredibly lesser extent than they use to be. Without doubt, there is a long way 
to go. 
  
H. Borrow Efficiency-adding Clauses from the City Code 
In Chapter VI, we compared the three original hostile takeover regulatory 
frameworks of the U.S., the U.K. and the E.U. and found that the self-regulatory 
framework of the U.K was of incredibly high efficiency in terms of not only 
dispute resolution but also legal improvement. The Takeover Panel responds 
quickly to takeover issues, and the City Code refreshes itself on a yearly basis to 
cope with the needs of the market.  
Some of the articles in the City Code could largely increase the efficiency 
of tender offers and takeovers, which are of great referential value to Asian 
countries, especially China. Increasing the speed and transparency of takeover 
activities could help to ease the uncertainties in the market. 
The Rule 30 to 35 of Section M1to N3 stipulated in detail the timetable for 
the acquirers in tender offers. 584 The acquirer who had the intention of taking 
over must send out a formal tender offer within 28 days after the announcement 
of the takeover proposition: “[T]he offeror must, normally within 28 days of the 
announcement of a firm intention to make an offer, send an offer document to 
shareholders in the offeree company and persons with information rights, in 
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accordance with Rule 30.2 and must make the document readily available to the 
trustees of the offeree company’s pension scheme(s)”.585 Most important of all, 
the target company have the right to ask a potential bidder to either confirm or 
deny its intention of obtaining corporate control. 586 Estoppel is a common 
principle in any law system, once the bidder waived its intention of corporate 
control, he shall keep this promise for at least 12 months.587 These rigorous 
articles could ensure that the bidder cannot take advantage of information 
asymmetry and thereby increase the efficiency of the market. 
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Ending Remarks 
It has been 15 years since the first hostile takeover attempt588 in China. 
From indiscriminately imitating the law from the Western countries to drafting 
the Administrative Rules on Acquisition with regard to the local conditions, this 
15-year period marked the rugged path of the slow growth of the Chinese 
securities market. Despite several amendments and revisions, the Chinese 
hostile takeover regulatory framework is still insufficient in terms of legislative 
technique and dispute resolution.  
Currently, our takeover law has borrowed from the U.S., the U.K. and the 
E.U. However, this seemingly comprehensive, conclusive regulatory framework 
has not only failed to provide explicit answers in corporate control conflicts, but 
also exacerbated the internal contradictions of the provisions. In the 15 years of 
regulatory practice, China has formed the “CSRC centralism” path dependence 
in its semi market economy. The defects of the law might be temporarily masked 
in government-leading legal reforms, as the CSRC and the State Council have 
extreme controlling power over the capital market. However, with the 
intensification of the hostile takeovers and the prosperity of the market of 
corporate control, these defects will eventually manifest themselves and even 
cause disastrous consequences.  
Even though, the old supervisory pattern in China is in urgent need of 
change; the 21st century has seen reforms. The graduate dispersion of shares in 
Chinese listed companies, the expansion of the institutional investors, and the 
endless emergence of financial innovation are some of the ways in which 
Chinese regulation began to shift. The aim of this research is to look for 
solutions in the history and evolution process of the three Western hostile 
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takeover regulatory frameworks and put forth locally applicable suggestions and 
opinions for future lawmaking. The top priority for future legal reform is to get 
rid of the reliance of the CSRC in hostile takeover disputes. In order to do so, 
policy makers must draw lessons from previous attempts, and take contextual 
factors in China into consideration, such as the economic needs, capital market 
inertia, supply side reform and other political appeals. 
One thing is for sure – the transformation process is going to be long and 
arduous. 
References 
217 
References 
A. Laws and Administrative Regulations 
1. 11 Ala. 191 (1847). 
2. 15 PA.CONS.STAT.ANN §2571-2576 (West 1999). 
3. 1933 Securities Act 
4. 1934 Securities Exchange Act  
5. 1939 Trust Indenture Act 
6. 1940 Investment Advisers Act of 1940 
7. 1940 Investment Company Act 
8. 1968 Williams Act. 
9. 2002 Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 
10. 2014 Administrative Rules on Acquisition. 
11. 2014 Chinese Company Law. 
12. 2014 Securities Law. 
13. 2016 Guidelines on Articles of Association. 
14. 70 PA.CONS.STAT. §74(d) (Supp. Repealed 1987) 
15. Administrative Rules on Acquisition, Article 62. 
16. Association of British Insurers, Directors' power to allot shares and disapply 
shareholders' pre-emption rights (1995 & Updated 2009) (U.K). 
17. Bank of England. Issuing Houses Association. British Insurance Association. 
London Stock Exchange. Notes on Amalgamation of British Businesses. 
October 1959, at 4. 
18. CAL.CORP.CODE§309 (West 1990 & Supp. 2002);IND.CODE.ANN. 
§23-1-35-1(1999 & Supp.2002). 
19. Companies Act, 2006, Part 17, c.3, §560(1). 
20. Conn.Gen.Stat.Ann. §33-840. 
References 
218 
21. Corps. & Assns. 
22. Council Directive 2004/25, art. 10, 2004 O.J. (L142) 8 (EC).  
23. CSRC. Administrative Measures of Stock Exchanges.  
24. CSRC. Measures for the Administration of Equity Incentives of Listed 
Companies. 2016. 
25. CSRC. Rules for the Shareholders' Meetings of Listed Companies. 2016 
Revision.  
26. European Directive Proposal, 1996. 
27. Financial Reporting Council. The UK Corporate Governance Code. D1.5 
(2012) 
28. Guidelines on Article of Associations, Article 98.  
29. LA.REV.STAT.ANN §51-1501(E) (Repealed 1987); 
30. N.Y.BUS.CORP.LAW § 912 (McKinney Supp. 2002).  
31. Securities and Exchange Commission, Regulation S-K. 
32. The Large and Medium-sized Companies and Groups (Accountant Reports 
(Amendment) Regulations 2013. 
33. The Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, The City Code on Takeovers and 
Mergers (12th ed. 2016). 
34. The State Council, Notice of the General Office of the State Council on 
Further Strengthening Protection of the Lawful Rights of Small Investors in 
Capital Markets. 
35. Treaty establishing the European Community (Consolidated version 2002). 
 
B. Academic Researches and Books 
1. Amighini, Alessia A., Roberta Rabellotti, and Marco Sanfilippo. "Do 
Chinese state-owned and private enterprises differ in their 
internationalization strategies?" China Economic Review 27 (2013): 316. 
2. Armour, John, and David A. Skeel Jr. "Who writes the rules for hostile 
References 
219 
takeovers, and why-the peculiar divergence of US and UK takeover 
regulation." Geo. LJ 95 (2006): 1739. 
3. Armour, John, and David A. Skeel Jr. "Who writes the rules for hostile 
takeovers, and why-the peculiar divergence of US and UK takeover 
regulation." Geo. LJ 95 (2006): 1757//City Notes: The J. Sears Offer, 
TIMES (London), Feb.5, 1953, at 10 
4. Armour, John, and David A. Skeel Jr. "Who writes the rules for hostile 
takeovers, and why-the peculiar divergence of US and UK takeover 
regulation." Geo. LJ 95 (2006): 1757//Battle for the Savoy, Economist, 
December 12, 1953, at 831-832. 
5. Armour, John, and David A. Skeel Jr. "Who writes the rules for hostile 
takeovers, and why-the peculiar divergence of US and UK takeover 
regulation." Geo. LJ 95 (2006): 1760//Back to the Jungle, Economist, July 
22, 1967 at 337. 
6. Armour, John, Jack B. Jacobs, and Curtis J. Milhaupt. "The evolution of 
hostile takeover regimes in developed and emerging markets: An analytical 
framework." Harv. Int'l LJ 52 (2011): 219. 
7. Arsht, S. Samuel, and Walter K. Stapleton. "Delaware's New General 
Corporation Law: Substantive Changes." Bus. Law. 23 (1967): 75. 
8. Arsht, S. Samuel. "The Business Judgment Rule Revisited." Hofstra L. Rev. 
8 (1979): 95. 
9. Bai, Chong-En, et al. "Corporate governance and market valuation in 
China." Journal of comparative economics 32.4 (2004): 599-616. Cai, Wei. 
"Hostile takeovers and takeover defences in China." Hong Kong LJ 42 
(2012): 901. 
10. Bailey, Warren, et al. "Stock returns, order imbalances, and commonality: 
Evidence on individual, institutional, and proprietary investors in China." 
Journal of Banking & Finance33.1 (2009): 9-19. 
References 
220 
11. Bainbridge, Stephen M. "Director primacy and shareholder 
disempowerment." Harv. L. Rev. 119 (2005): 1735. 
12. Banner, Stuart. "The origin of the New York stock exchange, 1791–1860." 
The Journal of Legal Studies 27.1 (1998): 113-140. 
13. Baoshu Wang. Corporate Takeovers: Law and Practice. Publication House 
of Social Science Literature, 2003.  
14. Bebchuk, Lucian A. "The case for facilitating competing tender offers: A 
reply and extension." Stanford Law Review (1982): 23-50. 
15. Bebchuk, Lucian Arye. "Toward undistorted choice and equal treatment in 
corporate takeovers." Harvard Law Review (1985): 1693-1808. 
16. Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, etc. 
17. Benati, Luca. "Evolving post-World War II UK economic performance." 
Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 36.4 (2004): 691-717. 
18. Bennett v. Propp, 187 A.2d 405, 409 (Del. 1962), at 955. 
19. Benston, George J. "Required disclosure and the stock market: An 
evaluation of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934." The American 
Economic Review (1973): 132-155. 
20. Bessler, Wolfgang, and Colin Schneck. "Excess Takeover Premiums and 
Bidder Contests in Merger & Acquisitions: New Methods for Determining 
Abnormal Offer Prices." Analysis of Large and Complex Data. Springer 
International Publishing, 2016. 323-333. 
21. Bing Pen. "Meditations on Hostile Takeover Legislation". Finance, 
2016(01): 119-121.  
22. Black, Bernard S. "The first international merger wave (and the fifth and 
last US wave)." U. Miami L. Rev. 54 (1999): 799. 
23. Brown, Meredith M. "The Scope of the Williams Act and Its 1970 
Amendments." Bus. Law. 26 (1970): 1637. 
References 
221 
24. De Sousa Santos, Boaventura. "Toward a New Common Sense Law, Science 
and Politics in the Paradigmatic Transition." (1995). 
25. Cabrelli, David, and Mathias Siems. "Convergence, legal origins, and 
transplants in comparative corporate law: A case-based and quantitative 
analysis." The American Journal of Comparative Law 63.1 (2015): 109-154. 
26. Cai, Wei. "Hostile takeovers and takeover defences in China." Hong Kong 
LJ 42 (2012): 901. 
27. Cain, Matthew D., Stephen B. McKeon, and Steven Davidoff Solomon. "Do 
takeover laws matter? Evidence from five decades of hostile 
takeovers."Journal of Financial Economics 124.3 (2017): 464-485. 
28. Carpenter, Jennifer N., Fangzhou Lu, and Robert F. Whitelaw. "The real 
value of China’s stock market." Work. Pap., Stern Sch. Bus., NY Univ. 
(2017). 
29. Carter, David A., Betty J. Simkins, and W. Gary Simpson. "Corporate 
governance, board diversity, and firm value." Financial review 38.1 (2003): 
33-53. 
30. Changxing Sun, Jie Qin. "Problems and Countermeasures of the Securities 
Market Self-regulation in China."Research on Rule of Law. (10)2009: 
28-30. 
31. Cheffins, Brian R. "Does law matter? The separation of ownership and 
control in the United Kingdom." The Journal of Legal Studies 30.2 (2001): 
459-484. 
32. Chen, Juan. "Legal Transplantation Theory: A Theoretical Framework for 
Examining Chinese Takeover Law." Regulating the Takeover of Chinese 
Listed Companies. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2014. 19-41. 
33. Christmann, Petra, and Glen Taylor. "Globalization and the environment: 
Determinants of firm self-regulation in China." Journal of international 
business studies 32.3 (2001): 439-458. 
References 
222 
34. Clark, Robert C. "Contracts, elites, and traditions in the making of corporate 
law." Columbia Law Review 89.7 (1989): 1703-1747. 
35. Coffee Jr, John C. "Future as history: The prospects for global convergence 
in corporate governance and its implications." Nw. UL Rev. 93 (1998): 641. 
36. Cohen, Milton H. "" Truth in Securities" Revisited." Harvard Law Review 
79.7 (1966): 1340-1408. 
37. Conard, Alfred F. "A Behavioral Analysis of Directors' Liability for 
Negligence." Duke LJ (1972): 895.  
38. Conrad, Alfred F., et al. "Functions of Directors Under the Existing 
System." Bus. Law 27 (1971): 23.  
39. Cui Yan. The Bid for Tibet Tourism Violating the Disclosure Requirement 
(Weigui Jupai Xizang Lvyou Hushi Xiongdi Bei Zhengjianhui Chufa). 
China Securities 05 (2017), available at 
http://cs.com.cn/ssgs/gsxw/201705/t20170508_5273073.html (last accessed 
29 July 2017).  
40. Deakin, Simon, et al. Implicit contracts, takeovers and corporate governance: 
in the shadow of the City Code. University of Cambridge, 2002.  
41. Demsetz, Harold, and Kenneth Lehn. "The structure of corporate ownership: 
Causes and consequences." Journal of political economy 93.6 (1985): 
1155-1177. 
42. Demsetz, Harold, and Kenneth Lehn. "The structure of corporate ownership: 
Causes and consequences." Journal of political economy 93.6 (1985): 
1155-1177.  
43. Depser, Ingrid. "Amended EC Proposal for a 13th Council Directive on 
Company Law concerning Takeover and other General Bids." Int'l Bus. Law. 
19 (1991): 483. 
44. Dong, Min, and Aydin Ozkan. "Institutional investors and director pay: An 
empirical study of UK companies." Journal of Multinational Financial 
References 
223 
Management 18.1 (2008): 16-29. See also Khan, Tehmina. "Company 
dividends and ownership structure: Evidence from UK panel data." The 
Economic Journal 116.510 (2006). 
45. Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target’s Management in 
Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161 (1981) . 
46. Easterbrook, Frank H., and Daniel R. Fischel. "The proper role of a target's 
management in responding to a tender offer." Harvard Law Review (1981): 
1161-1204. Partial offer is definitely cheaper, the acquirer only have to 
acquire as much shares as he needs.  
47. Easterbrook, Frank H., and Daniel R. Fischel. The economic structure of 
corporate law. Harvard University Press, 1996: 162. 
48. Eddey, Peter H., and Roger S. Casey. "Directors' Recommendations in 
Response to Takeover Bids: Do They Act in Their Own Interests?." 
Australian Journal of Management 14.1 (1989): 1-28. 
49. Edwards, Vanessa. "The Directive on Takeover Bids–Not Worth the Paper 
It’s Written On?." European Company and Financial Law Review 1.4 (2004): 
416-439. 
50. Emma Armson, Evolution of Australian Takeover legislation, Monash 
University Law Review,Vol.39(2012). See also Klaus J,Hopt, Takeover 
Defenses in Europe: A Comparative ,Theoretical and Policy Analysis, 
Columbia Journal of European Law, Vol.20(2014),P249-281.  
51. Fengmian Zhou."Strange Company Bylaw Violate the Law: Reappointment 
of Director without Shareholders' Approval. "Legal Online. 2017-06-15. 
Available at 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2017-06/15/c_129633286.htm. 
52. Firth, Michael. "Takeovers, shareholder returns, and theory of the firm." 
The Quarterly Journal of Economics 94.2 (1980): 235-260. 
53. Fogelson, James H., Joanne R. Wenig, and Brian P. Friedman. "Changing 
References 
224 
the Takeover Game: The Securities and Exchange Commission's Proposed 
Amendments to the Williams Act." Harv. J. on Legis. 17 (1980): 409. 
54. Fox, Justin, and Alan Sklar. The myth of the rational market: A history of 
risk, reward, and delusion on Wall Street. New York: Harper Business, 
2009. 
55. Frank Easterbrook & Daniel Fischer, Takeover Bids, Defensive Tactics, and 
Shareholders’ Welfare, 36 BUS. LAW. 1733 (1981) 
56. Franks, Julian, and Colin Mayer. "Bank control, takeovers and corporate 
governance in Germany." Journal of Banking & Finance 22.10-11 (1998): 
1385-1403. 
57. Garnaut, Ross, et al. Private enterprise in China. ANU Press, 2014. 
58. Gay, Edwin F. "The Great Depression." Foreign Affairs 10.4 (1932): 
529-540. 
59. Gilson, Ronald J. "Globalizing corporate governance: Convergence of form 
or function." The American Journal of Comparative Law 49.2 (2001): 
329-357.  
60. Gilson, Ronald J. Globalizing corporate governance: Convergence of form 
or function. The American Journal of Comparative Law 49.2 (2001): 
329-358. 
61. Goergen, Marc, and Luc Renneboog. "Strong managers and passive 
institutional investors in the UK." Available at SSRN 137068 (1998). 
62. Goethe, Johann Wolfgang. Faust: der Tragödie erster und zweiter Teil. 
BoD–Books on Demand, 2015. 
63. Grossman, Sanford J., and Oliver D. Hart. "Takeover bids, the free-rider 
problem, and theory of the corporation." The Bell Journal of Economics 
(1980): 42-64. 
64. Gustafson, Barbara J. "The Lawyer as Impresario: Form vs. Substance in the 
Target's Boardroom." Hastings LJ 39 (1987): 759. 
References 
225 
65. Hart, Michael A. "Decimal stock pricing: dragging the securities industry 
into the twenty-first century." Loy. LAL Rev. 26 (1992): 843. 
66. Hart, Oliver. "Corporate governance: some theory and implications." The 
economic journal 105.430 (1995): 678-689. 
67. Hartley William Shawcross, barrister, politician and businessman. He was 
the Chief UK Prosecutor of the International Military Tribunal in 
Nuremberg from 1945-1946, and was the President of the Board of Trade 
since 1951. 
68. Hazen, Thomas L. "Transfers of Corporate Control and Duties of 
Controlling Shareholders. Common Law, Tender Offers, Investment 
Companies. And a Proposal for Reform." University of Pennsylvania Law 
Review 125.5 (1977): 1023-1067. 
69. Hazen, Thomas. The Law of Securities Regulation, 6th (Hornbook Series). 
West Academic, 2009. 
70. Hemphill, Thomas A. "Corporate governance, strategic philanthropy, and 
public policy." Business Horizons 42.3 (1999): 57-62. 
71. Herzel, Leo, John R. Schmidt, and Scott J. Davis. "Why Corporate Directors 
Have a Right to Resist Tender Offers." Chi. B. Rec. 61 (1979): 152. See 
Also Winter Jr, Ralph K. "State law, shareholder protection, and theory of 
the corporation." The Journal of Legal Studies 6.2 (1977): 251-292. 
72. Holderness, Clifford G. "The myth of diffuse ownership in the United 
States."Review of Financial studies 22.4 (2009): 1377-1408. 
73. Holmes Jr, Oliver Wendell. The path of the law. The Floating Press, 2009.  
74. Holmstrom, Bengt, and Steven N. Kaplan. Corporate Governance and 
Merger Activity in the US: Making Sense of the 1980s and 1990s. No. 
w8220. National bureau of economic research, 2001:121, 126-27 
75. Hongchen Xie. "What is the Gold Parachute? An Inquiry into Baoan's 
Practice." Everyday Economic News. 2016-06-23. Available at 
References 
226 
http://www.nbd.com.cn/articles/2016-06-23/1015388.html. 
76. Honggao Hu, Limei Zhao. "On Decision Power of Takeove Defenses". 
China Legal Science 02(2001):123-132.  
77. Hongtao Xu. "Research on the Institution of Hostile Takeover". Report of 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange,2017.  
78. Hoover, Herbert Clark, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, and Inflation 
Overproduction. The great depression. Macmillan, 1952. 
79. Hopt, Klaus J. "Takeover regulation in Europe—The battle for the 13th 
directive on takeovers." Australian Journal of Corporate Law 15 (2002): 
1-15. 
80. Huang, Hui. "The New Takeover Regulation in China: Evolution and 
Enhancement’(2008)." International Lawyer 42: 153. 
81. Huang, Robin Hui. "China's Takeover Law: A Comparative Analysis and 
Proposals for Reform'(2005)." Delaware Journal of Corporate Law 30: 145. 
82. Huang, Robin Hui. "Private enforcement of securities law in China: a 
ten-year retrospective and empirical assessment." American Journal of 
Comparative Law 61.4 (2013): 757-798. 
83. HUANG, Xing-luan, and Shen Weitao. "A study on Government 
Intervention Insider Control and M&As' Performance of Chinese Listed 
Companies [J]." Economic Management Journal 6 (2009). 
84. Huber, Brent W. "Target Corporations, Hostile Horizontal Takeovers and 
Antitrust Injury Under Section 16 of the Clayton Act After Cargill." Ind. LJ 
66 (1990): 625. 
85. Ikenberry, David, and Josef Lakonishok. "Corporate governance through the 
proxy contest: Evidence and implications." Journal of Business (1993): 
405-435. 
86. Jenkins, Rhys, and Nations Unies. "Corporate codes of conduct: 
Self-regulation in a global economy." (2001). 
References 
227 
87. Jensen, Michael C. "Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance, and 
takeovers." The American economic review 76.2 (1986): 323-329. 
88. Jensen, Michael C., and William H. Meckling. "Theory of the firm: 
Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure." Journal of 
financial economics 3.4 (1976): 305-360.  
89. Jensen, Michael C., and William H. Meckling. "Theory of the firm: 
Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure." Journal of 
financial economics 3.4 (1976): 305-360.   
90. Jiang, Chunxia, and Shujie Yao. "The Evolution of the Banking Sector in 
China." Chinese Banking Reform. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham, 2017. 15-56. 
91. John C. Coffee, Regulating the Market for Corporate Control: A Critical 
Assessment of the Tender Offer’s Role in Corporate Governance, 84 
COLUM. L. REV. 1145, 1149 (1984). 
92. Johnston, Alexander. The city take-over code. Oxford Univ Pr, 1980. 
93. Jordan, Cally, and Pamela Hughes. "Which way for market institutions: The 
fundamental question of self-regulation." Berkeley Bus. LJ 4 (2007): 205. 
94. Junfeng Huang. Baoyan Takeover: the First Takeover in the Capital Market 
(Baoyan Fengbo: Zibenshichang Binggou Diyian). China Securities Daily, 
Sep 1(2008). 
95. Kanter, Gregg H. "Judicial Review of Antitakeover Devices Employed in 
the Noncoercive Tender Offer Context: Making Sense of the Unocal Test." 
University of Pennsylvania Law Review 138.1 (1989): 225-274. 
96. Karpoff, Jonathan M., Paul H. Malatesta, and Ralph A. Walkling. 
"Corporate governance and shareholder initiatives: Empirical evidence." 
Journal of financial economics 42.3 (1996): 365-395. 
97. Keller, Elisabeth, and Gregory A. Gehlmann. "Introductory comment: a 
historical introduction to the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934." Ohio St. LJ 49 (1988): 329. 
References 
228 
98. Kelsen, Hans. General theory of law and state. Routledge, 2017. 
99. Kini, Omesh, William Kracaw, and Shehzad Mian. "The nature of discipline 
by corporate takeovers." The Journal of Finance 59.4 (2004): 1511-1552. 
100. Kling, Gerhard, and Lei Gao. "Chinese institutional investors’ 
sentiment." Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and 
Money 18.4 (2008): 374-387. 
101. Kraakman, Reinier, and John Armour. The anatomy of corporate law: A 
comparative and functional approach. Oxford University Press, 2017. 
102. La Porta, Rafael, et al. Investor protection and corporate governance. 
Journal of financial economics 58.1 (2000): 3-27.  
103. Lee, Joseph. "Striking a Fair Balance in UK Takeover Law: Market 
Interests, Power of Regulation, and Enforcement." European Business Law 
Review 28.6 (2017): 829-846. 
104. Lee, Rebecca. "Fiduciary duty without equity: fiduciary duties of 
directors under the revised company law of the PRC." Va. J. Int'l L. 47 
(2006): 897. 
105. Li, Wei, Ghon Rhee, and Steven Shuye Wang. "Differences in herding: 
individual vs. institutional investors in China." Institutional Investors in 
China (SSRN: February 13, 2009)(2009). 
106. Lindgren, Håkan. "Succession strategies in a large family business 
group: The case of the Swedish Wallenberg family." Conference paper for 
the 6th European business history association annual congress. Helsinki, 
Finland. 2002. 
107. Linyao Tang. "Farmland Property Rights Reform in China: Lessons 
from the E.U." Review on Chinese Real Estate. L. (02)2014:91-104. 
108. Linyao Tang. "On Tender Offer in Takeovers of Chinese Listed 
Company." Social Science. 10(2017):106-114. 
109. Linyao Tang. "Power Allocation in Hostile Takeover Regulation: 
References 
229 
Rethinking Chinese Fiduciary Duty, Board Neutrality Rule and Shareholder 
Rights." TOHOKU Law Review 47 (2017):113-197. 
110. Linyao Tang. "Independent Directors and Insider Control in Chinese 
Listed Companies: A Practical Economic Analytical Framework of Law." 
Tohoku Law Review. 48 (2017): 65-85. 
111. Linyao Tang. "Technical Rules in Chinese M&A: A Scrutiny." Tohoku 
Law Review. 49 (2018): 37-73. 
112. Linyao Tang. "Pre-warning of Takeover Bids and General Offer in 
China." Journal of Southwest University of Nationalities. 12(2017):108-115. 
113. Linyao Tang. "On Exemption of Tender Offer: A Comparative 
Perspective." Symposium of Economic Law. 2(2017):68-76.  
114. Liu, Chunyan, Konari Uchida, and Yufeng Yang. "Controlling 
shareholder, split-share structure reform and cash dividend payments in 
China." International Review of Economics & Finance 29 (2014): 339-357. 
115. Liu, Miao. "A Comparative Study of Takeover Defences in UK, US and 
Chinese Law". Diss. Durham University, 2016.  
116. Loss, Louis, and Edward M. Cowett. Blue sky law. Little, Brown, 1958. 
117. Luca Enriques, Ronald J, Gilson,Alessio M. Pacces,The Case for an 
Unprejudiceed Takeover Law(with an Application to the European 
Union),Harvard Business Law Review Vol.4,(2014)；  
118. Macey, Jonathan R., and Geoffrey P. Miller. "Origin of the blue sky 
laws." Tex. L. Rev. 70 (1991): 347. 
119. Magnuson, William J. "Takeover regulation in the United States and 
Europe: an institutional approach." (2009):208. 
120. Mallette, Paul, and Robert Spagnola. "State takeover legislation: the 
political defense." SAM Advanced Management Journal 59.3 (1994): 15. 
121. Manne, Henry G. "Mergers and the market for corporate control." 
Journal of Political economy 73.2 (1965): 110-120. 
References 
230 
122. Mark J. Roe,Strong Managers,Weak Owners:The Political Roots Of 
American Corporate Finance (1994), At 28–32, 94–101. 
123. Martin Lipton & Andrew Brownstein, Takeover Responses and 
Directors’ Responsibilities: An Update, ABA National Institute on the 
Dynamics of Corporate Control (Dec. 8, 1983).  
124. Martin Lipton, Takeover bids in the target’s boardroom: an update after 
one year, 35 Bus. Law. 101 (1979).  
125. McCahery, Joseph, ed. Corporate governance regimes: convergence and 
diversity. Oxford University Press on Demand, 2002. 
126. Melbourne, Brett A., et al. "Invasion in a heterogeneous world: 
resistance, coexistence or hostile takeover?" Ecology letters 10.1 (2007): 
77-94. 
127. Michie, Ranald C. "The London and New York stock exchanges, 
1850–1914." The Journal of Economic History 46.1 (1986): 171-187. 
128. Milhaupt, Curtis J. "In the Shadow of Delaware-The Rise of Hostile 
Takeovers in Japan." Colum. L. Rev. 105 (2005): 2171. 
129. Mitchell, Mark L., and Jeffry M. Netter. "The role of financial 
economics in securities fraud cases: Applications at the Securities and 
Exchange Commission." The Business Lawyer (1994): 545-590. 
130. Moerland, Pieter W. "Alternative disciplinary mechanisms in different 
corporate systems." Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 26.1 
(1995): 17-34. 
131. Mukherjee, Tarun K., and Oscar Varela. "Corporate operating 
performance around the proxy contest." Journal of Business Finance & 
Accounting 20.3 (1993): 417-425. 
132. Nikkel, Michael Irl. "Chinese Characteristics in Corporate Clothing: 
Questions of Fiduciary Duty in China's Company Law." Minn. L. Rev. 80 
(1995): 503. 
References 
231 
133. Nourse, Victoria. "Passion's progress: Modern law reform and the 
provocation defense." Yale LJ 106 (1996): 1331. 
134. Posner, Richard A. Overcoming law. Harvard University Press, 1995. 
135. Pound, John. "Proxy contests and the efficiency of shareholder 
oversight." Journal of financial economics 20 (1988): 237-265. 
136. Priest, George L. "The common law process and the selection of 
efficient rules." The Journal of Legal Studies 6.1 (1977): 65-82.  
137. Qiong Fu, Lin Chen. "Evolution of the Rules of Takeovers and 
Anti-takeovers". Contemporary Law, 2009(05). 
138. Qiong Fu. "Legal Standing of Hostile Takeover." China Legal Science 3 
(2017): 227. 
139. Rehnquist, William H. "The Prominence of the Delaware Court of 
Chancery in the State-Federal Joint Venture of Providing Justice." The 
Business Lawyer (1992): 351-355. 
140. Renders, Annelies, and Ann Gaeremynck. "Corporate governance, 
principal‐principal  agency confl icts, and fi rm value in European l i sted 
companies." Corporate Governance: an international review 20.2 (2012): 
125-143. 
141. Robert, S. McElvaine. "The Great Depression." America 182 (1941). 
142. Roberts, Richard. "Regulatory responses to the rise of the market for 
corporate control in Britain in the 1950s." Business History 34.1 (1992): 
183-200. 
143. Ronald Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case 
Against Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REV. 819, 819 
(1981). 
144. Rothbard, Murray Newton. America's great depression. Ludwig von 
Mises Institute, 1972. 
145. Schneper, William D., and Mauro F. Guillén. "Stakeholder rights and 
References 
232 
corporate governance: A cross-national study of hostile takeovers." 
Administrative Science Quarterly 49.2 (2004): 263-295. 
146. Sheppard, David K. The Growth and Role of UK Financial Institutions, 
1880-1966. Routledge, 2013. 
147. Shi, Zhonghua. "A Practical Legal Analysis of Defense Mechanisms in 
the Wake of Hostile Takeovers in China." PhD diss., Harvard Law School, 
2016. 
148. Skog, Rolf. "The European Union’s Proposed Takeover Directive, the 
“Breakthrough” Rule and the Swedish System of Dual Class Common 
Stock." Scandinavian Studies in Law 45 (2004): 293. 
149. Sobel, Robert. The Big Board: a history of the New York stock market. 
Beard Books, 2000. 
150. Sorkin, Andrew Ross. Too Big to Fail: The Inside Story of How Wall 
Street and Washington Fought to Save the FinancialSystem--and 
Themselves. Penguin, 2010. 
151. Stein, Jeremy C. "Efficient capital markets, inefficient firms: A model 
of myopic corporate behavior." The Quarterly Journal of Economics 104.4 
(1989): 655-669. 
152. Steinmo, Sven. "The end of redistribution? International pressures and 
domestic tax policy choices." Challenge 37.6 (1994): 9-17. 
153. Sun, Jian, et al. "Principal–principal agency problems and stock price 
crash risk: Evidence from the split‐share structure reform in China." 
Corporate Governance: An International Review 25.3 (2017): 186-199. 
154. Tan, Liying. "Freedom or legal restriction on company chart--current 
assessment and suggestion for improvements in the PRC context." (2009). 
155. Tyrolt, Jochen, and Christian Cascante. "European Directive Takeover 
Guide" Mülbert, Gleiss Lutz, Germany: 1. 
156. Uchida, Konari, and Peng Xu. "US barbarians at the Japan gate: Cross 
References 
233 
border hedge fund activism." University of Kitakyushu and Honsei 
University. February (2008). 
157. Varottil, Umakanth, and Wai Yee Wan. "Hostile Takeover Regimes in 
Asia: A Comparative Approach." (2018). 
158. Ventoruzzo, Marco. "Europe's Thirteenth Directive and US takeover 
regulation: regulatory means and political and economic ends." Tex. Int'l 
LJ41 (2006): 171.  
159. Wardley, Peter. "The anatomy of big business: aspects of corporate 
development in the twentieth century." Business History 33.2 (1991): 
268-296. 
160. Wei, Yuwa. "The Development of the Securities Market and Regulation 
in China." Loy. LA Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 27 (2005): 479. 
161. Wendao Lu, Jun Fang. "Latest Updates and Regulatory Path of 
Corporate Control Battles of Chinese Listed Companies". Securities Law 
Forum. December 2014. Volume 13.  
162. Wenyu Wang. "Policy and Law of Undesired Takeovers". Yuedan Law. 
Volume 125. January 2015: 155-175.  
163. Williams, Cynthia A. "The securities and exchange commission and 
corporate social transparency." Harvard Law Review (1999): 1197-1311. 
164. Wu, Jinglian. Understanding and interpreting Chinese economic reform. 
Texere, 2005. 
165. Xie, Fenghua. Activist Investors and Firm Performance Empirical 
Evidence From Chinese A Share Market. Diss. Arizona State University, 
2017. 
166. Xin Tang, Yunyang Zhu. "The Anti-takeover Defenses under the New 
European Directive". Tsinghua Law Review, 2006(00): 128-142. 
167. Xin, Zhang, and China Securities Regulatory Commission. "Do Mergers 
and Acquisitions Create Value: Evidence from Chinese Listed Companies 
References 
234 
[J]." Economic Research Journal 6 (2003): 1-10. 
168. Yuetang, Wang, Zhao Ziye, and Wei Xiaoyan. "Does Independence of 
the Board Affect Firm Performance?[J]." Economic Research Journal 5 
(2006): 62-73. 
169. Zhiyuan Cui. "Implications of the Legal Reforms of 29 U.S. States". 
Economic Research. 4(1996):17-34. 
 
C. News and Online Resources 
1. Baoneng Shentie Xiangji Biaotai: Wanke Guquanzhizheng Shengfuweiding, 
available at 
http://finance.21cn.com/news/cjyw/a/2017/0115/14/31887855.shtml, (last 
visited 17th January 2017). 
2. Baoshen Zhu. "Investor Service Center Paid Attention to Six Types of 
Inappropriate Anti-takeove Provisions: Company Bylaw Should not 
Transcend Law". Securities Daily. 2017-05-24. Available at 
http://www.ccstock.cn/stock/gupiaoyaowen/2017-05-24/A1495614939531.h
tml. 
3. China Resources opposes proposal to oust Vanke board, available at 
https://www.ft.com/content/e8a4cbce-3e98-11e6-8716-a4a71e8140b0, (last 
visited January 24th, 2017). 
4. China securities regulator chairman condemns "barbaric" company buy-outs 
by asset managers, available at 
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-csrc-asset-management-idUSKBN1
3S09B, (last visited 13th January 2017). 
5. CHINA VANKE CO., LTD., available at 
http://www.vanke.com/en/about.aspx, (last visited 17th January 2017). 
6. Endgame Nears for Vanke-Baoneng Showdown, available at 
http://www.theepochtimes.com/n3/2123431-endgame-nears-for-vanke-baon
References 
235 
eng-showdown/, (last visited January 24th, 2017). 
7. Fengmian Zhou."Adopting Anti-takeover Provisions: Listed Companies in 
China Violate Basic Shareholders' Rights."Legal Online. 2017-06-05. 
Available at https://www.sohu.com/a/146245421_120809. 
8. Fengmian Zhou."Strange Company Bylaw Violate the Law: Reappointment 
of Director without Shareholders' Approval. "Legal Online. 2017-06-15. 
Available at 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2017-06/15/c_129633286.htm. 
9. Hongchen Xie. "What is the Gold Parachute? An Inquiry into Baoan's 
Practice." Everyday Economic News. 2016-06-23. Available at 
http://www.nbd.com.cn/articles/2016-06-23/1015388.html. 
10. Jicong Wen. "Over 620 Listed Companies Adopted Anti-takeover 
Provisions". Economic Daily. 2017-06-15. Available at 
http://www.ce.cn/xwzx/gnsz/gdxw/201706/15/t20170615_23634850.shtml. 
11. Justice Randy J. Holland. Delaware’s Business Judgment Rule: International 
Variations.(EB/OL) (2015-04-09) [2017-05-16] 
http://global.blogs.delaware.gov/2015/04/09/delawares-business-judgment-r
ule-international-variations/#_ednref19 
12. Leveraged Buyout – LBO, available at 
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/l/leveragedbuyout.asp, (last visited 20th 
January 2017). 
13. Mission, Vision, and Values. 
https://www.fdic.gov/about/strategic/strategic/mission.html 
14. Olivia B. Waxman. How a Financial Panic Helped Launch the New York 
Stock Exchange [EB/OL],(2017-05-17), [2017-06-06]. 
http://time.com/4777959/buttonwood-agreement-stock-exchange/. 
15. Sangtong."600 A-share Companies Revised Their Bylaw: Shareholders 
Became Outsiders Due to Over Defenses." Xinhua News 
References 
236 
Agency.2016-09-26. Available at 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2016-09/26/c_1119625379.htm. 
16. SEC (June 10, 2013). "What We Do". SEC.gov. U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission. Retrieved 2017-03-24. 
17. The driving force behind Baoneng’s assault on Vanke, available at 
http://www.scmp.com/business/article/1990310/driving-force-behind-baone
ngs-assault-vanke, (last visited January 24th, 2017). 
18. Vanke Asks CSRC to Investigate Baoneng on Alleged Misconduct, available 
at 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-07-19/vanke-asks-csrc-to-i
nvestigate-baoneng-funds-alleging-misconduct, (last visited January 24th, 
2017). 
19. Vanke-Baoneng rivalry tests China’s market economy,available at 
http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/959608.shtml, (last visited January 24th, 
2017). 
20. Yingying Tang. "More than 600 Listed Companies Add Anti-takeover 
Provisions, the Investors Service Center Regarded Most of Them Illegal." 
Penpai News. 2017-05-24. Available at 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/stock/s/2017-05-24/doc-ifyfqqyh8216145.shtml. 
 
D. Official Reports and Documents 
1. COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES. Report on the 
implementation of the Directive on Takeover Bids. Brussels, 
21.02.2007.SEC(2007)268. 
2. CSRC, Annual Report of the CSRC (2014). 
3. CSRC, Annual Report of the CSRC (2015). 
4. CSRC, Annual Report of the CSRC (2016). 
5. CSRC, Annual Report of the CSRC (2017). 
References 
237 
6. CSRC. The Draft Notice for the Measures for the Administration of Equity 
Incentives of Listed Companies. （EB/OL） .(2016-07-25), [2017-06-22]. 
http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/shenzhen/ztzl/ssgsjgxx/jgfg/sszl/201607/t20160
725_301111.htm. 
 
E. Referenced Articles of Associations 
1. Beijing Tiantan Biological Products Co., Ltd. Articles of Association
（Revised in 2016） .（DB/OL） .[2017-06-21].Stock Code：600161 
2. China Fangda Group Co., Ltd. Articles of Association（Revised September 
2016） .（DB/OL） .[2016-09-26].Stock Code：000055 
3. Guoguang Electric Company Limited. Articles of Association（April 2016）.
（DB/OL） .[2017-06-21].Stock Code：002045.  
4. Hunan China Sun Pharmaceutical Machinery Co.,Ltd. Articles of 
Association（June 2017）.（DB/OL）.[2017-06-21].Stock Code：300216）
（Shanghai Zhenhua Heavy Industry Co., Ltd. Articles of Association
（Revised in 2008） .（DB/OL） .[2017-06-21].Stock Code：600320 
5. Hunan Er-Kang Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd. Articles of Association（October 
2016） .（DB/OL） .[2017-06-21].Stock Code：300267 
6. Shanghai Ersansiwu Internet Technology Co., Ltd. Articles of Association
（April 2017） .（DB/OL） .[2017-06-21].Stock Code：002195 
7. Hunan Mendale Household Textiles Co., Ltd. Articles of Association
（February 2016） .（DB/OL） .[2017-06-21].Stock Code：002397 
8. Inner Mongolia Yili Industrial Group Co., Ltd. Articles of Association 
（Revised in April 2017） .（DB/OL） .[2016-09-26].Stock Code：600887 
9. KENNEDE Electronics MFG. Co., Ltd. Articles of Association (March 
2014).（DB/OL） .[2017-06-21].Stock Code：002723.  
10. Lanzhou Huanghe Enterprise Co., Ltd. Articles of Association（December 
2014） .（DB/OL） .[2017-06-21].Stock Code：300216 
References 
238 
11. Liaoning Bengang Steel Plates Co., Ltd. Articles of Association（June 2017）.
（DB/OL） .[2017-06-21].Stock Code：000761 
12. Liaoning Jinzhou Port Co., Ltd. Articles of Association （November 2016）.
（DB/OL） .[2017-06-21].Stock Code：600190 
13. Shanghai BizConf Telecom Co.,Ltd. Articles of Association（Revised March 
2017） .（DB/OL） .[2017-06-21].Stock Code：300578 
14. Shanghai Datun Energy Co., Ltd. Articles of Association（Revised in 2015）.
（DB/OL） .[2017-06-21].Stock Code：600508 
15. Shanghai Dazhong Public Utilities (Group) Co., Ltd. Articles of Association
（Revised in 2017） .（DB/OL） .[2017-06-21].Stock Code：600635 
16. Shanghai Fukong Interactive Entertainment Co.,Ltd. Articles of Association
（February）（DB/OL）.[2017-06-21].Stock Code：600634）（Yuan Long 
Ping High-Tech Agriculture Co., Ltd. Articles of Association（ January 
2016）（DB/OL） .[2017-06-21].Stock Code：000998 
17. SHANGHAI HILE BIO-PHARMACEUTICAL CO.,LTD. Articles of 
Association （Revised 2015）.（DB/OL）.[2017-06-21].Stock Code：603718 
18. Shanghai Yiwei Communication Techonology Co., Ltd. Articles of 
Association（May 2017）.（DB/OL）.[2017-06-21].Stock Code：300590. For 
details of the cases mentioned above, please refer to Fengmian 
Zhou."Adopting Anti-takeover Provisions: Listed Companies in China 
Violate Basic Shareholders' Rights."Legal Online. 2017-06-05. Available at 
https://www.sohu.com/a/146245421_120809. 
19. Sichuan Yahua Industiral Group Co., Ltd. Articles of Association（July 
2016） .（DB/OL） .[2017-06-21].Stock Code：002497 
20. Tianjing Asymchem Laboratories Inc. Articles of Association（December 
2016） .（DB/OL） .[2017-06-21].Stock Code：002821 
21. Xinjiang Tecon Animal Husbandry Bio-Technology Co,. Ltd. Articles of 
Association（Revised November 2016）.（DB/OL）.[2017-06-21].Stock Code：
References 
239 
002100 
22. Yueyang Xingchang Petro-chemical Co.,ltd. Articles of Association（April 
2016） .（DB/OL） .[2017-06-21].Stock Code：000819 
23. Zhejiang Zhenyuan Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd. Articles of Association（April 
2017） .（DB/OL） .[2017-06-21].Stock Code：000705 
24. Zhuhai Letong Ink Co., Ltd. Articles of Association（ April 2016） .
（DB/OL） .[2017-06-21].Stock Code：002319 
25. China Baoan Group Co., Ltd. Articles of Association（ June 2016）
（DB/OL） .[2017-06-21].Stock Code：000009 
26. Blackcow Food Company Limited. Articles of Association（October 2016）
（DB/OL） .[2017-06-21].Stock Code：002387 
 
F. Judicial Precedents and Trials 
1. Ampol Petroleum V RW Millers. 
2. Aronson v. Lewis 473 A.2d 805 (1984), at IV.A. 
3. Cayne And Another V Global Natural Resources Plc. 
4. Criterion Props. Plc v. Stratford U.K. Props. LLC. 
5. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America 481 U.S. 69 (1987). 
6. Edgar v. Mite Corp 457 U.S. 624 (1982). 
7. Kaplan v. Centex Corp., Del.Ch., 284 A.2d 119, 124 (1971). 
8. Litwin v.Allen N.Y. Sup. Ct., 25 N.Y.S.2d 667 (1940). 
9. Moran v. Household International , 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985). 
10. Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 
1994). 
11. Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Incorporated, Fed Sec L Rep 
(CCH) 94, 514; affd 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989). 
12. Puma v. Marriott, Del.Ch., 283 A.2d 693, 695 (1971). 
13. R.v.Panel on Take-Overs and Mergers,[1987]Q.B.815,841,842. 
References 
240 
14. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 
1986). 
15. Robinson v. Pittsburgh Oil Refinery Corp., Del.Ch., 126 A. 46 (1924). 
16. The Charitable Corporation v Sutton (1742) 26 ER 642.  
17. Unitrin, Inc. v. American General Corp., 651 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1995). 
18. Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985). 
19. Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d at 782. 
 
 
